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This dissertation analyzes market and environmental effects of alternative U.S. and Brazilian 
biofuel policies. Although we focus on corn- and sugarcane-ethanol, the advanced analytical 
framework can easily be extended to other biofuels and biofuel feedstocks, such as biodiesel and 
soybean. The dissertation consists of three chapters. 
The first chapter develops an analytical framework to assess the market effects of a set of 
biofuel policies (including subsidies to feedstocks). U.S. corn-ethanol policies are used as an 
example to study the effects of biofuel policies on corn prices. We determine the ‘no policy’ 
ethanol price, analyze the implications for the ‘no policy’ corn price and resulting ‘water’ in the 
ethanol price premium due to the policy, and generalize the surprising interaction effects 
between mandates and tax credits to include ethanol and corn production subsidies. The effect of 
an ethanol price premium depends on the value of the ethanol co-product, the value of 
production subsidies, and how the world ethanol price is determined. U.S. corn-ethanol policies 
are shown to be a major reason for recent rises in corn prices. The ethanol policy-induced 
increase in corn prices is estimated to be 33 – 46.5 percent in the period 2008 – 2011.  
The second chapter seeks to answer the question of what caused the significant increase 
in ethanol, sugar, and sugarcane prices in Brazil in the period 2010/11 to 2011/12. We develop a 
general economic model of the Brazilian fuel-ethanol-sugar complex. Unlike biofuel mandates 
  
 
 
and tax exemptions elsewhere, Brazil’s fuel-ethanol-sugar markets and fuel policies are unique 
in that each policy, in this setting, theoretically has an ambiguous impact on the market price of 
ethanol and hence on sugarcane and sugar prices. Our empirical analysis shows that there are two 
policies that seemingly help the ethanol industry but do otherwise in reality: a low gasoline tax 
and a high anhydrous tax exemption result in lower ethanol prices. On the other hand, as 
expected, higher mandates, gasoline prices, and tax exemptions for hydrous ethanol lead to 
higher ethanol and sugar prices. Eliminating Brazilian ethanol tax exemptions and mandates 
reduces ethanol prices by 21 percent in 2010-11, which is very similar to the estimated effects of 
U.S. ethanol policies in the same time period. However, the marginal changes in Brazilian 
policies on ethanol prices between 2010-11 and 2011-12 are small both individually and 
collectively. The observed market changes can only be explained by outward shifts in fuel 
transportation and sugar export demand curves, and reduced sugarcane supply due to bad 
weather.  
In the third chapter, we investigate whether U.S. corn ethanol saves greenhouse gas 
emissions relative to the gasoline it is assumed to replace one-to-one (on an energy equivalent 
basis). This chapter shows that ethanol policies generate far greater carbon leakage in the fuel 
market than in the agricultural market, where leakage occurs in the form of land use change. 
Carbon leakage in the fuel market due to a tax credit is always greater than that of a mandate, 
while the combination of a mandate and subsidy generates greater leakage than a mandate alone. 
We show that corn-ethanol does not meet the U.S. EPA’s sustainability threshold, regardless of 
the biofuel policy and whether one includes emissions from land use change. This result makes 
the controversy over how to measure land use change inconsequential. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
The Theory of Biofuel Policy and Food Grain Prices1 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a framework of analysis to assess the market effects of 
alternative biofuel policies, including subsidies to feedstocks. The model developed here uses 
U.S. corn-ethanol policy as an example, but the model can be applied to any country or biofuel 
policy. The analysis follows the pioneering work of de Gorter and Just (2008, 2009a,b), Lapan 
and Moschini (2009) and Cui et al. (2011). The key contributions of this paper are (1) a formula 
to determine the ‘no policy’ ethanol price; (2) the implications for the ‘no policy’ corn price and 
resulting ‘water’ in the ethanol price premium due to the policy2; (3) a generalization of the 
unique interaction effects between mandates and tax credits to include ethanol and corn 
production subsidies. All these issues have major implications for the market effects of ethanol 
policies, particularly on the level of corn prices, which is the focus of this paper.3 
The consensus in the extensive literature on the causes of the recent increase in grain 
prices is that biofuel policies are only one of a multitude of contributing factors. For example, 
Headey and Fan (2010) attribute the price increase to a “near-perfect storm” of factors, and 
Abbott et al. (2008, 2009) argue that it has been a “complex maze of factors” where “one cannot 
with any precision partition the effects” and although biofuels are one “driver” among many, 
only 25 percent of biofuels’ contribution to the price increase is due to biofuel policies.4 
However, Wright (2011) argues that most of the factors falling under the rubric of a “near-
                                                 
1 An earlier version of this chapter has been published as: Drabik, D. 2011. The Theory of Biofuel Policy and Food 
Grain Prices. Working Paper 2011-20. Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell 
University. December.  
2 ‘Water’ refers to the gap between the ‘no policy’ ethanol price and the intercept of the ethanol supply curve. 
3 The analysis in this paper has also implications for environmental aspects of ethanol policy; we do not analyze 
those here, however. 
4 Abbott et al. (2008, 2009) and Hochman et al. (2011) provide extensive surveys on the different papers analyzing 
the effects of biofuel policies on food grain prices. 
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perfect storm” do not in the aggregate explain the recent grain price spikes. He concludes that the 
two recent grain price spikes were caused by new demand for biofuels. 
Because the demand for biofuels is greatly influenced by existing biofuel policies, the 
purpose of this paper is to develop an analytical framework to analyze the linkage between 
biofuel policies and food grain commodity prices. The theory explains the price linkages among 
biofuels, their feedstocks, and fossil fuel (oil), under alternative policies. It also provides the 
means to determine which policy—a tax credit or a blend mandate— is determining the ethanol 
price in the United States or in the rest of the world. 
This paper extends the previous literature (e.g., de Gorter and Just 2008, 2009a,b; Yano 
et al. 2010) in several ways. First, we explicitly take into account the role of the ethanol co-
product in modeling the price (i.e., vertical) and quantity (i.e., horizontal) links between the fuel 
and corn markets. Because the ethanol co-product (Dried Distillers Grains with Solubles) is a 
very close substitute to yellow corn in feed consumption, DDGS replaces yellow corn when it is 
returned to the corn market, and the ethanol industry effectively obtains more feedstock than 
initially available. We call this the ‘recycling effect’ of the ethanol co-product. The recycling 
effect has important implications not only for the ethanol supply curve per se – it increases its 
elasticity – but also for the analysis of the price effects of biofuel policies and the volatility of 
corn prices due to exogenous shocks in the oil and/or corn markets. 
Second, unlike the current literature, which has focused primarily on the analysis of 
biofuel mandates, blender’s tax credits and ethanol import tariffs, we model and analyze two 
additional policies: ethanol and corn production subsidies.5 In this paper, we do not analyze the 
effects of the import tariffs, but we extensively study the corn price effects of the remaining four 
                                                 
5 This is surprising, given that corn production subsidies in the United States totaled 21.1 billion dollars from 2006 
to 2010 (Environmental Working Group) and ethanol production subsidies are estimated to be 1.35 billion dollars in 
2008 alone (Koplow 2009). 
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biofuel policies (blend mandate, blender’s tax credit, ethanol and corn production subsidies) and 
their interactions. We find that if the biofuel mandate binds (i.e., it determines the ethanol market 
price), the other three policies actually subsidize consumption of the fuel blend, so these policies 
effectively subsidize gasoline consumption. However, the market mechanism differs between the 
policies’ effects on ethanol and corn prices. For example, a blenders’ tax credit increases the 
ethanol market price, while the ethanol production subsidy reduces it; nevertheless, both policies 
increase the corn market price. 
Third, we revisit the concept of ‘water’ in the biofuel price premium, which exists when 
the intercept of the ethanol supply curve is above the ethanol price that would prevail without 
any of the four biofuel policies in place. We find that the previous literature has ignored the 
effect of the volumetric fuel tax on ‘water’ and thus underestimated the rectangular deadweight 
costs of biofuel policies. We also find that the ethanol price premium, defined as the difference 
between the observed corn price and a hypothetical ethanol price (in dollars per bushel) that 
would cause consumers to purchase ethanol in the absence of biofuel policies, is high because of 
(1) lower mileage per gallon of ethanol relative to gasoline and (2) a ‘penalty’ on ethanol due to 
the volumetric fuel tax. For example, we estimate the ethanol price premium to be $3.51/bu in 
2008, which is 83 percent of the ethanol market price. However, the impact of the price premium 
on the corn market price is decreased by the ‘water’ which exists in the ethanol price premium; 
although the impact of biofuel policies on the corn price is significant, the impact is smaller than 
it would be if there were less ‘water’. 
The paper is outlined as follows. The next section develops the link between ethanol and 
corn prices (i.e., the vertical link). The link between corn and ethanol quantities (i.e., the 
horizontal link) is analyzed in Section 3 where we also explain the ‘recycling effect’ of the 
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ethanol by-product. In Section 4, we provide an intuitive graphical analysis of the effects of 
various combinations of the mandate and tax credit with production subsidies on both ethanol 
and corn prices. In Section 5, we revisit the concept of ‘water’ in a biofuel price premium and 
show why the previous literature has underestimated the rectangular deadweight costs associated 
with ‘water.’ Section 6 provides an empirical illustration of our theoretical results. The last 
section provides concluding remarks. 
2. The Link between Ethanol and Corn Prices 
One bushel of yellow corn produces β = 2.8 gallons of ethanol (Eidman 2007). The lower energy 
content of ethanol relative to gasoline translates into lower mileage from ethanol, meaning that 
one gallon of ethanol yields only λ = 0.7 times the miles obtained from one gallon of gasoline (de 
Gorter and Just 2008).6  Therefore, one bushel of yellow corn yields λβ = 1.96 gasoline miles-
equivalent gallons (GMEGs) of ethanol.  
When a bushel of yellow corn is processed into ethanol, γ = 0.3047 bushels of a co-
product known as Dried Distillers Grains with Solubles (DDGS) are also produced. The DDGS 
are a valuable substitute for yellow corn in non-ethanol uses of corn, especially as animal feed. 
The market price of the co-product has historically differed from that of yellow corn. Denoting 
PC as the corn market price and r as the relative price of DDGS and yellow corn, the price of 
DDGS is r×PC. Let the processing cost associated with one GMEG of ethanol be c0. Following 
de Gorter and Just (2008) and Cui et al. (2011), we assume that c0 is a fixed constant. Ethanol is 
assumed to be produced by perfectly competitive firms that use a constant returns to scale 
                                                 
6 Using average EPA data, de Gorter and Just (2008) take into account the difference between ethanol and gasoline 
on the basis of miles traveled per gallon of each fuel, rather than by the energy content of the two fuels. This yields a 
value of λ = 0.7. If one simply uses the differential energy content, then the value of λ equals 0.66 (=75,700 
Btu/115,000 Btu; Btu – British thermal unit) (http://bioenergy.ornl.gov/papers/misc/energy_conv.html). Most of the 
literature uses the latter value.  
7 Ethanol production generates approximately 17 pounds of DDGS per bushel of corn (56 pounds); hence, γ = 17/56 
≈ 0.304 (Cui et al. 2011). 
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technology. These assumptions about the technology and market structure imply zero marginal 
profits; the zero-profit condition is equivalent to the following relationship between ethanol and 
corn prices: 
                                                       0
1
0E C C
r
P P P c

 
                                                      (1) 
where PE  denotes the price received by ethanol producers (in dollars per GMEG). The second 
term in equation (1) represents the cost of yellow corn needed to produce one GMEG of ethanol; 
the third term is the revenue received for the ethanol co-product; the last term is the processing 
cost. 
By rearranging equation (1), we obtain the link between ethanol and corn prices8 
                                                              0
1
C EP P c
r


 

                                                        (2) 
Under the given ethanol production assumptions, equation (2) governs the ethanol-corn price 
relationship under any biofuel policy.  
How Well Does the Theoretical Corn-Ethanol Price Linkage Reflect Reality? 
The corn-ethanol price relationship (2) hinges on the assumption that ethanol producers operate 
under zero profits. Although this assumption is justifiable in the long run when the industry is 
likely to be in equilibrium, the observed data for recent years reveal that ethanol producers 
mostly earn positive profits. Given this discrepancy, which could be due to either capacity 
constraints or a short operation period for ethanol plants, any further analysis requires a 
comparison of how well the theoretical corn price predicts reality. 
                                                 
8 Alternatively, the zero profit condition per bushel of yellow corn is:
0 0E C CP P r P c     , where 0c denotes a 
processing cost per bushel of yellow corn. The corn market price can then be expressed as:
   0 1C EP P c r    . Comparing the preceding expression with that in equation (2) yields: 0 0c c . 
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The first column of Table 1 shows the average profit per gallon of ethanol production by 
year. We use monthly data on ethanol operating margins from March 2005 to December 2011, 
from the Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) of Iowa State University.9  
 
Profits are significantly positive in the first three years when many ethanol production facilities 
opened. Overall, however, profits tend to decline over the sample period, reaching almost zero in 
2010. To test the validity of the relationship in (2) empirically, we rewrite it as 
                                                                 
0 1
C
E
P
P c r



 
                                                            (3) 
The left-hand side of equation (3) is solely determined by the observables, while the right-hand 
side consists of fixed parameters10, except for the relative price of DDGS to ethanol, r, because 
this may vary over time. Since CARD does not report prices for DDGS, we use data for 
Lawrenceburg, Indiana as reported by the USDA AMS. The processing cost c0 includes capital 
costs of $0.25 per gallon and other operating costs which average$0.52 per gallon over the 
period of observation. All data reported in Table 1 pertain to a physical gallon of ethanol and are 
not adjusted for energy content. To obtain GMEG counterparts of the reported data, the values in 
                                                 
9 http://www.card.iastate.edu/research/bio/tools/hist_eth_gm.aspx 
10 These parameters are assumed to be fixed at least over the period analyzed.  
Table 1. Comparison of  the Observed and Predicted Ethanol-Corn Price Conversion Factors
Year Profit per gal. (π) PC/(PE-c0) PC/(PE-c0-π) β/(1-rγ)
(1) (2) (4) (6)
 2005* 0.48 2.55 4.32 4.27
2006 1.21 1.44 4.15 3.96
2007 0.32 2.95 3.91 3.78
2008 0.07 3.62 3.80 3.84
2009 0.11 3.53 3.91 3.78
2010 0.08 3.60 3.86 3.85
2011 0.13 3.48 3.72 3.92
Note: * March - December
           ** The ethanol production subsidy is considered only for 2008 - 2011.
           The values are simple averages for a given year. They are not adjusted for mileage of ethanol. 
Source: Calculated based on "Historical Ethanol Operating Margins" data from table "All Historical Data",
http://www.card.iastate.edu/research/bio/tools/hist_eth_gm.aspx
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the first column should be divided by λ = 0.7, and those in the remaining columns should be 
multiplied by λ = 0.7. 
The second column of Table 1 corresponds to the left-hand side of equation (3). Compare 
this to the last column, which represents the predicted vertical (i.e., price) ethanol-corn 
conversion factor. The discrepancies are comparatively large, especially for 2005 to 2007. These 
discrepancies can be explained by the observed non-zero profits. After 2008, profits are close to 
zero and the values in the second and forth columns get much closer. Indeed, if we treat the 
observed profits as measurement error, and we take this into account by adjusting the left-hand 
side of equation (3) (with the corrected values shown in the third column), then in the period 
2008 – 2011, both sides of equation (3) are almost the same (see the highlighted part of Table 
1).11 The remaining discrepancies are attributable to different measurement locations for the corn 
and DDGS prices – Iowa and Indiana, respectively. The good match between the predicted and 
observed corn prices in the period 2008 – 2011 is advantageous because we seek to analyze the 
recent increases in food grain commodity prices which manifested mainly in 2008 and 2011. 
3. The Link between Ethanol and Corn Quantities 
We have shown that, under plausible assumptions, a long run relationship between corn and 
ethanol prices can be expected. To derive the price link, we assumed that 2.8 gallons of ethanol 
(1.96 GMEGs) are produced from one bushel of yellow corn. Is this technological parameter the 
only conversion factor that governs the quantity link between the corn and ethanol markets? The 
answer is ‘yes’ if we analyze the observed quantity of corn used in ethanol production, but it is 
‘no’ if we wish to consider the intended quantity of corn to be used in ethanol production. The 
reason is intuitive: because the ethanol co-product (DDGS) is a very close substitute for yellow 
                                                 
11 Mallory et al. (2010) propose that the link between the corn and the energy sectors is manifested in the prices of 
commodity futures with at least one year until maturity. Although we use spot prices to test the predictive ability of 
equation (2), we obtain a close match between the predicted and observed (spot) prices. 
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corn in feed or food consumption, a market effect of DDGS being returned to the corn market is 
that it replaces yellow corn; since DDGS decreases the amount of yellow corn consumed for 
non-ethanol uses, more yellow corn is available for ethanol production. This means that the one 
bushel of yellow corn “initially intended” to be used for ethanol effectively produces more than 
2.8 gallons of ethanol. We call this the recycling effect of the ethanol co-product. On the other 
hand, the ratio of ethanol production and the quantity of corn used for ethanol is empirically 
shown to be very close to 2.8; this is because the observed data are inclusive of the recycling 
effect. We now explain these important concepts in greater detail.  
Consider the corn market depicted in the first panel of Figure 1. If no ethanol is produced, 
corn is only used as feed or food. In this case, the non-ethanol corn market price PNE is where the 
supply curve of yellow corn SC intersects the demand curve for non-ethanol corn DNE. The 
demand curve represents aggregate (domestic and export) demand for feed/food corn facing U.S. 
farmers. At corn prices greater than PNE, there is an excess supply of yellow corn, which can be 
feedstock for ethanol production. Notice that because yellow corn and DDGS are very close 
substitutes, the demand curve DNE should be thought of as demand for yellow corn and possibly 
DDGS as well.12 In the absence of ethanol production, DNE denotes demand for yellow corn, but 
if ethanol is produced, DNE represents aggregate demand for yellow corn and DDGS. 
 
                                                 
12 Typically, yellow corn and DDGS differ in their nutritional value. This makes them imperfect substitutes. In order 
to model the market effects of the ethanol co-product consistently, we assume the relative price of DDGS and 
yellow corn reflects the nutritional differences. Therefore, after adjusting the physical quantity of DDGS by the 
relative price, yellow corn and DDGS are modeled as perfect substitutes. 
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Figure 1. Equilibrium in the Corn and Ethanol Markets with a  
Binding Blender’s Tax Credit
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Assume that an ethanol blenders’ tax credit ct determines the ethanol market price EP , 
where the tilde sign denotes that the blenders’ tax credit and ethanol market price are expressed 
in dollars per gallon of ethanol. Following de Gorter and Just (2008), the ethanol market price 
under a binding tax credit is 
                                                            1E G cP P t t                                                           (4) 
where PG is the market price of gasoline (oil) and t is a volumetric fuel tax. Dividing equation (4) 
by λ, similarly to Cui et al. (2011), we express the ethanol market price in dollars per GMEG 
                                                            
1
1E G cP P t t

 
    
 
                                                       (5) 
where E EP P   and c ct t  . The ethanol market price given by equation (5) is depicted in the 
second panel of Figure 1 (and also in Figures 2 and 3).13 Equations (4) and (5) reflect the idea 
that if consumers are free to choose between ethanol and gasoline for fuel, and if they buy fuel 
based on the miles traveled that it provides, then they will buy ethanol only if its price (adjusted 
for the fuel tax and tax credit) per GMEG equals the price of gasoline. (See section 5 for more 
details). 
 Using equation (2), we can convert the ethanol price PE to the corn price PC, equal to the 
price of ethanol in dollars per bushel, PEb.
14 If the corn market price is directly linked to the 
ethanol price through equation (2) and the latter is linked to the gasoline price through equation 
(5), then any supply or demand shifts in the corn market15 have no effect on the corn price unless 
                                                 
13 The graphical analysis in Figures 2 to 7 assumes that the gasoline supply is perfectly elastic. We relax this 
assumption in the appendices. 
14 To avoid the “discontinuities” along the vertical axis in the second panel of our figures (because the price 
conversion factor is greater than one), we assume that the corn market price is the same as the ethanol price, except 
for their different units. This simplifies the graphical exposition but has no impact on the qualitative results. 
15 These shifts can be, for example, due to exchange rate depreciation, bad weather, income growth in developing 
countries, or biodiesel mandates that increase soybean prices (Heady and Fan 2010; Abbott et al. 2008, 2009; 
Hochman et al. 2011). 
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they also affect oil prices. This is the situation which existed when the now phased-out U.S. tax 
credit was determining the ethanol price prior to 2008. The only effect these shifts have when 
ethanol prices are tied directly to oil prices through the tax credit is to change the non-ethanol 
corn price (i.e., PNE) and hence the level of ‘water’16 in the ethanol price premium due to the tax 
credit. This point seems to be forgotten in the debate about the influence of the ethanol tax credit 
or ethanol price premium due to the mandate on corn prices.  
In Figure 1, the quantity of yellow corn produced at price PC is QC and the amount to be 
consumed for non-ethanol uses is CNE.
17 Thus, for any price PC (which is linked to the ethanol 
price), the horizontal difference between SC and DNE in the first panel of Figure 1 represents the 
quantity of yellow corn for ethanol production. Multiplying this quantity by the parameter β = 
2.8, we obtain a corresponding ethanol supply curve SE0, constructed under the assumption of no 
ethanol co-product. Note that the intercept of SE0, adjusted for units, corresponds to PNE. Without 
any co-product, the quantity of ethanol would be QE0, equal to β times the distance CNEQC . 
However, we must take the co-product of ethanol production into consideration when modeling 
the corn market. 
The high degree of substitutability between DDGS and yellow corn (after we account for 
their slight difference in nutritional value) implies a one-to-one replacement of yellow corn, 
which would otherwise be consumed as feed, by the ethanol co-product. As noted above, we call 
this the ‘recycling effect’ of the ethanol co-product. In a first step of recycling, DDGS enter the 
feedstock and the yellow corn it displaces is made available for ethanol production. This process 
continues until the marginal amount of yellow corn that is displaced by DDGS and made 
                                                 
16 The concept of ‘water’ in a biofuel policy is explained in section 5. 
17 At this stage, we aim to determine the quantity of yellow corn to be used in ethanol production at price PE. When 
ethanol is produced and the co-product returned in the corn market, then DNE represents demand for corn equivalent, 
and the implicit demand for yellow corn for non-ethanol use is derived. 
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available for ethanol production is approximately zero.18 In equilibrium, one initial bushel of 
corn is associated with 1/(1–rγ) ≈ 1.35 bushels of yellow corn processed for ethanol.19 By 
definition, the size of the recycling effect is equal to the total quantity of the co-product in 
equilibrium; that is, rγ/(1–rγ)
 
= 0.35 additional bushels of corn for non-ethanol consumption are 
associated with one initial bushel of yellow corn.20 
After accounting for the recycling effect, one initial bushel of yellow corn yields λβ/(1-rγ) 
= 2.65 GMEGs of ethanol.21 Therefore, the equilibrium supply of ethanol, denoted by SE1 in the 
second panel of Figure 1, is given by 
                                                       
1
E E C C NE CS P S P D P
r


 

                                           (6) 
where the ethanol and corn prices are linked through equation (2). The implicit demand curve for 
yellow corn DNEY in the first panel of Figure 1 is derived by subtracting the quantity of the co-
product from DNE at any corn price above PNE. By construction, DNEY is flatter than DNE.  
                                                 
18 Formally, denote X as the initial quantity of yellow corn for ethanol production. The physical quantity of the co-
product is then γX. Adjusting this quantity for the nutritional value, we obtain rγX. This is the quantity that replaces 
yellow corn one-to-one. Thus, the additional quantity of yellow corn is rγX. The physical quantity of the co-product 
corresponding to the additional yellow corn is rγ2X, which diverts another r2γ2X bushels of yellow corn to ethanol 
production. This process continues until the ethanol co-product replaces no additional corn. As a result, the total 
quantity of yellow corn actually used in ethanol production is  2 2 ... 1X r X r X X r       , while the 
quantity of (corn-equivalent) co-product is  2 2 ... 1r X r X r X r       . This process is bound to converge 
because 0 < rγ  < 1. 
19 In the illustrative calculations of the recycling effect, we use data for 2009. 
20 The analysis above needs to be adjusted if there is an upper bound on the share of the co-product in DNE, perhaps 
because of some technological limits. Denote this upper bound as . As long as the equilibrium quantity of the co-
product satisfies        1 C C NE C NE Cr S P D P D P            , the technological constraint is not binding, and 
the recycling effect is fully effective, meaning that the maximum quantity of ethanol is produced from a given 
quantity of yellow corn. However, if in a potential equilibrium:        1 C C NE C NE Cr S P D P D P            , 
then the technological constraint binds, and the maximum quantity of ethanol produced is:
      ' ' 'NE C C C NE CD P S P D P      , which is always less than the quantity given by identity (6). We use the 
primes on the corn price to indicate that the corn price would differ from the case when the constraint is not binding. 
Whether the constraint is binding or not is an empirical question. 
21 If not adjusted for the relative miles traveled per gallon of ethanol and gasoline, one bushel of yellow corn 
produces 3.78 gallons of ethanol. 
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Alternatively, the effects of the co-product on the corn market can be viewed as a pivot of 
the corn supply curve SC; DDGS increase the supply of corn in corn-equivalent (nutritional 
units). Thus, the curve SCE in the first panel of Figure 1 denotes the quantity of corn-equivalent 
available at any corn price above PNE and is constructed as the horizontal summation of SC and 
the corresponding quantity of the co-product. Mathematically, 
                                                
1
CE C C C C C NE C
r
S P S P S P D P
r


  

                                   (7) 
for C NEP P . Since 0CE C C CdS dP dS dP  , for a given corn price, the supply curve of corn-
equivalent is always flatter than the supply of yellow corn. 
A closer inspection of equations (2) and (6) suggests that biofuel policies affect ethanol 
production or corn production and consumption indirectly: ethanol prices affect corn prices; corn 
prices affect corn production and feed/food consumption; corn supply and non-ethanol corn 
demand together determine the quantity of ethanol produced. 
To illustrate the concepts related to the horizontal (quantity) link between corn and 
ethanol, we use data from the USDA for marketing years 2005/06 to 2009/10 (seen in columns 
one through five in Table 2).22  
                                                 
22 The data come from the USDA’s WASDE (World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates) reports. 
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All reported data relate to yellow corn. The quantities of domestic non-ethanol corn and 
corn for exports combined represent the quantity CNEY in the first panel of Figure 1. Similarly, 
the observed quantity of corn for ethanol production corresponds to the distance CNEYQC; in order 
to compute the counterfactual quantity of corn that would be processed into ethanol in the 
absence of the co-product, the values in the fourth column of Table 2 would be multiplied by (1 
– rγ) ≈ 0.74. 
 The sixth column presents empirical estimates of the corn-ethanol quantity conversion 
factor, β, which are obtained by dividing the actual ethanol production by the quantity of corn 
used for ethanol. The empirical ratio ranges between 2.74 and 2.81 and closely resembles the 
commonly-used conversion factor of β = 2.8. This is in accord with our earlier hypothesis that 
the distance CNEYQC in Figure 1 represents the effective quantity of corn used for ethanol 
production (i.e., it reflects the recycling effect). 
 The last column in Table 2 presents estimates of the elasticities of the ethanol supply 
Table 2. Estimated Elasticity of the Implied Ethanol Supply Curve
Million gallons
Supplya
Domestic non-
ethanol useb
Exportsc
Ethanolc 
QCE
Ethanol prod.d 
QE
QE/QCE
Elasticity of ethanol 
supplye
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2005-06 11270 7533 2134 1603 4500 2.81 10.86
2006-07 11210 6966 2125 2119 5883 2.78 8.06
2007-08 12738 7251 2437 3049 8367 2.74 6.50
2008-09 12057 6498 1849 3709 10305 2.78 4.57
2009-10 13065 6495 1980 4591 12670 2.76 4.09
Source: Calculated based on
a Supply = production + imports + beginning stocks - ending stocks; USDA WASDE reports, various years.
b Domestic non-ethanol use = feed and residual + food, seed and industrial - ethanol for fuel; USDA 
WASDE reports, various years.
c USDA WASDE reports, various years.
d EIA - Table 10.3 Fuel Ethanol Overview, http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/index.cfm#renewable
e Formula for elasticity of the ethanol supply curve is in Appendix 3.
Million bushels
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curve SE.
 23 Consistent with the recent literature (de Gorter and Just 2009b; Cui at al. 2011), we 
assume that the elasticities of corn supply, domestic demand and foreign demand are equal to 
0.23, – 0.2 and –1.5, respectively. In Table 2, the ethanol supply curve becomes less elastic over 
time, largely because the share of corn supply used for ethanol is increasing.  
4. Ethanol and Corn Production Policies Combined 
To keep the graphical analysis as simple as possible, we analyze at most two policies at a time 
and abstain from depicting the supply of corn-equivalent, SCE. More specifically, Figures 2 and 3 
investigate the effects of combining a binding tax credit with a corn production subsidy or an 
ethanol production subsidy, respectively. Figure 4 analyzes the impact of a binding ethanol blend 
mandate alone; Figures 5 through 7 analyze the binding ethanol blend mandate in combination 
with a tax credit, corn production subsidy, or ethanol production subsidy, respectively. In all 
figures, we assume a fixed oil (gasoline) price; we assume that the demand for non-ethanol corn 
is the horizontal sum of domestic and export demand for corn, inclusive of the ethanol co-
product. We analyze an endogenous oil price in an extended model presented in the appendices. 
In the numerical simulations we will assume an endogenous gasoline (oil) price, international 
trade in gasoline (oil) and corn, as well as a fuel tax in the domestic economy, but these features 
are omitted from the graphical representation of the model for tractability.  
A Blender’s Tax Credit with a Corn Production Subsidy 
Consider a corn production subsidy sC that lowers the marginal cost of yellow corn production in 
the first panel of Figure 2; this is depicted as a shift of SC to S'C. As a result, the threshold price of 
corn for ethanol production to occur decreases from PNE to P'NE, giving rise to a new supply of 
ethanol S'E. Given that the ethanol market price is constant (since it is linked to  
                                                 
23 The formula for the elasticity of the ethanol supply curve is derived in Appendix 3. 
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the oil price), the corn production subsidy causes ethanol production to increase from QE to Q'E. 
One might ask, why should ethanol producers produce more ethanol if they receive the same 
market price? 
 To answer this question, note that without the corn production subsidy, the quantity of 
corn for ethanol production is given by the distance CYQC, which corresponds to the excess corn 
supply at price PC. The corresponding profits are given by 
                                                 0E C C Y CP P r P c C Q                                                  (8) 
and are equal to zero because of the zero-profit condition in ethanol production. (See the 
discussion of equation (1)). 
Suppose for a moment that an ethanol producer does not change its level of production 
when the subsidy is introduced. Demand for corn is still equal to CYQC. With the subsidy, 
however, the same quantity of corn can be purchased at a lower price denoted by P'C (not shown 
in Figure 2); the market price of ethanol remains unchanged at EP . Hence, under the corn 
production subsidy the profits for an ethanol producer which does not change its production level 
when the subsidy is introduced are 
                                             0' ' ' 0E C C Y CP P r P c C Q                                               (9) 
because 'C CP P . 
The positive economic profits in (9) imply that new producers will enter the market or the 
incumbent producers will expand their production; more corn will be consumed for ethanol 
production. Competition ensures that the producers will bid up the price of corn back to PC as 
more corn is processed for ethanol. 
Because the corn market price in Figure 2 does not change with the corn production 
subsidy, consumption of corn for feed/food use does not change either. This situation motivates 
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the notion of the recycling effect because it is probably the only explanation for how the corn 
and ethanol markets can be in equilibrium under this situation.  The additional corn produced as 
a result of the corn production subsidy shifts to ethanol production, followed by yellow corn 
obtained by changing the composition of non-ethanol consumption due to additional quantity of 
the co-product induced by the corn production subsidy. 
In the fuel market, the corn production subsidy does expand the supply of ethanol (curve 
S'E), but the ethanol market price does not change unless the increase in ethanol production 
affects the world oil price (we relax the assumption of an exogenous gasoline price in the 
appendices). Corn producers receive the market price of corn plus the corn production subsidy. 
Note also that because the corn production subsidy expands ethanol production, more co-product 
is returned to the corn market which crowds out yellow corn from feed/food consumption; hence 
the total consumption of yellow corn decreases to C'Y. 
A Blender’s Tax Credit and an Ethanol Production Subsidy 
The market effects of an ethanol production subsidy sE are presented in Figure 3. The subsidy 
reduces the marginal cost of ethanol production, and the vertical shift of the ethanol supply curve 
from SE to S'E in the second panel of Figure 3 expands ethanol production from QE to Q'E. 
Ethanol producers receive a price that exceeds the ethanol market price by the full amount of the 
subsidy— i.e., they receive E EP s . However, since ethanol producers earn zero profits, the 
subsidy is essentially a transfer to corn producers, who expand their production from QC to Q'C. 
Consumers of corn for feed/food are worse off because of an increase in the corn market price 
from PC to P'C in the first panel of Figure 3.
24  
 The comparative statics for the blender’s tax credit and ethanol production subsidy model  
                                                 
24 As the consumption of non-ethanol corn contracts, it is more likely that the technological constraint considered in 
footnote 24 will be binding, if it exists. 
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with an endogenous gasoline price and a binding tax credit are presented in Table 3 (see 
Appendix 1 for details). The tax credit decreases the gasoline and fuel prices and increases the 
ethanol and corn prices. These price effects occur because the tax credit induces greater ethanol 
production and hence also greater corn production. Ethanol crowds out gasoline in the fuel blend, 
so gasoline production declines and the gasoline price decreases. As we show in Appendix 1, 
under a binding tax credit the fuel price equals the sum of the gasoline price and the fuel tax. A 
corn production subsidy has a negative effect on all prices. It decreases the marginal cost of corn 
production, and ethanol production expands as the corn price decreases. The ethanol production 
subsidy lowers the marginal cost to fuel blenders by reducing the ethanol market price, and it 
expands ethanol production because producers receive the ethanol market price plus the subsidy. 
The ethanol production subsidy increases the corn price because the corn price is linked, as per 
equation (2), to the price received by ethanol producers. 
Table 3. Comparative Statics Results for a Binding Tax 
               Credit 
 Effect on 
PG PE PF PC 
C
h
an
g
e 
in
 
tc – + –  + 
sC – – – – 
sE – – – + 
Source: Appendix 1 
 
 Although a blender’s tax credit is an ethanol consumption subsidy, it has the same 
quantitative effect on the corn price as an ethanol production subsidy. This occurs even though 
the former increases the ethanol market price and the latter reduces it. 
A Biofuel Blend Mandate 
Instead of focusing on the economics of a biofuel blend mandate depicted in the second panel of 
Figure 4, we analyze the market effects of a mandate on the corn and fuel market  
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equilibria.25 An exposition of the economics of a biofuel blend mandate is provided by de Gorter 
and Just (2009b). The purpose of Figure 4 is to explicitly show how the ethanol co-product 
recycling effect changes the ethanol market price (introducing the recycling effect is equivalent 
to assuming a flatter ethanol supply curve, S'E in the first panel): the recycling effect reduces the 
price from PE to P'E. The recycling effect also decreases the corn market price. Compare this 
with the recycling effect’s impact on ethanol and corn prices in Figure 1, where a blender’s tax 
credit is the binding biofuel policy—in that situation, the recycling effect’s flattening of the 
ethanol supply curve has no effect on ethanol or corn prices. Notice also that under the binding 
blend mandate, the ethanol market price coincides with the price received by ethanol producers. 
Even though the supply of yellow corn is decreased relative to a situation where the co-product is 
not considered (Q'C < QC), the final quantity of ethanol is higher, Q'E > QE. This occurs because 
of the co-product’s recycling effect.  
A Binding Biofuel Blend Mandate and a Tax Credit 
In Figure 5, we show the impact of adding a blender’s tax credit tc to a binding blend mandate. A 
blender’s tax credit is an ethanol consumption subsidy. It reduces the fuel price and increases the 
ethanol market price. This is shown in the second panel of Figure 5; the marginal cost of the final 
fuel blend SF shifts down by an amount equal to the tax credit after adjusting for the share of 
ethanol in the fuel, αtc. As a result, the pre-tax credit fuel price PF decreases to P'F and fuel 
consumption increases. Corresponding to increased fuel consumption is increased ethanol 
production. Because the ethanol supply curve is unaffected by the introduction of the tax credit, 
more ethanol will be produced only if the market price of ethanol increases from PE to P'E. The 
corn market price increases to P'C following the increase in the ethanol price. However,  
                                                 
25 In Figure 4, DF, SF and PF denote the demand, supply and price of fuel (which is a blend of gasoline and ethanol); 
α denotes the percentage of ethanol in the blend. 
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the corn price increase is likely to be small because demand for fuel is known to be inelastic and 
the ethanol supply curve is more elastic than shown here because of the recycling effect. Figure 5 
also shows that addition of the tax credit to a binding blend mandate does not increase the 
ethanol price by the full amount of the tax credit. Therefore, the price premium due to the 
mandate and the tax credit are not additive – an argument previously made in de Gorter and Just 
(2009b). 
A Binding Biofuel Blend Mandate and a Corn Production Subsidy 
The effects of a corn production subsidy sC on the corn supply curve and demand for non-ethanol 
yellow corn with a binding blend mandate, as shown in the first panel of Figure 6, are identical to 
the corn production subsidy’s effects with a binding tax credit, as depicted in Figure 2. The corn 
production subsidy makes the ethanol supply curve shift to S'E, which in turn decreases the 
marginal cost of the fuel blend supply to S'F. The intersection of the new fuel supply curve with 
the fuel demand curve DF constitutes a new equilibrium in the fuel market with a lower fuel price 
P'F and higher fuel consumption C'F. Thus, the corn production subsidy implicitly subsidizes fuel 
consumption. Since the quantities of fuel and ethanol are linked in equilibrium through the blend 
mandate, production of ethanol increases to Q'E. The new ethanol market price P'E corresponds 
to the new quantity of ethanol on the supply curve S'E, and the price is decreased by the subsidy. 
Owing to the link between ethanol and corn prices, consumers of corn for non-ethanol use enjoy 
a lower market price P'C, while corn producers receive the market price plus the subsidy. 
The fuel market effects shown in the second panel of Figure 6 are similar but not 
identical to the effects in Figure 2 (where ethanol producers receive a lower market price and yet 
supply more). Without the subsidy, profits per bushel of corn to ethanol producers are  
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                                                        0E C CP P r P c                                                        (10) 
and with the corn production subsidy they are 
                                                        0' ' ' 'E C CP P r P c                                                       (11) 
Hence, the effect of the corn production subsidy on ethanol producers’ profits can be written as 
                                                   ' 1 'E E C CP P r P P                                                (12) 
Because a production subsidy always lowers the market price of the subsidized product (corn, in 
this case), it must be the case that ' 0C CP P  . Assume for a moment that ethanol producers do 
not change their production of ethanol when the corn production subsidy is introduced. In this 
case, 'E EP P and   1 ' 0C Cr P P       . Akin to the situation in Figure 2, positive 
economic profits and competition among ethanol producers must eventually result in increased 
ethanol production. However, because the derived demand of fuel blenders for ethanol, FD , has 
a negative slope, more ethanol will be blended only if the fuel price decreases. For the fuel price 
to decrease, the price of ethanol must decrease.26 Ethanol producers will expand their production 
and the ethanol price will decrease until zero profits are made, or in terms of equation (12) 
                                                ' 1 ' 0E E C CP P r P P  
 
                                            (13) 
In the new equilibrium which is established, the negative term in equation (13) is exactly offset 
by the positive term. 
A Binding Biofuel Blend Mandate and an Ethanol Production Subsidy 
An ethanol production subsidy sE lowers the marginal cost of ethanol production; this is 
represented as a shift in SE to S'E in the second panel of Figure 7. The production subsidy  
                                                 
26 Recall that the fuel price is a weighted average of the ethanol and gasoline market prices. The weights are the 
shares of ethanol and gasoline, respectively, in the final fuel mix. 
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decreases the market price of ethanol, making the fuel blend cheaper; this is depicted as a 
decrease in the marginal cost for blenders – a shift in SF to S'F. As a result, the fuel price 
decreases from PF to P'F, while fuel consumption increases from CF to C'F. In this respect, the 
ethanol production subsidy has the same effect as an ethanol blender’s tax credit (a consumption 
subsidy). The market price of ethanol (paid by blenders) decreases, as shown by the intersection 
of S'E with the quantity of ethanol supporting the market equilibrium at the fuel price P'F. 
However, the ethanol price received by ethanol producers is equal to the market price of ethanol 
plus the production subsidy. The corn market price P'C is therefore linked to P'E. Notice that the 
price premium due to the blend mandate and the ethanol production subsidy are additive, unlike 
the case of the mandate combined with the tax credit. The increase in the corn price due to the 
corn production subsidy is likely to be small because of relatively inelastic demand for fuel and 
relatively elastic ethanol supply. 
 The comparative statics results for the binding blend mandate, which are presented in 
Table 4, are mostly identical to those for a binding tax credit. One important difference is that 
when the mandate binds, the tax credit, corn production subsidy and ethanol production subsidy 
increase the gasoline price. With a binding mandate, all of these policies implicitly subsidize fuel 
consumption, so they increase gasoline consumption and increase the gasoline price. An increase 
in the blend mandate always reduces the gasoline price because it is an implicit tax on gasoline, 
but the mandate’s impacts on the market prices of fuel, ethanol, and corn are ambiguous. The 
ambiguous effect of a blend mandate on the fuel price has been well documented (de Gorter and 
Just 2009b; Lapan and Moschini 2009), but we are not aware of any previous work which shows 
that the mandate’s effect on the ethanol price is also ambiguous. Intuitively (although not 
completely technically correct), because the mandate can either increase or decrease the fuel 
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price, it can also increase or decrease the equilibrium fuel quantity. But because the quantity of 
ethanol is linked to the quantity of fuel through the blend mandate, the ethanol quantity effect 
can be either positive or negative. If the ethanol quantity decreases, the ethanol price also 
decreases. 
Source: Appendix 2 
Table 4. Comparative Statics Results for a Binding Blend 
               Mandate 
 Effect on 
PG PE PF PC 
C
h
an
g
e 
in
 tc + + – + 
sC + – – – 
sE + – – + 
α – +/– +/– +/– 
 
5. Revisiting the Concept of ‘Water’ in a Biofuel Policy 
Consider a situation where ethanol consumption is not mandated but instead an ethanol 
consumption subsidy (either a blender’s tax credit or a tax exemption) is provided to incentivize 
consumers to purchase the biofuel. Consistent with the previous literature (e.g., de Gorter and 
Just 2008, 2009a; Holland et al. 2009; Lapan and Moschini 2009; Cui et al. 2011; Chen et al. 
2011), we assume that do not demand the fuel per se, but rather they demand vehicle-miles-
traveled which the fuel produces for final consumers. Therefore, if we assume that consumers 
have a choice between gasoline and ethanol, and a gallon of ethanol provides 70 percent of the 
vehicle-miles-traveled provided by a gallon of gasoline, they will be willing to pay for one gallon 
of ethanol only 70 percent of the price at which they can purchase one gallon of gasoline. We 
also assume that blenders view ethanol and gasoline as perfect substitutes. Therefore, they will 
be indifferent between the two fuels only if the price per mile is equalized; this is how equation 
(5) is derived. In the analysis to follow, we consider an endogenous gasoline price. 
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Since equation (5) determines the ethanol market price with a binding blender’s tax 
credit, and because it assumes the tax credit is the only biofuel policy, by setting the tax credit 
equal to zero we can obtain a hypothetical ethanol market price
*
EP that would render consumers 
indifferent between ethanol and gasoline without any biofuel policy 
                                                  
* * 1 1E GP P t

 
   
 
                                                        (14) 
The term
*
GP  in equation (14) denotes the gasoline price that would exist in the fuel 
market in the absence of biofuel policies; notably, if no ethanol were produced, then
*
GP would be 
determined by the intersection of the demand and supply curves for gasoline (or excess demand 
and supply curves under international trade). Note that since
* *
E GP P , ethanol production is 
unlikely to occur at 
*
GP because the intercept of the ethanol supply curve has historically been 
above the gasoline market price. However, if the gasoline price were high enough, ethanol 
production would occur without any policy intervention.  The hypothetical ethanol market price
*
EP  does not depend on any biofuel policy; therefore, it can be used to compare market effects of 
various biofuel policies. Notice also that owing to the absence of the tax credit, the hypothetical 
no-policy ethanol price can be relatively low. 
 The concept of ‘water’ in a biofuel policy arises from two prices already discussed: the 
intercept of the ethanol supply curve, PNE, and the hypothetical gasoline energy-equivalent 
ethanol market price
*
EP . Intuitively, if PNE is greater than
*
EP , then part of the corn price increase 
caused by a biofuel policy will have no actual effect on market outcomes; until the corn price 
increases enough to fill the gap between PNE and
*
EP , no biofuel is actually produced. The gap 
between PNE and
*
EP  is referred to as ‘water’ in the biofuel price premium. This means, within the 
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range of water, a biofuel policy has no effect on corn prices. Intuitively, ‘water’ can be thought 
of as representing the waste of societal resources that occurs when production of ethanol is 
incentivized through biofuel policies despite it costing more than gasoline to produce.  
In defining the ‘water’ in a biofuel policy price premium, the previous literature (de 
Gorter and Just 2008, 2009a) does not take into account the penalty due to the volumetric fuel 
tax.27 They define water w as the difference between the intercept of the ethanol supply curve 
corresponding to the non-ethanol corn price PNE and the blenders’ gasoline (oil) price PGb 
(expressed in dollars per bushel) under a biofuel policy  
                                                   0
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
                                         (15) 
In reality, the fuel tax represents a significant share of the gasoline price (even more so in the 
European Union than in the United States); ignoring the presence of a volumetric fuel tax will 
bias our estimate of water and the rectangular deadweight cost of a biofuel policy) significantly. 
To illustrate the concepts, we take the tax credit as an example. The logic outlined below also 
holds for a binding biofuel mandate and any combination of biofuel policies. 
Assume that no biofuel policy exists in Figure 1. Corresponding to this situation is an 
ethanol price
*
EP defined by equation (14).
28  Consider a sufficiently large tax credit tc that 
increases the ethanol market price to PE, where PE is defined by equation (5). Recalling that 
‘water’ is the range of ethanol prices where a biofuel policy has no impact on the corn price, we 
                                                 
27 In this respect, the previous literature describes ‘water’ in the special case of a zero fuel tax. 
28 The price of gasoline is depicted below the intercept of the ethanol supply curve in Figure 1 only. In other figures, 
the price of gasoline is above PNE and hence, we do not depict ‘water’. This does not affect our graphical analyses of 
the other figures. 
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can depict ‘water’ in Figure 1 as the difference between the intercept of the ethanol supply curve 
PNE (in dollars per GMEG) and
*
EP
29  
                                            * *
1
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
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                                     (16) 
’Water’ is also equal to the distance ci in the second panel of Figure 1. This distance is always 
greater than (or equal to) the distance cg, which corresponds to the ‘water’ as originally defined 
by de Gorter and Just (2008, 2009a). Since de Gorter and Just relate water to the endogenous 
gasoline price rather than 
*
EP , they ignore the role of the volumetric fuel tax. The penalty to fuel 
blenders due to the volumetric fuel tax is represented by the distance ei, and it corresponds to the 
second (negative) term on the right-hand side of equation (14). 
 The price premium of a biofuel policy is defined as the difference between the producer 
price of ethanol (which is equal to its production cost) and the hypothetical gasoline-equivalent 
ethanol price
*
EP . Since the gasoline-equivalent ethanol price is biofuel policy-invariant, the price 
premium is only affected by a change in the ethanol producer price. Note that if an ethanol 
production subsidy is present, it generates two unique effects, unlike other policies analyzed: the 
ethanol market price decreases (perhaps only marginally), and the corn price (which is linked to 
the ethanol producer price) increases. 
It follows from Figure 1 that with an endogenous gasoline price, the price premium due 
to a blenders’ tax credit is always less than the tax credit itself. The price premium must be 
smaller because the tax credit causes the gasoline (oil) price to decrease, which moderates the tax 
credit’s effect on the ethanol price. In contrast, if the gasoline price did not decrease, the ethanol 
                                                 
29 Because the prices and quantities of corn and ethanol are linked through equations (2) and (6), respectively, the 
amount of water in either market is the same, up to measurement units. We measure water in the fuel market. 
 33 
 
price would be above PE in the second panel of Figure 1. The ethanol price premium equals the 
tax credit only if the gasoline price is exogenous. 
 Explicitly embedded in equation (14) is the fact that the fuel market is distorted by the 
volumetric fuel tax: consumers are willing to pay a price for fuel (inclusive of the tax) according 
to the mileage the fuel produces, but blenders are taxed on fuel by volume. To attain a distortion-
free economy, a tax credit equal to the penalty due to the volumetric fuel tax would be required30 
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                                                            (17)  
It could be argued that ‘water’ should be calculated with respect to a distortion-free price of 
ethanol which equals the price of gasoline when expressed in dollars per GMEG. However, 
calculating ‘water’ using this ethanol price and the de Gorter and Just formula in (15) above is 
equivalent to calculating ‘water’ using equation (16) above, which incorporates the penalty to 
fuel blenders as a separate term.  Whether we adjust the tax credit to reflect the volume-energy 
disparity between ethanol and gasoline or we adjust the calculation of ‘water’ directly, we will 
obtain the same value for ‘water’ which captures the difference between ethanol and gasoline 
costs to society. 
 Closely related to the concept of ‘water’ in the biofuel price premium are the 
‘rectangular’ deadweight costs (DWC) associated with the biofuel policy. Rectangular DWC 
represent a pure welfare loss—a transfer of resources that does not benefit anyone. Consider the 
second panel of Figure 1: area abkl represents the taxpayers’ cost of the tax credit that gets 
transferred to corn producers, area abcd, and domestic fuel consumers (and foreign oil 
consumers but that is accounted for in the terms of trade effect), area efgh. The area that is not 
attributable to anyone is equal to cdef + ghkl and represents the rectangular DWC of the 
                                                 
30 This tax credit can be thought of as a Pigovian subsidy. 
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blenders’ tax credit. Notice that area cdij, which represents the waste of resources associated 
with ‘water’, is equal to cdef + ghkl.31 This means that the rectangular DWC can be calculated as 
the level of ‘water’ multiplied by the quantity of ethanol produced. This method of rectangular 
DWC calculation holds for any biofuel policy. 
 The preceding analysis has assumed that consumers can buy a fuel with any share of 
ethanol as long as the price per mile traveled is equalized between ethanol and gasoline. In 
reality, however, this assumption is mostly not met, because currently most gas stations offer 
premixed blends of fuel containing 10, 15, or 85 percent ethanol. Blenders are essentially 
“watering down the scotch” by adding ethanol to the fuel blend. Consumers of the fuel blend 
face a de facto mandate, because they want to buy fuel according to miles but are not able to. 
Moreover this mandate exists even if the actual share of ethanol in the total fuel is greater than a 
specified blend mandate. The difference between the observed ethanol market price and the 
hypothetical price represents a price premium due to no choice of fuel. 
 We have described so far how ethanol production could arise solely because of a biofuel 
policy and how a biofuel policy could be in place but not be binding. A third market equilibrium 
could also arise where there is no biofuel policy in place but ethanol is still consumed. For 
example, this equilibrium obtained in 2006 after the ban of MTBE, a low-cost alternative to 
ethanol. This is also a de facto mandate because ethanol is consumed in a certain proportion to 
gasoline when it is used as an oxygenator and octane enhancer. This proportion is typically lower 
than the blend mandate levels which have prevailed under U.S. policy. It could therefore be 
argued that the ethanol market price under this scenario should be the no-policy counterfactual, 
rather than the hypothetical gasoline-equivalent price defined by equation (14). In this case, our 
definition of ‘water’ represents an upper bound on the true level of ‘water’ in the blend mandate. 
                                                 
31 Figure 1 is not drawn to scale. This equality follows from the equations defining PE and PE*. 
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However, it could be the case that ethanol for oxygenator and octane enhancer purposes would 
be produced from sugar cane in Brazil rather than from corn in the U.S., in the absence of U.S. 
biofuel policies. During the past decades, sugar-cane ethanol from Brazil has been less expensive 
in the U.S. than corn ethanol, even taking into account transportation costs to the U.S. This 
suggests that the U.S. ethanol import tariffs (equal to about 58 percent) would have been an 
important driver in influencing corn prices in the past, had there not been any other ethanol 
policy in place. 
6. An Empirical Illustration 
For each year between 2008 and 2011, inclusive, we calibrate the model of the corn and fuel 
markets in the U.S. described above, using the data and parameters detailed in Appendix 4.32 We 
calibrate each year’s model to four simultaneous biofuel policies: a binding blend mandate 
combined with a blenders’ tax credit, an ethanol production subsidy and a corn production 
subsidy. We assume that the supply and demand curves in all markets exhibit constant price 
elasticities. The U.S. corn production supplies domestic demand for yellow corn and export 
demand, as well as demand for corn to be used in ethanol production. The U.S. is an importer of 
gasoline and is assumed to consume its entire production of ethanol; the rest of the world is 
assumed to consume only gasoline. Using the calibrated model, we simulate various 
combinations of the four biofuel policies. 
Table 5 provides an overview of the observed gasoline and ethanol market prices – PG 
and PE, respectively – as well as their hypothetical counterparts, PG* and PE*, which would 
prevail in the fuel market if no biofuel policies were in place.  
                                                 
32 All models are calibrated to the observed market prices and quantities, with the assumption that the blend mandate 
determines the ethanol market price. This assumption is likely to be violated in the recent period, however, because 
the ethanol market price seems to have been determined outside of the United States since the end of 2010; hence, 
the U.S. mandate is dormant (i.e., does not determine the market price). The violation of this assumption does not 
affect our major conclusions because most of our results are derived directly from the observed data. 
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For convenience, gasoline and ethanol prices are expressed in dollars per gallon (that is, we do 
not adjust the ethanol price for mileage). The hypothetical gasoline prices are always greater than 
the observed prices; the difference ranges between two and four percent. This occurs because 
existing biofuel policies effectively impose a tax on gasoline producers, resulting in a lower 
gasoline price relative to a no policy counterfactual. This suggests that although recent biofuel 
policies do have an impact on world gasoline prices, this effect is not very significant – in terms 
of price – owing to a small share of ethanol in total world fuel consumption.33 However, it 
should come as no surprise that even a small change in the gasoline price can result in sizable 
monetary effects because of the large quantity of gasoline that is consumed. 
The hypothetical ethanol market prices are significantly less than the observed ethanol 
prices; the hypothetical gasoline-equivalent ethanol price is about 70 percent of the observed 
ethanol price over the analyzed period (its fraction is smallest in 2009 at 63 percent). The 
hypothetical prices are less than the observed ones because, unlike the observed prices, they do 
not include the blender’s tax credit. Note that the hypothetical ethanol price PE* is significantly 
                                                 
33 In reality, however, biofuel policies are likely to have a stronger reduction effect on the world gasoline price 
because the United States is not the only ethanol producer; this is in contrast to our simplifying assumption in the 
paper. 
Table 5. Gasoline and Ethanol Prices
2008 2009 2010 2011
Observed gasoline price PG ($/gal) 2.57 1.76 2.17 2.90
Hypothetical gasoline price (no ethanol) PG* ($/gal) 2.64 1.81 2.24 3.00
Observed ethanol price PE ($/gal) 2.47 1.79 1.93 2.70
Hypothetical ethanol price (no biofuel policy) PE* ($/gal) 1.70 1.12 1.42 1.96
Observed ethanol price PE ($/GMEG) 3.53 2.56 2.76 3.86
Hypothetical ethanol price (no biofuel policy) PE* ($/GMEG) 2.42 1.60 2.03 2.80
Hypothetical ethanol price as % of observed ethanol price 69 63 74 72
Hypothetical ethanol price as % of hypothetical gasoline price 92 88 91 93
Source: caluclated
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below the hypothetical gasoline price PG
* because of the fuel tax; the difference is equal to 
0.43×fuel tax. 
In Table 6, we present key corn and ethanol prices expressed in dollars per bushel over 
the period 2008 -2011. Not surprisingly, corn prices are the highest in 2008 and 2011, that is, 
years that saw spikes in food commodity prices. The intercept of the ethanol supply curve 
corresponds to the intersection of the corn supply curve and the total demand curve for non-
ethanol corn. The intercept value varies over time, reaching peaks in 2008 ($3.59/bu) and 2011 
($4.11/bu).  
 
Although the peaks coincide with the years when commodity prices spiked, it is not necessarily 
the case that the observed commodity price spikes were caused only by shifts (shocks) in corn 
demand or supply. For example, when the tax credit determines the ethanol price (and the oil 
supply is perfectly elastic), any shock in the corn market actually has no effect on the corn price 
unless the resulting change in ethanol production affects the oil price. The third row of Table 6 
presents the hypothetical ethanol market price expressed in dollars per bushel (a counterpart to 
Table 5). 
The ethanol policy price premium (measured in dollars per bushel) in Table 6 is obtained 
Table 6. Ethanol Price Premium due to All Four Policies ($/bushel)†
2008 2009 2010 2011
Observed corn price PC 4.78 3.75 3.83 6.01
Non-ethanol corn price PNE 3.59 2.70 2.67 4.11
Hypothetical ('no-policy') ethanol price P*E 1.27 0.69 1.34 2.55
Ethanol price premium = PC - P*E 3.51 3.06 2.49 3.47
Net change in corn price ΔPC = PC - PNE 1.19 1.04 1.16 1.91
Source: calculated
Note: † The four policies are: blender's tax credit, blend mandate, ethanol production subsidy, 
          corn production subsidy.
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by subtracting the values in the third row from those in the first row. 34 There are at least four 
reasons why the ethanol price premium of the combination of the existing biofuel policies is so 
high. First, the blend mandate is binding (by assumption). Second, consumers have a limited 
choice of fuel blends because there are few E-85/E-15 retail outlets; this imposes a de facto 
mandate in which the actual blend is greater than the mandated one. Third, the MTBE ban and 
Clear Air Act also constitute a de facto mandate, and the import tariff on sugar-cane ethanol 
supports it. Fourth, the world ethanol price may be determined outside of the United States (as it 
seems to have been the case since the end of 2010); if the world price exceeds the ethanol price 
which the U.S. biofuel policies would generate, then the price premium which results is even 
greater than it would be with the mandate alone (de Gorter et al. 2011). 
 Finally, in the last row of Table 6 we report the effect on the corn market price which 
can be attributed to the existing biofuel policies. These values are obtained by taking the 
difference between the observed corn price and the intercept of the ethanol supply curve (in 
dollars per bushel).35 In absolute terms, the biofuel policies have the greatest effect on corn 
prices in 2008 and 2011, although the 2011 effect is more than 60 percent greater than the 2008 
effect. 
In Table 7, we provide a breakdown of how individual biofuel policies change the corn 
price relative to a no-policy scenario (PNE) in which the corn price is determined by the 
intersection of the corn supply curve and demand for non-ethanol corn. If the corn price is below 
PNE  (because of ‘water’), then no ethanol production would have occurred in that year. This 
seems to be the case in 2008 and 2009, as the first line of Table 7 documents. For example,  
                                                 
34 As explained above, the presence of biofuel policies reduces the gasoline price, and if this price were used to 
compute the hypothetical ethanol price, then the price premium would increase. 
35 The price PNE is simulated. It is the corn price that equilibrates the U.S. corn supply with the sum of the domestic 
and export demand for yellow corn under no ethanol production. 
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$/bu % change $/bu % change $/bu % change $/bu % change
Tax credit -0.18 -5.0 -0.13 -4.8 0.49 18.4 0.33 8.1
Mandate 1.26 35.1 1.10 40.8 1.21 45.3 1.96 47.7
       Mandate differential 1.44 40.0 1.23 45.6 0.72 26.8 1.63 39.6
Tax credit & ethanol production subsidy 0.31 8.6 0.35 12.9 0.96 36.1 0.81 19.7
Mandate & ethanol production subsidy 1.26 35.1 1.11 40.9 1.21 45.3 1.96 47.7
       Mandate differential 0.95 26.5 0.76 28.0 0.25 9.3 1.15 28.1
Tax credit & corn production subsidy -0.18 -5.0 -0.13 -4.8 0.49 18.2 0.33 7.9
Mandate & corn production subsidy 1.18 32.8 1.04 38.4 1.15 43.1 1.90 46.2
       Mandate differential 1.36 37.8 1.16 43.1 0.67 24.9 1.57 38.3
Tax credit & ethanol production subsidy & corn production subsidy 0.30 8.4 0.34 12.7 0.96 35.8 0.80 19.5
Mandate & ethanol production subsidy & corn production subsidy 1.18 32.9 1.04 38.4 1.15 43.2 1.90 46.2
       Mandate differential 0.88 24.5 0.69 25.7 0.20 7.3 1.10 26.7
Mandate & tax credit & ethanol production subsidy & corn 
production subsidy
1.19 33.0 1.04 38.6 1.16 43.4 1.91 46.5
Note:  The discrepancies are due to rounding errors.
Source: calculated
2008 2009 2010 2011
Change in the corn price relative to a no policy scenario
Table 7. Estimated Change in the Corn Price due to Different Policies
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because the per-bushel-of-corn equivalent of the 2008 55.8¢/gal blenders’ tax credit is $2.14/bu 
and the ‘water’ associated with the tax credit alone is $2.32/bu (not reported), the net effect of 
the introduction of the tax credit on corn prices is negative ¢18/bu. On the other hand, the 
mandate alone would increase corn prices above their baseline values by $1/bu – $2/bu, 
depending on the year. In other words, the mandate increases corn prices by $0.72/bu – $1.63/bu 
more than the tax credit does (this is denoted as the ‘mandate differential’ in Table 7). If one 
adds the ethanol production subsidies, this differential declines to $0.25/bu – $1.15/bu; the 
differential decreases even more, to $0.20/bu – $1.10/bu, if both corn and ethanol production 
subsidies are added to the tax credit or mandate. The final row in Table 7 shows that corn prices 
increase by $1.04/bu – $1.91/bu with the corn production subsidy and the three ethanol policies 
combined (the actual policy case), which corresponds to a 33 – 46.5 percent increase in the corn 
price.  
Table 8 presents estimates of rectangular deadweight costs for the observed baseline (all 
four policies combined) in the years 2008 – 2011. For example, the values in the first row 
suggest that the rectangular deadweight costs totaled 21.3 billion dollars (in nominal terms) over 
the four years analyzed. The deadweight loss due to the volume/miles penalty constitutes a 
significant share of the total rectangular deadweight costs – between 25 and 43 percent, 
depending on the year. The rectangular DWC represent approximately ten percent of the value of 
corn production between 2008 and 2011.  
 
Table 8. Estimates of Rectangular Deadweight Costs for the Observed Baseline (All Four Policies)
2008 2009 2010 2011
Rectangular DWC (bil. $) 5.84 5.87 4.44 5.15
% of DWC due to penalty 24.50 27.64 42.42 36.85
% of rectangular DWC in value of corn production 9.69 11.47 8.55 6.57
Source: calculated
Note: DWC - Deadweight costs
        The four policies are: blender's tax credit, blend mandate, ethanol production subsidy, corn production subsidy.
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7. Conclusions 
This paper has developed a framework to analyze the market effects of biofuel mandates, 
consumption subsidies (U.S. blender’s tax credit or EU tax exemption) and production subsidies 
for ethanol or corn. We have focused on the impact of these policies on corn and ethanol prices. 
By properly taking into account the market effects of the ethanol co-product, we conclude that 
the ethanol supply curve is more elastic than previously thought, because the co-product’s 
existence makes more yellow corn available to ethanol producers (at any corn price above the 
intercept of the ethanol supply curve).  
We determined a hypothetical ethanol market price that would make consumers 
indifferent between purchasing gasoline or ethanol if there were no biofuel policies and 
consumers demanded fuel according to its mileage. This ‘no policy’ ethanol market price has 
important implications for ‘water’ (the gap between the intercept of the ethanol supply curve and 
the hypothetical ethanol price) associated with a biofuel policy because this price is much lower 
than the gasoline price, and the gasoline price has been used to calculate ‘water’ in the previous 
literature. Thus, our results show that the rectangular deadweight costs associated with ‘water’ 
were underestimated in the previous literature. We also analyzed the unique interaction effects 
between mandates and tax credits and included ethanol and corn production subsidies. All these 
issues have major implications for the market effects of ethanol policies, particularly on the level 
of corn prices. 
We found that the ethanol price premium is very high; for example, in 2008 it is 
estimated to be $3.51/bu, which represents 83 percent of the ethanol market price. However, the 
impact of the price premium due to biofuel policies on corn market prices, although still 
significant, is tempered by the existence of ‘water’. 
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It is to be noted that the level of ‘water’, apart from the hypothetical ethanol price, 
significantly depends on the non-ethanol corn price, that is, the price that would clear the corn 
market if no ethanol were produced. The non-ethanol corn price is affected, among other factors, 
by U.S. biofuel policies aimed at non-corn ethanol biofuels (such as biodiesel or cellulosic 
ethanol) and by biofuel policies in the rest of the world. The former effect occurs because of 
competition for agricultural land which increases the marginal cost to corn producers, shifts the 
corn supply curve up, and thus increases the non-ethanol corn price. The latter effect is reflected 
in demand for U.S. yellow corn exports. Because biofuel policies in the rest of the world increase 
the export demand for yellow corn facing the United States, they increase the non-ethanol corn 
price. Hence, the impact of U.S. biofuel policies on corn prices would have been larger if there 
had been no biofuel policies in the rest of the world. 
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Appendix 1. Model with an Endogenous Gasoline Price and a Binding Tax Credit 
For analytical tractability, we present a model for a closed economy, assuming a zero fuel tax. 
All quantities are expressed in gasoline miles equivalent gallons (GMEGs). Ethanol and gasoline 
are assumed to be perfect substitutes, and consumers can choose which fuel to purchase. They 
value the fuel for miles traveled. Consumers are willing to buy ethanol if the price of the fuel 
blend (gasoline and ethanol) PF equals the price of gasoline PG; the latter must equal the ethanol 
market price PE less the blender’s tax credit tc 
                                                                F G E cP P P t                                                        (A1.1) 
The corn market price PC is linked to the ethanol market price, the ethanol production 
subsidy sE and the ethanol processing cost c0 
                                                           0
1
C E EP P s c
r


  

                                              (A1.2) 
where λ denotes miles traveled per gallon of ethanol relative to gasoline; β is the number of 
gallons of ethanol produced from one bushel of corn; r denotes the relative price of the ethanol 
co-product (DDGS) and corn; and γ denotes the share of corn that gets returned back to the 
market as the co-product.  
The equilibrium condition for the fuel market is given by 
                                                         G G E E E F FS P S P s D P                                           (A1.3) 
where SG, SE and DF denote gasoline supply, ethanol supply and fuel demand, respectively.  
                  Finally, ethanol supply  E E ES P s is defined by the identity 
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where SC denotes corn supply, DNE is non-ethanol corn demand (inclusive of any co-product) and 
sC denotes a corn production subsidy.  
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Totally differentiating the system of equations (A1.1 – A1.4) and solving, we obtain 
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The set of derivatives (A1.5) reveals that if the tax credit is the binding biofuel policy, 
then an increase in the tax credit reduces the gasoline and fuel prices but increases the corn and 
ethanol market prices. An increase in the ethanol production subsidy reduces the market price of 
fuel, gasoline and ethanol by the same amount, and it increases the market price of corn 
(derivatives (A1.6)). The last set of derivatives (A1.7) shows that the prices of fuel, gasoline and 
ethanol decrease by the same amount with an increase in the corn production subsidy; unlike 
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with an ethanol production subsidy, a corn production subsidy always reduces the corn market 
price. The tax credit and the ethanol production subsidy have the same effect on the corn price. 
Combining the derivatives from (A1.6) and (A1.7) yields 
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This means that the probability that a corn production subsidy has a greater effect on the corn 
market price than an equivalent ethanol production subsidy increases as the corn supply becomes 
more elastic and gasoline supply and demand become less elastic. The same holds for a 
comparison of the corn production subsidy and the tax credit. 
Similarly, the probability that a tax credit has a greater effect on the ethanol market price 
than an ethanol production subsidy increases as the gasoline supply and demand become more 
elastic and the corn supply and demand become more inelastic 
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 Finally, the tax credit and the ethanol production subsidy have the same effect on 
gasoline and fuel prices. 
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Appendix 2. Model with an Endogenous Gasoline Price and a Binding Blend Mandate 
The model considers a blend mandate, tax credit, ethanol production subsidy and corn 
production subsidy. The blend mandate is assumed to be binding, that is, it determines the 
ethanol market price. The first three equations are the same as in Appendix 1  
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r
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                              (A2.3) 
With a blend mandate α equal to the share of ethanol in the final fuel blend, the fuel price 
is equal to a weighted average of ethanol and gasoline prices; the weights are equal to α and (1- 
α), respectively 
                                                           1F E c GP P t P                                                 (A2.4) 
Ethanol supply must also satisfy 
                                                             E E E F FS P s D P                                                 (A2.5) 
Totally differentiating the system of equations (A2.1 – A2.5) and solving for the desired 
derivatives, we obtain 
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Appendix 3. Elasticity of the Ethanol Supply Curve  
Following Figure 1, the ethanol supply curve can be written as 
                                                 
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where the right-hand side denotes the difference between the domestic corn supply SC and  
domestic non-ethanol corn demand DD and foreign export demand DX  (both inclusive of the 
ethanol co-product). Note that identity (A3.1) is an extended version of equation (6).  
Totally differentiating and rearranging identity (A3.1), we obtain 
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The link between ethanol and corn prices implies 
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which, when substituted into (A3.2), produces 
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Manipulating equation (A3.4), we arrive at  
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and after the conversion into elasticities and rearrangement we obtain 
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where ƞSE, ƞSC, ƞDD and ƞDX denote the elasticities of ethanol supply, corn supply, domestic non-
ethanol corn demand and export corn demand, respectively.                
Finally, reapplying the definitions of PC and SE, the ethanol supply elasticity simplifies to 
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where E
CS denotes the quantity of corn (exclusive of the recycling effect) used as an input to 
ethanol production. Note that the bracketed term in equation (A3.7) is an elasticity of the ethanol 
supply expressed in bushel terms. Because  0 1E EP P c  , such an elasticity is always lower 
than its proper counterpart in the ethanol space. 
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Appendix 4. Data Sources 
 
Parameter/Variable Source/explanation 
U.S. fuel tax American Petroleum Institute 
U.S. blender’s tax credit Federal plus state tax credit 
Ethanol production subsidy Koplow (2009) 
Corn production subsidy Environmental working group 
U.S. gasoline consumption Energy Information Administration 
Foreign gasoline consumption Energy Information Administration 
U.S. gasoline supply Energy Information Administration 
Foreign gasoline supply Energy Information Administration 
Ethanol consumption Energy Information Administration 
Gasoline price 
Unleaded gasoline average rack prices 
F.O.B. Omaha, Nebraska  
Price of fuel calculated 
U.S. production of yellow corn USDA WASDE reports (various years) 
U.S. domestic consumption of non-
ethanol yellow corn 
USDA WASDE reports (various years) 
U.S. corn exports USDA WASDE reports (various years) 
Quantity of corn for ethanol 
production 
USDA WASDE reports (various years) 
Ethanol price 
Ethanol average rack prices F.O.B. Omaha, 
Nebraska 
Lambda (λ) de Gorter and Just (2008) 
Beta (β) Eidman (2007) 
Gamma (γ) Eidman (2007) 
Relative price of ethanol cy-product 
and corn 
Lawrenceburg, Indiana as reported by the USDA 
AMS 
Ethanol processing cost calculated 
Corn market price 
ERS of USDA, (average prices received by farmers, 
United States) 
U.S. fuel demand elasticity (-0.20) de Gorter and Just (2009b) 
Foreign fuel demand elasticity 
(-0.32) calculated to obtain the elasticity of the 
excess supply of gasoline equal to 3 (Cui et al. 2011)  
U.S. gasoline supply elasticity (0.20) de Gorter and Just (2009b) 
Foreign gasoline supply elasticity (0.15) assumed  
Elasticity of yellow corn supply (0.23) de Gorter and Just (2009b) 
Elasticity of U.S. demand for non-
ethanol yellow corn 
(-0.20) de Gorter and Just (2009b) 
Elasticity of yellow demand for U.S. 
corn exports 
(-1.5) Cui et al. (2011) 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
An Economic Model of Brazil’s Ethanol-Sugar Markets and Impacts of Fuel Policies36 
 
1. Introduction 
Brazil has developed a unique system of producing competing tradable products – sugar and 
ethanol – from non-traded sugarcane. Modern “flex-plants” can produce either sugar or ethanol 
from sugarcane, and within a production year, can switch between the two products up to about 
65 percent of a product.37 Furthermore, flex-plants can extract up to 18.6 liters of ethanol per 
tonne of sugarcane processed into sugar from molasses, a by-product of sugar production (Gopal 
and Kammen 2009).38 The total output of sugarcane is shown in Figure 1; ethanol’s share of 
sugarcane has ranged between 45 and 57 percent in the past 7 years.39 
Brazil is the biggest sugar producer in the world (25 percent of the world total), the 
biggest sugar exporter (60 percent of the world total) and until overtaken by the United States 
recently, the world’s biggest ethanol producer and exporter. Hence, the world prices of sugar and 
ethanol would be expected to be directly linked and not diverge significantly, given the 
economics of sugarcane processing in Brazil. Figure 2 gives evidence that this may be the case. 
Brazil is regarded as the lowest cost producer of ethanol in the world but since mid-2009 to mid-
2012, Brazil’s market price of ethanol was higher than the U.S. price and Brazil became a major 
importer of U.S. ethanol. The reasons for high ethanol prices in Brazil in this time period are 
manifold, including strong domestic demand for transportation fuels, increasing demand for 
                                                 
36 This chapter is forthcoming as a World Bank working paper and has been coauthored with Harry de Gorter, Erika 
M. Kliauga, and Govinda R. Timilsina. 
37 About 300 plants today are flex-plants, accounting for a substantial share of total sugarcane processed. The other 
plants are either dedicated to ethanol only (125 plants in 2010, UNICA) or sugar only (12 plants, UNICA). 
38 Molasses is therefore, in theory, a very important source of ethanol because if 55 percent of total sugarcane 
production were devoted to sugar production, and every plant maximized ethanol production from molasses, then 25 
percent of total ethanol production in Brazil could come from molasses alone. But plants dedicated to just sugar 
production find it uneconomical to extract ethanol from molasses. 
39 Another unique aspect of processing sugarcane into ethanol and sugar is that the bagasse (leftover biomass) can be 
burned for electricity production to be used by the plant itself with excess electricity sold on the grid.   
 55 
 
 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
Figure 1. Brazil Sugarcane Processed (million tonnes)
Sugar Ethanol
Source: CONAB (Brazilian Food Supply Agency)
 56 
 
 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
N
o
v
 2
0
0
2
 =
 1
Figure 2. Brazilian Ethanol versus Sugar Prices (Index)
Ethanol Price São Paulo Sugar Price São Paulo
 57 
 
sugar with world record sugar prices, and bad weather affecting the sugarcane harvest at home 
and abroad. The impact of the Brazilian government’s ethanol policies is also blamed for 
inadequate domestic supplies of ethanol due to lack of investment since the 2008 financial crisis 
(Jank 2012), an issue we will pay close attention to in this paper.  
Brazil has two different demand curves for ethanol in transportation fuel: an anhydrous 
ethanol and gasoline fuel mixture (which we define as “fuel” in this paper) that all cars can 
consume, and E-100 (100 percent hydrous ethanol) which only flex cars40 can consume (23 
percent of total cars in Brazil are currently flex but this fraction is growing fast and over 80 
percent of new car sales in the past two years were flex).41 Strong domestic demand for ethanol 
in Brazil is due to growing incomes. Recently, about 50 percent of total gasoline plus ethanol 
consumed in Brazil has been ethanol, compared to 10 percent in the United States. Gasoline 
consumption in Brazil increased by 2 bil. liters from 2000/01 to 2009/10 but ethanol 
consumption increased by a whopping 24 bil. liters. But since 2009, total ethanol consumption 
(hydrous and anhydrous) has declined by almost 20 percent (Figure 3) as rising ethanol prices, 
along with lower gasoline taxes and gasoline prices being pegged below world prices (Figure 4), 
have all contributed to a higher share of gasoline being consumed.  
The share of anhydrous ethanol consumption of total ethanol consumed has increased 
from 33 percent in 2009/10 to 45 percent in 2011/12. The reason for this development is not just 
higher ethanol prices but also a narrowing of the “parity gap” between E100 and fuel prices. The 
price of E100 is usually discounted to the price of fuel in terms of the cost per kilometer traveled 
(cars get about 30 percent less kilometers per liter of E100 relative to fuel). The price of E100 at 
parity is denoted by the dotted line in Figure 5. Historically, E100 prices were at a substantial  
                                                 
40 A flex car can run on fuel with the share of ethanol between zero and 100 percent.  
41 The Brazilian government also gives tax breaks for the purchase of flex cars. 
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discount to fuel (adjusted for the differential kilometers per liter), often reaching levels 25 
percent lower than the fuel price. This encouraged the adoption of flex cars and infrastructure 
like E100 dispensing stations. As the share of flex cars has increased, and with higher ethanol 
prices, this discount has disappeared in the past 2-3 years. 
The market price of anhydrous ethanol exceeds that of hydrous ethanol because more 
sugarcane is required to produce a gallon of anhydrous ethanol and there are additional non-
sugarcane related production costs associated with anhydrous production. Because sugarcane is 
used to produce sugar, hydrous ethanol and anhydrous ethanol, then it must be that for a flexible 
plant – modeled in this paper – the marginal benefits of these three production processes are 
equal (adjusted for ethanol from molasses, a by-product from sugar production). 
Brazilian ethanol policies are also important factors affecting the sugar/ethanol markets 
and can be classified into four categories. First, Brazil has a mandate for anhydrous ethanol 
mixed with gasoline, requiring 18 to 25 percent of the total fuel mixture to be anhydrous ethanol, 
depending on supply-demand conditions (currently 20 percent, down from 25 percent in October 
2011).42 Second, E100 sales enjoy a tax exemption that is greater than what is needed to 
compensate for the fewer kilometers obtained relative to a liter of the gasoline-anhydrous fuel 
mixture. The tax on anhydrous ethanol is even lower, although as we show later, consumers only 
see the E25 price. Third, the Brazilian government has often in the past, and again recently, held 
the price of gasoline below world prices. Fourth, the federal government has recently eliminated 
the fuel tax. We show that in theory each of these policies has an ambiguous impact on ethanol 
market prices, but empirically we determine that a higher gasoline price, mandate and tax 
exemption for hydrous ethanol results in higher ethanol prices, but a lower gasoline tax and a 
higher tax exemption on anhydrous ethanol results in lower ethanol prices. 
                                                 
42 There is currently much political discussion in Brazil to increase the mandate back to 25 percent. 
 62 
 
The primary objectives of this paper are to (a) develop a general economic model of the 
Brazilian fuel-ethanol-sugar complex that reflects sugarcane processing flex-plants that produce 
both sugar and ethanol, with the world prices of each product determined endogenously; and (b) 
determine the economic effects of Brazil’s ethanol policies. To that end, we incorporate unique 
features of Brazil’s markets and policies into the economic model; specifically, we model the 
two fuel demands and the anhydrous ethanol mandate, the changing parity gap between E100 
and fuel prices, ethanol produced from molasses, the by-product of sugar production, and 
bagasse for electricity production. We use our model to explain the dramatic change in market 
conditions from 2010/11 to 2011/12 when ethanol and sugar prices soared, fuel consumption 
increased, sugarcane production fell and the share of sugarcane processed into ethanol declined. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. After a brief description of how our 
approach relates to the literature, we develop an analytical model in Section 3. In Section 4, we 
incorporate the shift in the demand curves for fuel and E100. Section 5 presents the comparative 
static results. Data and calibration used in our empirical model are described in Section 6. In 
Section 7, we empirically illustrate our results; the last section provides some concluding 
remarks. 
2.  Relation to the Literature 
There is a fledgling literature on the market effects of Brazilian ethanol policies. One of the first 
studies is Schmitz et al. (2003). Like in Elobeid and Togkoz (2008), who analyze the effects of 
U.S. ethanol policies on Brazilian markets, their economic representation of Brazil’s sugarcane-
ethanol industry is simplistic and there is a lack of detail in depicting the effects of various 
policies. Kliauga et al. (2010) hypothesize that through 2008, the U.S. tax credit determined the 
world ethanol price and the Brazilian price was often linked to it. Using time series techniques, 
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Rajcaniova et al. (2011) test the theory of Kliauga et al. but find only partial support for it. They 
find that Brazil and the United States co-determined the ethanol market price in the period 2002–
2010.  
A recent strand of the literature has focused on the analysis of the ethanol-sugar-oil nexus 
in Brazil (and also on ethanol-corn-oil long run relationships elsewhere).  For example, 
Balcombe and Rapsomanikis (2008) study the long-run price relationships among the three 
commodities using monthly data for the period 2000 – 2006. They use a bivariate error 
correction model and allow for non-linear adjustment toward the equilibrium. Oil prices were 
found to determine the long-run equilibria of both sugar and ethanol prices and sugar prices were 
found to cause ethanol prices but not the other way around. A recent paper by Serra et al. (2011) 
also uses time-series econometric techniques to investigate price volatility transmission in the 
Brazilian ethanol industry in the period 2000-2008. Akin to Balcombe and Rapsomanikis (2008), 
ethanol, sugar, and oil prices are analyzed. Serra et al. (2008) find a strong link, both for levels 
and volatility, between food and energy markets. Their impulse-response analysis shows that an 
increase in crude oil prices leads the system towards a new equilibrium with higher ethanol 
prices. Increases in sugar prices are also found to increase ethanol price levels and volatility (see 
also Serra 2011).  
What Balcombe and Rapsomanikis (2008) and Serra et al. (2011) fail to recognize, 
however, is that it is gasoline, not oil, which links ethanol to sugarcane (and sugar). Moreover, 
the Brazilian government fixes gasoline prices through Petrobras, a publically traded company in 
which it is the biggest shareholder (de Miranda 2010; Zilberman 2012). Under such regulation, 
the domestic gasoline prices are delinked from the world oil prices which they would follow 
under a free market (see Figure 4). 
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Papers in the earlier strand of econometric literature share two common features. First, 
many studies analyze periods ending in 2007 or 2008; second, they investigate the long run 
relationships among the prices. Unlike the econometric studies, our paper provides a structural 
model that takes a detailed account of the unique features of the Brazilian sugar-ethanol market. 
The advantage of our methodology is that it is also able to explain recent significant (short-term) 
shocks in the market. Our paper also extends the existing biofuels literature (e.g., de Gorter and 
Just 2009; Lapan and Moschini 2012) by incorporating two demand curves for ethanol and 
modeling the endogenous decision of flex cars owners to shift between consumption of fuel and 
hydrous ethanol. 
While the time-series models discussed above concentrate on the linkage among 
commodity prices, structural models for the Brazilian and U.S. ethanol markets focus more on 
the relative competitiveness of sugarcane and corn ethanol. Thus, for example, Crago et al. 
(2010) find that although the cost of sugarcane ethanol production in Brazil is lower than that of 
corn ethanol in the United States, once transportation costs for the sugarcane ethanol and the 
value of corn-related Dried Distiller Grain Solubles (DDGS) are included, the relative 
competitiveness changes. They also find that the relative cost of ethanol in the United States and 
Brazil is very sensitive to the prevailing exchange rate and prices of feedstocks. This is of 
particular importance as the Brazilian Real has appreciated about 30 percent in value relative to 
the U.S. dollar in the last half decade (de Gorter et al. 2012). 
The existence of a unique system of flexible plants in Brazil which are able to adjust their 
production program in favor of either sugar or ethanol, depending on their relative prices, 
substantially improves the profitability of the Brazilian sugarcane processing sector. Other 
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significantly contributing factors are government policies and market developments. We now 
analyze these aspects of the Brazilian market. 
3. The Model 
Consider a competitive industry that processes sugarcane into three products: sugar, anhydrous 
ethanol and hydrous ethanol. Sugar and ethanol are competing products because the industry can 
adjust, although only to a certain extent, the allocation of sugarcane, depending on the relative 
market price of sugar and ethanol.43 A by-product of sugarcane processing, regardless of the use 
of the sugarcane, is bagasse. Bagasse is a fibrous matter that is burned in special boilers whereby 
electricity and steam used in sugarcane processing are cogenerated.44 Sugar production also 
yields a by-product – molasses, which is further used to produce anhydrous and hydrous ethanol. 
For internal consistency of our model, we express all quantities related to the fuel market 
(i.e., ethanol and gasoline) in gasoline energy-equivalent liters (GEEL).45 A typical Brazilian 
flexible sugarcane processing plant extracts δ = δA + δH = 6.20 GEELs46 of ethanol from one 
metric tonne of sugarcane processed into sugar; the parameters δA and δH denote GEELs of 
anhydrous and hydrous ethanol from one metric tonne of sugarcane, respectively.47 
The burning of bagasse makes Brazilian flex plants self-sufficient in the electricity they 
need to process sugarcane into individual products. The excess supply of electricity is sold to the 
grid at the market price. Denote ρSC as the number of kilowatt hours (kWhs) of electricity 
                                                 
43 In a modern Brazilian “flex” sugarcane processing plant, the share of sugarcane going to sugar can vary between 
40 and 60 percent. 
44 The burning of the sugarcane straw for electricity cogeneration is currently not economical because of substantial 
transportation costs of hauling the straw to the processing plant. 
45 One gasoline energy-equivalent liter denotes a volume of fuel that contains the same energy as one liter of 
gasoline. In converting fuel quantities to GEELs, we assume that one physical liter of anhydrous and hydrous 
ethanol yield only 67 percent of vehicle kilometers traveled relative to gasoline. In Brazil, one liter of hydrous 
ethanol yields 70 percent of kilometers traveled on one liter of the 25 percent fuel blend (25 percent of anhydrous 
ethanol and 75 percent of gasoline). 
46 This corresponds to 9.25 liters. 
47 Molasses from one tonne of sugarcane could potentially yield as much as 18.6 liters of ethanol (Gopal and 
Kammen 2009). This yield is expected for new modern production plants. 
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produced from bagasse extracted from one metric tonne of sugarcane, ρi as the number of kWhs 
of electricity required to produce one unit of product i, 
i as the yield (in tonnes or GEELs) of 
product i per tonne of sugarcane, and PM and PI as the market and internal (to the processing 
plant) price of electricity, where  ,  ,  i S H A and S, H, and A denote sugar, hydrous ethanol, 
and anhydrous ethanol, respectively. The profit from electricity generation per tonne of 
sugarcane processed for product i is thus given by  
                                                        i M SC i i I i iP P                                                          (1) 
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (1) denotes the revenue from selling the 
excess supply of electricity at the market price. The second term represents the internal cost of 
producing electricity from bagasse. We assume that the electricity prices are exogenous to the 
processing plant, which makes
i a parameter in the consequent analyses. Notice also that 
although the observed market price of electricity is higher than the internal price (i.e., PM > PI), 
the profit from electricity generation might be negative, depending on the relative size of the 
excess supply and internal consumption of electricity. 
We assume that production of sugar and ethanol exhibits constant returns to scale. A 
competitive industry will allocate the sugarcane into sugar, hydrous and anhydrous ethanol so 
that each production process earns zero marginal profits in equilibrium48 
                                               
SC S S H H A A S S SP P P P                                                     (2) 
                                                          
SC H H H H HP P                                                          (3) 
                                                           
SC A A A A AP P                                                            (4)  
                                                 
48 Our model represents long run equilibria in the relevant markets. 
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Equation (2) comes from a zero profit condition for sugar production and takes into 
account the additional quantity of ethanol that can be produced from molasses. In equation (2), 
PSC and PS denote market prices of sugarcane and sugar (measured in $/tonne), respectively, and 
PH and PA denote market prices of hydrous and anhydrous ethanol (measured in $/GEEL), 
respectively. The parameter
S denotes (constant) processing cost (other than the cost of 
feedstock and electricity) per tonne of sugar.  
Equation (3) relates prices of sugarcane and hydrous ethanol while equation (4) links the 
prices of sugarcane and anhydrous ethanol. The processing costs per GEEL of hydrous and 
anhydrous ethanol are denoted by
H and A , respectively. 
 On the supply side, the market prices of hydrous and anhydrous ethanol are linked 
through the cost of feedstock (sugarcane) and processing cost of hydrous and anhydrous ethanol 
as follows 
                            0 1
1 1A H
A H A H SC SC
A H A H
P P P P   
   
    
           
   
                       (5) 
Equation (5), obtained by the summation and rearrangement of equations (3) and (4), 
shows that the gap between anhydrous and hydrous ethanol market prices widens as the price of 
sugarcane increases. This occurs because the production parameters satisfy
A H  , implying 
that production of one gallon of anhydrous ethanol is less efficient. This puts anhydrous ethanol 
at a relative disadvantage because consumers have to pay a higher (fuel) price to compensate 
producers of anhydrous ethanol for the higher production cost and lower efficiency. 
 Competition among fuel blenders results in zero profits (up to a constant marketing 
margin mF) which implies a link between the fuel price paid by consumers, PF, the price of 
anhydrous ethanol and the exogenous gasoline market price, PG 
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                                                  1F A A G G FP P t P t m                                                (6) 
where α denotes an energy-equivalent blend mandate, and tA and tG denote taxes on anhydrous 
ethanol and gasoline (measured in $/GEEL), respectively.49 We assume that the gasoline price is 
exogenous to fuel blenders because the Brazilian government regulates gasoline prices through 
Petrobras and ethanol production is assumed not to affect world oil prices. 
 Similarly, the consumer price of hydrous ethanol (E100) is determined by 
                                                            100 100E H H EP P t m                                                          (7) 
where, tH denotes the E100 fuel tax and mE100 denotes a constant marketing margin. 
 The market equilibrium requires that the supply of sugarcane, SSC, equals the sum of 
individual uses of sugarcane: sugar and anhydrous and hydrous ethanol 
                                  
S S
S H H H SC F A A SC
SC SC SC
H H A A
D I C D I C
S P C
  
   
 
                                (8) 
The first term on the right-hand site of equation (8),
S
SCC , is the quantity of sugarcane 
allocated to production of sugar. The second term represents the total quantity of sugarcane 
corresponding to production of hydrous ethanol. Hydrous ethanol used in the domestic 
transportation sector is denoted by DH and the quantity of ethanol used in the domestic non-
transportation sector is denoted by IH; the latter is assumed to be exogenous. The third (negative) 
term accounts for the hydrous ethanol produced from molasses. This quantity needs to be 
subtracted in order to avoid double counting: the total allocation of sugarcane for hydrous 
ethanol has already been accounted for in the second term.  
                                                 
49 The Brazilian blend mandate requires that α [x100] percent of total fuel volume be anhydrous ethanol, i.e., 
 /A A G   , where A denotes the quantity of ethanol and G denotes the quantity of gasoline. By converting A 
into GEELs, we express the mandate in energy-equivalent terms. 
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The fourth term in equation (8) denotes allocation of sugarcane used for production of 
anhydrous ethanol. Akin to hydrous ethanol, anhydrous ethanol is used in the domestic 
transportation sector, in quantity αDF, but it can also be exported or used in other industries. The 
quantity for the latter two uses is denoted as IA and is assumed to be determined exogenously. 
The last (negative) term again adjusts for the anhydrous ethanol extracted from molasses. 
 We close the model by equilibrating the sum of domestic and foreign demand for sugar,
D
SD  and
W
SD , respectively, with sugar production 
                                                           D W SS S S S S SCD P D P C                                                     (9) 
 An intrinsic feature of the model outlined above is its relative “stability”, since changes 
in policy parameters have small market effects: even if we change all the policy parameters (the 
blend mandate, taxes and gasoline price) and technology parameters (yields of sugar, hydrous 
and anhydrous ethanol from one tonne of sugarcane) that changed from the 2010/11 to the 
2011/12 levels, the impact on the market is modest and in no way reproduces the market changes 
from 2010/11 to 2011/12 (we will show this empirically later). This suggests that there were 
major exogenous shocks to the Brazilian sugar-ethanol market complex during this time period, 
other than the biofuel policy changes. These shocks came in the form of bad weather (shifting 
the sugarcane supply curve in by about 18.3 percent, according to our estimates), income growth 
that increased the number of cars and kilometers driven (thereby shifting out demand for fuel), 
and a major shift in export demand for sugar, as evidenced by record world sugar prices. All 
these shocks would be manifest in shifting the demand/supply curves for fuel, ethanol, sugar 
and/or sugarcane. To explain the significant increase in the market prices of the modeled 
commodities, it is therefore important to quantify the shifts in market demand/supply curves. 
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 The sugarcane supply curve in 2010/11 is depicted in the upper panel of Figure 6a, 
denoted by SSC with a corresponding equilibrium price-quantity pair PSC and QSC, respectively. 
The price of sugarcane in the 2011/12 marketing year increased to P'SC , while the quantity 
supplied reduced to Q'SC. As shown in Figure 6a, this implies an inward shift in the sugarcane 
supply curve, represented by S'SC. The size of the parallel shift is given by distance Q'SCa and is 
calculated as  ' 'SC SC SCS P Q , where the first term represents what the supply of sugarcane 
would have been if the price had increased to P'SC along the original supply curve.
50 
 The lower panel of Figure 6a depicts a shift in the aggregate demand for sugar. Both 
domestic and export demand experienced an outward shift, and we model them separately in the 
numerical part of our paper. Unlike in the upper panel, a decrease in consumption of sugar 
combined with an increase in its market price is not sufficient to conclude that the demand shifts 
in. To see this, consider the intersection of the demand curve DS with the vertical dashed line 
corresponding to C'S. If the price P'S were below this point (but above PS), the new demand curve 
would be to the left of the original one. However, the observed data show that the demand for 
sugar (both domestic and exports) shifted out. The size of the shift is given by  ' 'S S SC D P . 
Shifts in demands for fuel and hydrous ethanol are determined in a similar way (Figure 6b). 
 To see how the assumed elasticities of the demand and supply curves depicted in Figure 
6a and 6b affect the size of the shift, we estimate the shifts under three scenarios – low, medium, 
and high – as shown in Table 1. 
 
 
 
                                                 
50 This result holds also for non-linear curves, used in our numerical simulations because the shift is horizontally 
parallel.  
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Figure 6a. Estimated Shifts in Sugarcane Supply 
and Sugar Demand 
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Table 2 presents estimates of the shifts in individual markets in absolute and relative 
terms (we measure the size of the shift as a percentage of the 2010/11 consumption/production 
level). We focus on the medium elasticity scenario, noting that more elastic market curves are 
associated with greater shifts (with the exception of the hydrous ethanol demand, where the more 
elastic demand yields a smaller shift). The first column under each scenario presents the level of 
a shift. A negative value indicates a shift to the left. In the second column, we report the size of 
the shift as a percentage of the 2010/11 (baseline) production/consumption. Although all shifts 
are significant in magnitude, the 22.8 percent increase in fuel demand and the 33.8 percent 
increase in foreign demand for Brazilian sugar are noticeably high in the medium scenario.
 
The sizable changes (that must have occurred in combination in order to generate the 
surge in ethanol and sugar market prices from their 2010/11 levels) reported in Table 2 explain 
why the model developed earlier fails to approximate the 2011/12 outcome when only changes in 
Brazilian biofuel policies and technological parameters are considered.  
Low Medium High
Sugar supply 0.00 0.50 0.70
Fuel demand -0.09 -0.23 -0.40
Hydrous ethanol demand -0.30 -0.68 -0.80
Domestic demand for sugar -0.50 -0.75 -1.00
Export demand for sugar -1.00 -2.00 -4.00
Table 1. Elasticities Used in Simulations to Detemine Exogenous Shifts in Supply and Demand Curves
Table 2. Estimated Shifts in Brazilian Sugar and Fuel Markets between 2010/11 and 2011/12
Shift in… Size*
% of 2010/11 
quantity Size
% of 2010/11 
quantity Size
% of 2010/11 
quantity
     Sugarcane supply (bil. tonnes) -0.052 8.4 -0.114 18.3 -0.141 22.6
     Fuel demand (bil. liters) 6.662 21.8 6.965 22.8 7.315 24.0
     Hydrous ethanol demand (bil. liters) -4.209 27.5 -3.144 20.6 -2.838 18.6
     Domestic demand for sugar (bil. tonnes) 0.001 7.6 0.002 12.6 0.002 17.3
     Export demand for sugar (bil. tonnes) 0.004 17.3 0.009 33.8 0.015 57.1
* A negative value denotes an inward shift.
Source: own calculations
Low elasticity Medium elasticity High elasticity
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This can better be seen in Table 3 where we decompose the observed change in Brazilian 
market prices between the 2010/11 (first column) and 2011/12 (second column) marketing years. 
The third column in Table 3 gives estimates of what the market prices would have been, had only 
the exogenous demand and supply shifts occurred (in combination) and policies been held at 
their 2010/11 levels. The magnitudes of the exogenous shocks correspond to those pertaining to 
the medium elasticity scenario in Table 2. 
 
In the fourth column, we compute the observed price change as the difference between the 
second and first column. The price changes due to the exogenous shifts only (fifth column) are 
given by the difference between the third and first column. Finally, the share of the price change 
attributable to the shifts in the total observed price change is equal to the ratio of the values in the 
fifth and fourth columns. 
 The fact that half of the values in the last column of Table 3 are more than 100 percent 
indicates that there are considerable market interaction effects not only between Brazilian 
policies, but also between the policies and exogenous market changes. For example, if biofuel 
policies had not changed between 2010/11 and 2011/12 and only structural market changes had 
occurred, we would have observed an even a greater increase in the ethanol price.  
 While Table 2 reports final shifts in market demand and supply curves that reflect all 
changes in the domestic Brazilian biofuel policy as well as changes in the rest of the world, from 
Actual 
2010/11
Actual 
2011/12
2011/12 if market 
curves shifts only**
Observed  
price change
Change due 
to shifts
% of price change due to shifts 
in observed price change
Price of anhydrous ethanol $/liter 1.18 1.42 1.43 0.24 0.25 101
Fuel price $/liter 2.47 2.66 2.53 0.20 0.06 31
Market price of hydrous ethanol $/liter 0.96 1.19 1.20 0.23 0.23 102
Consumer price of hydrous ethanol $/liter 1.54 1.88 1.77 0.34 0.23 69
Price of sugarcane $/tonne 56.11 67.83 73.69 11.72 17.58 150
Price of sugar $/tonne 700.93 884.00 816.63 183.07 115.70 63
* These simulations assume market shocks (shifts) whose magnitudes correspond to the medium elasticity scenario in Table 2.
** Policies are held at their 2010/11 levels.
Source: calculated
Table 3. Decomposition of a Change in Brazilian Market Prices between 2010/11 and 2011/12*
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a policy analysis point of view, it is important to analyze the market effects of a change in a 
biofuel policy while assuming that all other factors, such as income growth or weather, are 
unchanged. But before we do so, let us model the endogenous shift in demand between E100 and 
fuel that is generated by a change in the parity gap between E100 and fuel prices when market 
changes occur. 
4. Modeling the Shift in Demand Curves for E100 versus Fuel 
Because a change in the biofuel policy (e.g., an increase in the blend mandate or a reduction in 
the tax on gasoline), will, among other things, affect the relative price of the fuel blend and 
hydrous ethanol, the composition of fuels consumed will change accordingly. When the price 
gap (in energy equivalent) between fuel and E100 narrows, some flex cars owners who 
previously used hydrous ethanol (because at previous prices it was worth traveling to the nearest 
E100 pump station), will find it profitable to switch to the blended fuel.51 In this case, the 
demand for fuel (measured in GEELs) shifts out by exactly the same amount as the demand for 
E100 shifts in, keeping the total consumption of fuel and E100 unchanged. This is shown in 
Figure 7 which uses actual prices for the 2010/11 and 2011/12 marketing years (the latter marked 
by the prime). The horizontal shift X does not reflect reality, however, since we are 
unrealistically assuming here that a change in the biofuel policy is the only driver of the demand 
shift. 
In 2010/11, the price gap between fuel and E100 was 39¢/GEEL (= 2.68 - 2.29). Suppose 
that a change in all biofuel policies (i.e., an increase in the mandate, change in fuels taxes, and 
manipulation of the gasoline price) resulted in a rise in fuel and E100 consumer prices to 
$2.88/GEEL and $2.80/GEEL, respectively, reducing the price gap to 8¢/GEEL. As the relative 
 
                                                 
51 Note that this is only possible for flex cars, as regular fuel (non-flex) vehicles are not able to run on E100. 
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Figure 7. Symmetrical Shifts in Demand for Fuel and Hydrous 
Ethanol 
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price changed in favor of fuel, demand for fuel shifts out to D'F, while that for E100 shifts in to 
D'H.  
The magnitude of the shift X depends on the price gap θ: the bigger the gap, the bigger 
the shift. Let X(θ) be a function characterizing the behavior of flex car owners when the price 
gap,
100F EP P   , changes. We assume that  X is at least once continuously differentiable and 
satisfies ' 0X dX d  . We also assume that at any point in time the owners of flex cars are 
sorted according to their propensity to switch between blend fuel and hydrous ethanol, depending 
on the relative prices of the two fuels. As the price gap widens, more flex car owners who 
currently consume fuel will find it preferable to switch to E100.  
The model defined by equations (1) to (9) can readily be extended to incorporate the 
endogenous demand shift by specifying the demand curves for the fuel blend, DF, and for E100, 
DH, as follows
52 
                                                                F FD f P X                                                         (10) 
                                                              100H ED g P X                                                       (11) 
The functions  f and  g denote Marshallian demand functions for blend fuel and E100, 
respectively, and satisfy ' 0Ff df dP  and 100' 0Eg dg dP  . The Marshallian demand curves 
shift horizontally by distance X whenever there is a change in the parity gap θ. Because the shift 
occurs only when the price gap changes, we must have  0 0X   , where 0 denotes the price 
gap in the baseline (when the policies do not change and the existence of any price gap has been 
internalized). This point of the X function is very important as it determines the parity gap’s 
                                                 
52 Note that if the price gap decreases relative to the baseline, then the term   0X    becomes negative and the 
fuel demand curve shifts out, while that for E100 shifts in.  
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position on the horizontal axis. Figure 8 depicts a family of logistic curves that satisfy the 
properties (continuity, differentiability, and monotonicity) imposed on the function X. 
5. Comparative Statics Results 
Equations (2) through (11) plus the definition
100F EP P   constitute a market equilibrium 
whose comparative statics results are presented in Appendix 1 and summarized in Table 4. In 
general, a change in a policy (i.e., mandate, gasoline price, gasoline tax, anhydrous or hydrous 
ethanol tax) has an ambiguous impact on market prices. The sign of most comparative statics 
results depends on the sign of the following expression 
                                         
' 1 1
'
f
A H A A F H A
ff dX
X
P d
   
      
   
       
   
                                 (12) 
where the slope of the fuel demand curve, f ', has been expressed by means of the elasticity, ηf, of 
the Marshallian fuel demand. Intuitively, the right-hand side of expression (12) represents two 
simultaneously occurring effects. First, a change in any policy affects the price of fuel, which in 
turn results in a change in the quantity of fuel demanded; this is the shift along the fuel demand 
curve and is represented by the term f '. Second, a change in the fuel price PF – combined with a 
change in the consumer price for hydrous ethanol – alters the price gap which affects flex cars 
owners’ purchasing decision and so the demand curves for fuel and hydrous ethanol shift in 
opposite directions. The magnitude of the shift is represented by the term dX/dθ. 
The first term on the right side of identity (12) is unambiguously negative while the 
second term is negative only if 
A H   . Using the observed parameters values for 2010/11 
and 2011/12 marketing years, the second term is negative only for α > 0.96; this means the 
Brazilian ethanol mandate would have to be at least 96 percent for the value on the right-hand 
side of equation identity (12) to be negative. We therefore do not consider this possibility further. 
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 The probability of the expression in (12) being negative increases with a higher elasticity 
of the fuel demand, higher blend mandate, and smaller sensitivity of flex car owners to the 
change in the price gap (represented by the term dX/dθ). However, fuel demand is empirically 
found to be relatively price inelastic, and the observed blend mandate is around 25 percent. This 
suggests that the expression in (12) is very likely to be positive in reality (and we find that it is so 
in our empirical model). This is best seen if we assume an extreme case of perfectly inelastic fuel 
demand, that is, ηf = 0, in which case the expression is (almost surely) positive. In our further 
analysis, we therefore use the following assumption                                                         
Assumption 1: 
' 1
' 0
A H A
f
X
 
  
 
   
 
. 
 Given Assumption 1, an exogenous increase in the gasoline price unambiguously results 
in an increase in all analyzed prices (Table 4). The intuition behind this result is that a higher 
gasoline price necessitates a higher price of fuel (gasoline plus anhydrous ethanol) paid by the 
consumers. This gives a cost advantage to hydrous ethanol whose demand shifts out (by the same 
amount by which the demand for fuel shifts in), thus increasing the market price and consumer 
price of hydrous ethanol. But as equation (5) shows, the market prices of anhydrous and hydrous 
ethanol are linked on the supply side, which gives rise to a higher price of anhydrous ethanol. 
Owing to the higher competition for the feedstock, the prices of sugarcane and sugar increase.  
Table 4. Effect of a Change in a Policy on Market Pricesa 
Increase in… Market price of 
ethanolb 
Consumer 
price of E100 
Price of fuel Gap in Fuel & 
E100 price  
Gasoline price/taxc + + + + 
Tax on anhydrous ethanol + + + + 
Tax on hydrous ethanol – +/– [+]d – – 
Mandate +/– [+] +/– [+] +/– [–] +/– [–] 
a The unambiguous signs are conditional on Assumption 1. 
b We do not distinguish between anhydrous and hydrous ethanol prices nor report the effects on 
sugar and sugarcane prices as all four prices move in the same direction. 
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c These effects are equal not only in sign, but also in magnitude. 
d Signs in square brackets refer to our empirical results. 
Source: Appendix 1. 
 
 The tax on gasoline has identical (both in magnitude and in sign) market effects as the 
gasoline price. The directional effects of a higher tax on anhydrous ethanol (or equivalently a 
lower tax exemption) on market prices are also the same as for the gasoline price. The 
explanation for the signs follows the same logic as above— a higher tax on anhydrous ethanol 
increases the consumer price of fuel. 
However, the price effects of an increase in the tax on hydrous ethanol (or equivalently a 
reduction in a tax exemption) exhibit an opposite pattern. The tax drives a wedge between the 
consumer price and market price of hydrous ethanol. As this wedge grows larger, the market 
price of hydrous ethanol decreases. But because on the supply side it is linked to the anhydrous 
ethanol price, the latter decreases, too, making the blending of fuel less expensive for the 
blenders; hence, the fuel price decreases. Weaker competition for sugarcane pushes its price and 
production down. However, the reduction in sugarcane use due to a decreased need for ethanol 
more than offsets the reduction in sugarcane production, thus diverting more feedstock to sugar 
production. As the supply of sugar increases, its market price falls. 
Interestingly, a higher tax has an ambiguous effect on the consumer price of hydrous 
ethanol. Whether this price will increase or decrease depends on the relative magnitudes of the 
inward shifts in the demand and supply curves for hydrous ethanol. The demand curve shifts in 
because of a change in the relative prices (in favor of fuel), and the supply curve contracts 
because a lower market price of hydrous ethanol makes this product less profitable to producers, 
who subsequently divert sugarcane to sugar production.  
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 Finally, we note that Assumption 1 is not sufficient to draw unequivocal conclusions 
about the effect of a higher mandate on the market equilibrium (although, as we show later, a 
higher mandate empirically results in a higher ethanol price). This ambiguity contrasts with the 
prediction of the model by de Gorter and Just (2009), where a higher mandate with perfectly 
elastic gasoline supply unambiguously results in a higher ethanol price. The effect of a mandate 
on the ethanol price differs between their model and ours since they study only one ethanol 
demand curve (corn ethanol) while we analyze two competing demand curves for ethanol uses. 
6.  Data and Calibration 
The substantial proportion of hydrous ethanol in total ethanol consumption in Brazil (71 and 60 
percent in 2010/11 and 2011/12, respectively) necessitates a consistent measurement of fuel-
related quantities and prices in energy-equivalent terms (i.e., according to vehicle kilometers 
traveled). As described above, hydrous ethanol is typically sold as E100 (i.e., 100 percent 
ethanol) to owners of flex cars. The empirical evidence suggests that owners of flex cars buy fuel 
according to the price per kilometer traveled, not per liter bought. To that end, all prices and 
quantities related to anhydrous and hydrous ethanol as well as fuel (the blend of anhydrous 
ethanol and gasoline) are expressed in gasoline energy-equivalent liters (Appendix 4).53 
One liter of anhydrous or hydrous ethanol yields only 67 percent of kilometers traveled 
relative to one liter of gasoline. Because anhydrous ethanol cannot be used in its pure form, the 
number of kilometers traveled per liter of fuel is equal to the weighted average of kilometers per 
liter of anhydrous ethanol (if, hypothetically, in the pure form) and gasoline. The result will thus 
depend on the share of the anhydrous ethanol in the blend. Given the 2010/11 and 2011/12 
mandate level the relative kilometrage of fuel is equal to 0.92 in both years. 
                                                 
53 Sources of the data used and formulas for other variables’ calculation are listed in Appendix 4. 
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The yield of sugar, anhydrous and hydrous ethanol from one tonne of sugarcane is not 
constant but depends largely on the quality of the cane and the way the juice is extracted; the 
quality in turn depends heavily on the weather in a given year. The data indicate that the weather 
conditions in 2011/12 adversely affected the yields of sugar, anhydrous and hydrous ethanol 
relative to 2010/11: output totaled 130kg, 68.6 liters, and 71.6 liters, respectively, in 2011/12 vs 
133kg, 71.7 liters, and 75.0 liters, respectively, in 2010/11. 
The state-of-the-art production plants that process the sugarcane into sugar are able to 
make use of the sugar’s by-product, molasses. Currently, as many as 9.25 liters of ethanol 
(anhydrous and hydrous combined) can be extracted from the molasses obtained from one tonne 
of sugarcane. Because the proportion of both ethanol types produced from molasses varies 
among individual producers, we assume that the ratio of anhydrous and hydrous ethanol 
produced is the same as the observed ratio of these ethanol types in overall ethanol production. 
Thus, for example, in 2010/11, the amount of anhydrous ethanol from molasses per tonne of 
sugarcane is equal to 0.29*9.25 = 2.69 liters, and that of hydrous ethanol is equal to 9.25 – 2.69 
= 6.56 liters. 
Using bagasse for electricity cogeneration significantly improves the economics of all 
products derived from sugarcane. To illustrate this, the Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association 
(UNICA) reports that one tonne of sugarcane produces 250 kilograms of bagasse worth 85.6 
kWh of electricity.54 The excess supply of electricity not used in the plant, approximately 63 
kWh, is currently sold on the grid for about $R100/MWh (although the price varies).55 This price 
                                                 
54 
http://cavalierecapital.com/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/Ethanol_A_sustainable_alternative_for_transport.5111444
6.pdf  
55 This corresponds to approximately $50/MWh. 
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needs to be adjusted for the losses of electricity during distribution, however. (It is estimated that 
the above price would be reduced by as much as 25 percent). 
In our empirical simulations, we model three biofuel policies: an ethanol mandate, a tax 
exemption on anhydrous ethanol (i.e., the difference between the tax levied on gasoline and 
anhydrous ethanol), and fuel taxes. We calibrate our model to the observed mandate as 
represented by the actual share of anhydrous ethanol in total fuel consumption, that is, 24.6 and 
23.1 percent for 2010/11 and 2011/12, respectively. The system of Brazilian fuel taxes is 
complex. Appendix 3 presents calculations of the individual taxes on gasoline and the two types 
of ethanol. 
Our (non-linear) demand and supply curves are assumed to have constant price 
elasticities. The central estimates of these elasticities come from recent studies analyzing the 
Brazilian market. In particular, the sugarcane supply elasticity is assumed to be 0.5 (Schmitz et 
al, 2003), reflecting the fact that sugarcane is a perennial and its replanting requires significant 
investments. The elasticity of the domestic demand for sugar is assumed to be -0.75 (de Freitas 
and Kaneko 2011) while  the assumed elasticity of export demand for sugar is substantially 
higher, -2. We use Menezes et al. (2008)’s estimated elasticity of demand for fuel: -0.23. This 
value is close to the estimate (for the Unites States) reported by Hamilton (2009), and also close 
to the medium/long run meta-analysis estimate by Havránek (2011). The assumed demand 
elasticity for hydrous ethanol is more elastic: -0.68 (Menezes et al. 2008); this is not surprising, 
because hydrous ethanol can only be used in flex cars whose owners can easily change their fuel 
blend proportion according to relative prices.  
We compute the price of fuel as the weighted average of anhydrous and gasoline prices 
adjusted for their respective taxes. The weights are equal to the shares of ethanol and gasoline in 
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the final fuel blend. The observed fuel price is higher than our computed value, but we attribute 
the difference to the marketing margin and treat the margin as a constant. The observed 
consumer price of hydrous ethanol is also greater than our calculated value, and we treat this as a 
constant marketing margin as well. 
The gap between the price of fuel and hydrous ethanol was $0.39/GEEL in 2010/11 but 
dropped to $0.08/GEEL in 2011/12. Given the relatively large gap in 2010/11, one can 
hypothesize that the owners of flex cars were less sensitive to a change in the relative fuel price 
than they would be in 2011/12. This implies that any shock in the price gap in 2010/11 would 
have been more likely to induce a smaller shift in the demand for hydrous ethanol than in 
2011/12. 
The sugarcane production is used for sugar and anhydrous and hydrous ethanol. The 
production of both anhydrous and hydrous ethanol exceeds their domestic use. The difference is 
due to trade and industrial use of the ethanol. We assume that this part of ethanol production is 
exogenous, that is, the biofuel policies do not affect those markets. Brazil exports about two 
thirds of its sugar production. 
7. An Empirical Illustration 
The Shift Function 
We use a logistic function of the form  
                                                             
1 C
A
X D
Be 


 

                                                     (13) 
to model the propensity of flex cars owners to switch between consumption of fuel and E100. 
Parameters A and D relate to the asymptotes of the logistic function and parameters B and D 
relate to its shape. (For a discussion of these parameters and their calibration, see Appendix 2). 
This function is increasing in its argument, meaning that a higher gap between the consumer 
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prices of fuel and hydrous ethanol leads to a greater shift-out of the demand for hydrous ethanol 
(coupled with an opposite shift-in of the demand for fuel). 
We set the lower asymptote of function (13) to be the negative of consumption of 
hydrous ethanol in the baseline, because the maximum reduction in the demand for hydrous 
ethanol would occur if all flex cars using hydrous ethanol in the baseline switched to the fuel 
blend. The upper asymptote is harder to pin down. Its level depends on how much fuel the flex 
cars consume in the baseline, and this information is not readily available. We therefore perform 
a sensitivity analysis with respect to the upper asymptote, as well as to the curvature of the 
function X. Parameter values under various scenarios are summarized in Table 5.  
 
In the benchmark, we assume that the upper asymptote is equal to the negative of the 
lower asymptote (-10.24 bil. GEELs), meaning that half of flex cars consumes hydrous ethanol 
and the other half consumes fuel in the baseline. The larger the gap between consumer prices of 
fuel and hydrous ethanol at a given point in time, the less sensitive flex cars owners are to 
changes in this gap. Consider, for instance, the actual price gap of $0.39/GEEL observed in 
2010/11. In this case, a small perturbation in the price differential is likely to result in a small 
change in the proportion of fuel and hydrous ethanol use because flex car owners are already 
“inclined” to use hydrous ethanol. Contrast this with the price differential of $0.08/GEEL 
Table 5. Summary of Parameters of the Logistic Function used in Simulations
Benchmark Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Upper asymptote 10.24 5.12 12.28 10.24
Lower asymptote -10.24 -10.24 -10.24 -10.24
A 20.48 15.36 22.52 20.48
B 1.20 1.20 1.20 5.00
C* 0.46 2.23 0.00 4.10
D -10.24 -10.24 -10.24 -10.24
Price gap (θ) 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39
* calibrated value
Source: own calculations
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observed in 2011/12. It is reasonable to assume that the inclination to hydrous ethanol is not as 
strong now as in the previous case, hence a greater sensitivity to a change in the price gap. 
To reflect the arguments above, we set the value of the shape parameter B to be 1.2 in the 
benchmark and Scenarios 1 and 2, but set it much higher (B =5) in Scenario 3.56 The parameter C 
is calibrated (Appendix 2) to ensure that given the values of other parameters, the following 
condition holds:  0 0X   . The logistic curve corresponding to the benchmark specification is 
depicted in Figure 8. 
In Scenario 1, we set the upper asymptote to one half of its benchmark level (5.12 bil. 
GEELs), while in Scenario 2 we set it to 12.28 bil. GEEL, which is the highest possible value 
that is consistent with our assumptions on the signs of other parameters.57 As shown in Figure 8, 
under this scenario, flex cars owners hardly respond to the change in the price gap. The opposite 
is true for Scenario 3 (B = 5), where a small deviation from the current price gap makes many 
flex cars switch to an alternative fuel. 
Policy Simulations 
We run a battery of simulations to analyze the impacts of individual biofuel policies and market 
shocks quantitatively. All price changes possess the predicted signs presented in Table 4. The 
first set of simulations (columns denoted by B = 1.2 in Table 6 and 7) assumes that the behavior 
of owners of flex cars is described by the benchmark logistic curve in Figure 8, whereas the 
second set (columns denoted by B = 5) uses the Scenario 3 logistic curve to investigate how the 
                                                 
56 The values for the shape parameter B were arbitrarily chosen to illustrate the point that the sensitivity of flex car 
owners to the observed price gap can differ depending on the size of the gap. The relative size of the two values of 
the shape parameter matters more that their levels. But it should be noted that the choice of this parameters is not 
completely arbitrary because if the shape parameters is less than unity, the logistic curve becomes decreasing, which 
runs afoul of our assumption about the monotonicity of this curve.  
57 If the upper asymptote were higher than 12.2 bil. GEELs, the logistic function would be decreasing, thus 
contradicting our assumption that the bigger the price gap, the bigger the shift. This happens because by requiring 
that  0 0X   , we are imposing structure on the logistic function that does not allow for any choice of the upper 
asymptote. 
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market outcomes differ if flex cars owners are very sensitive to a change in the fuel price gap. 
The vector of baseline policies (in effect in the 2010/11 marketing year) consists of the 
volumetric blend mandate α = 0.246, the tax on gasoline tG = $1.28/liter, the tax on anhydrous 
ethanol tA = $0.048/liter, the tax on hydrous ethanol tH = $0.262/liter, and the gasoline price PG = 
$1.05/liter. 
 
 The first policy scenario presented in Table 6 models a recent 28 cent per liter reduction 
in the gasoline tax (assuming it occurred in the 2010/11 marketing year); ethanol prices decline 
by 1 cent as a result. The comparative statics results presented in Appendix 1 show that a 
decrease in the gasoline tax has identical effects – in both sign and magnitude –as a reduction in 
the gasoline price. This makes our exposition easier because the gasoline price in Brazil is 
believed to be below its world market counterpart by approximately the same amount as the 
recent reduction in the gasoline tax. Thus, the results for the first scenario are not only 
informative of the magnitudes of the market effects of a gasoline tax shock, but also of the 
effects of exogenously pegging the gasoline price in Brazil below the world price. 
Table 6. Policy Simulations Results*
Baseline
B = 1.2 B = 5 B = 1.2 B = 5 B = 1.2 B = 5 B = 1.2 B = 5 B = 1.2 B = 5
Fuel price ($/liter) 2.47 -0.21 -0.23 0.05 0.05 0.20 0.22 -0.02 -0.05 0.27 0.08
Market price of anhydrous 
ethanol ($/liter)
1.18 -0.01 -0.06 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.06 -0.07 -0.19 -0.21 -0.18
Market price of E100 ($/liter) 0.96 -0.01 -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.06 -0.07 -0.18 -0.20 -0.17
Consumer price of E100 
($/liter)
1.54 -0.01 -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.06 0.38 0.27 0.40 0.42
Price of sugarcane ($/tonne) 56.11 -0.59 -4.50 -1.96 -1.12 0.58 4.50 -5.26 -13.56 -14.73 -13.03
Price of sugar ($/tonne) 700.93 -3.88 -29.64 -12.93 -7.39 3.83 29.59 -34.60 -89.26 -96.95 -85.78
* Mandate binding in all simulations except the last one.
B = 1.2 means that flex cars owners are less sensitive, and B = 5 that they are very sensitive to a change in the fuel price gap.
Source: own calculations
Difference relative to baseline
No mandate, and 
all taxes at parity
5 percentage 
point reduction in 
mandate
28 ¢ reduction in 
gasoline tax**
Parity between 
anhydrous and 
gasoline tax
Parity between 
hydrous and fuel 
taxes
** Or the same reduction in gasoline price.
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The instantaneous effect of a lower gasoline tax is a reduction in the price of fuel from 
PF0 to PF1 in Figure 9. This results in an increase in the consumption of fuel by the distance a, 25 
percent of which is anhydrous ethanol when the mandate is 25 percent (i.e., with E25). With this 
decline in the fuel price, the parity gap between fuel and E100 prices declines to PF1 – PE100 and 
some E100 consumers switch to fuel consumption. As a result, the hydrous demand curve shifts 
in by the same amount (distance e) as the fuel demand curve shifts out (distance b), since the 
distances are measured in gasoline energy-equivalent liters.  
The reduced demand for hydrous ethanol results in a new demand curve D'H, with a 
decline in the price of hydrous ethanol to P'E100 , thus partially offsetting the decline in hydrous 
ethanol consumption by distance d to yield a net reduction in hydrous ethanol consumption of 
distance e – d. If the fuel price stayed at PF1, resulting fuel consumption would correspond to 
C'F. But because the hydrous and anhydrous ethanol prices are linked on the supply side, the 
anhydrous ethanol price falls, resulting in a further reduction in the fuel price, denoted by PF2. Of 
the additional fuel consumption associated with this price decrease, 25 percent is anhydrous 
ethanol. In total, a reduction in the gasoline tax brings about an increase in fuel consumption of a 
+ b + c, and hence a higher need for anhydrous ethanol of 0.25 x (a + b + c). On the other hand, 
the net decrease in the use of hydrous ethanol is e – d. Therefore, if 0.25 x (a + b + c) < e – d,  
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Figure 9. Effects of a Decrease in the Gasoline Tax
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then the total use of ethanol declines, resulting in a decrease in both hydrous and anhydrous 
ethanol prices.  
The effect of the government arbitrarily reducing the gasoline price below the world price 
follows the same set of arguments as the reduction in the gasoline tax, while an increase in the 
tax exemption for hydrous ethanol (equivalent to a decrease in the tax) has the reverse logic of 
Figure 9 where the demand for hydrous ethanol shifts out first to D'H.  
 In the second scenario, we analyze what would happen if the 2010/11 mandate decreased 
by 5 percentage points. Currently, the mandate can range between 18 and 25 percent in Brazil.  
Our results reported in Table 6 suggest that the sensitivity of flex cars owners (proxied by the 
curvature of the shift function) has a minimal effect on market outcomes. For example, while the 
market price of hydrous ethanol decreases by 3 cents (relative to the baseline) when the mandate 
is reduced and flex cars owners are less sensitive, it decreases by 2 cents for the same policy 
change with more sensitive flex car owners. 
Notice also that a reduction in the mandate has associated with it an increase in the fuel 
price by 5 cents. This illustrates our earlier comparative statics result that an exogenous change 
in the blend mandate, given a perfectly elastic supply of gasoline, can have opposite effects in 
different market environments. To reiterate, in a market with only one demand curve for ethanol, 
like in the United States, a lower mandate would unambiguously result in a lower fuel price; this 
might, however, not be the case in an environment with two competing demand for ethanol (as 
we show in Table 6).58 In sum, the mandate in Brazil operates very differently from the 
traditional blend mandate model. 
                                                 
58 The blend mandate model by de Gorter and Just (2009) predicts that a higher gasoline price (given a perfectly 
elastic gasoline supply curve) unequivocally reduces the ethanol price, while Lapan and Moschini’s (2012) model 
(with a fixed consumption mandate) would predict no change in ethanol price. Moreover, both models predict that a 
higher mandate results in a higher fuel price (provided the gasoline price is fixed). 
 92 
 
In Brazil, anhydrous ethanol enjoys a significant tax exemption vis-à-vis gasoline (as 
much as $1.21/GEEL). But fuel consumers benefit from it only to the extent that it lowers the 
final fuel price which they face (since anhydrous ethanol cannot be purchased in its pure form 
and is always blended with gasoline). If anhydrous ethanol were taxed on parity with gasoline 
(so that the tax exemption was eliminated), all market prices would increase, although only 
marginally—for instance, ethanol prices are predicted to rise by 1 cent (see third scenario in 
Table 6). This result implies that ethanol producers would be better off with a higher tax on 
anhydrous ethanol, since they are being implicitly taxed by the existing generous anhydrous tax 
exemption. 
On the other hand, when the tax on hydrous ethanol is raised to obtain parity between the 
tax-inclusive hydrous ethanol and fuel prices (with the gasoline and anhydrous ethanol taxes held 
at their baseline levels), ethanol prices decline by R$0.07 per liter, making the ethanol producers 
worse-off. This occurs because the tax drives a wedge between the consumer and producer price 
of hydrous ethanol, pushing the latter down. 
The last scenario presented in Table 6 analyzes the effects of the elimination of the blend 
mandate and all tax exemptions (i.e., the tax on anhydrous ethanol is on parity with that on 
gasoline while the tax on hydrous ethanol is on parity with the fuel tax, where the fuel tax is 
given by the weighted average of gasoline and anhydrous taxes). A significantly higher 
anhydrous price makes the marginal cost to fuel blenders rise, resulting in an increase in the fuel 
price. A higher consumer price for hydrous ethanol leads to a net decrease in the demand for 
hydrous ethanol, resulting in lower ethanol production, and thus its lower market price. 
The sum total effect of eliminating the Brazilian ethanol mandate and tax exemptions 
(with the gasoline price and taxes held constant) is to reduce hydrous ethanol prices by 21 
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percent (= – 0.20/0.96 [x100%]). Other recent research (Drabik 2011) finds a comparable effect 
of eliminating U.S. ethanol policies for the same time period (a 24 percent reduction in U.S. 
ethanol prices), although ethanol prices are higher in Brazil and U.S. ethanol consumption is 
more than twice that of Brazil. 
Unlike in the United States, where the mandate always acts as a lower bound on the 
ethanol price (i.e., it determines the minimum price), the mandate in Brazil may be either a lower 
or an upper bound. The latter may occur, for example, if sugar demand is low and sugarcane 
supplies are plentiful. In that case, the removal of the mandate would increase the ethanol price. 
 Table 7 presents results for simulations where the Brazilian market experiences a 
negative sugarcane supply shock , a positive shock to the demand for fuel (with corresponding 
negative shock to demand for hydrous ethanol), and a positive demand shock for sugar.  
 
Table 7. Market Shocks Simulations Results*
Baseline
B = 1.2 B = 5 B = 1.2 B = 5 B = 1.2 B = 5
Fuel price ($/liter) 2.47 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01
Market price of anhydrous 
ethanol ($/liter)
1.18 0.15 0.10 -0.02 -0.02 0.09 0.06
Market price of E100 ($/liter) 0.96 0.15 0.10 -0.02 -0.01 0.08 0.06
Consumer price of E100 
($/liter)
1.54 0.15 0.10 -0.02 -0.01 0.08 0.06
Price of sugarcane ($/tonne) 56.11 11.07 7.47 -1.58 -1.11 6.29 4.29
Price of sugar ($/tonne) 700.93 72.88 49.14 -10.42 -7.31 41.38 28.23
* Mandate binding in all simulations.
** Reduction of 18.3%.
*** Increase of 22.8%; reduction of 20.6%.
**** Increase in domestic demand of 12.6% and increase in export demand of 33.8%.
B = 1.2 means that flex cars owners are less sensitive, and B = 5 that they are very sensitive to a change
in the fuel price gap.
Source: own calculations
Increase in demand for 
sugar ****
Difference relative to baseline
Reduction in supply of 
sugarcane**
Increase in demand for 
fuel & reduction in 
demand for E100 ***
 94 
 
The magnitudes of the shocks correspond to the medium scenario values presented in Table 2. 
Both the “increase in demand for sugar” and “reduction in supply of sugar” scenarios yield the 
same qualitative conclusions: as the price of sugarcane increases, making production of 
anhydrous and hydrous ethanol and sugar more expensive, the market prices of these 
commodities rise. A higher market price of anhydrous ethanol increases the marginal cost for 
fuel blenders, which increases the consumer price of fuel.  
8. Conclusions 
Dramatic changes have occurred recently in Brazilian ethanol and sugar markets. This paper 
presents a general economic model of the Brazilian sugar/ethanol nexus from the processing of 
sugarcane, which determines the world price of sugar and the Brazilian market price for ethanol. 
Domestic ethanol demand is depicted in two demand curves – one for fuel (a mixture of 
anhydrous ethanol and gasoline) and the other for hydrous ethanol (E100). We incorporate an 
endogenous switching model for E100 consumers as they respond to changes in the relative 
prices of E100 and fuel. On the supply side, we incorporate the economics of electricity 
production from bagasse, ethanol production from molasses (a by-product of sugar production), 
and we also incorporate the differential cost of producing hydrous and anhydrous ethanol, 
thereby keeping a specific price link between the two types of ethanol.  
This paper has several key findings. Unlike biofuel mandates and tax exemptions 
elsewhere, Brazil’s fuel-ethanol-sugar markets and fuel policies are unique in that each policy, in 
theory, has an ambiguous impact on the market price of ethanol and hence on sugarcane and 
sugar prices. The Brazilian market is complex with two competing demands for ethanol use, so 
any initial change in ethanol price due to a policy change can be offset by consumers’ shifts in 
demand for E100 versus fuel. Furthermore, the sugarcane feedstock can be used to produce two 
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competing products, sugar and ethanol, which give processors more flexibility. However, under 
plausible assumptions regarding the elasticity of the fuel demand curve and the responsiveness of 
flex car owners to changes in relative prices, we find that most of the policies analyzed have an 
unambiguous impact on ethanol prices. 
Our empirical analysis shows there are two policies that seemingly help the ethanol 
industry but do otherwise in reality: a low gasoline tax and a high anhydrous tax exemption 
results in lower ethanol prices (unlike in the U.S. where lower gasoline tax will increase ethanol 
prices regardless and a lower gasoline price increases the ethanol price in the case of a binding 
blend mandate). On the other hand, as expected, higher mandates, gasoline prices, and tax 
exemptions for hydrous ethanol in Brazil means higher ethanol and sugar prices.  
Eliminating Brazilian ethanol tax exemptions and mandates reduces ethanol prices by 21 
percent in 2010-11, which is very similar to the estimated effects of U.S. ethanol policies by 
Drabik (2011) for the same time period. But the marginal changes in Brazilian policies on 
ethanol prices between 2010-11 and 2011-12 are shown in this paper to be relatively small both 
individually and collectively. We find that observed market changes can only be explained by 
outward shifts in fuel transportation and sugar export demand curves, and reduced sugarcane 
supply due to bad weather.  
Although the hydrous ethanol tax exemption always increases ethanol prices (with or 
without the mandate), in principle it is very possible that the mandate in Brazil can also act as an 
upper bound on ethanol consumption (rather than a lower bound as is always the case in the 
United States), depending on the year and market circumstances. This outcome is more likely, 
inter alia, when sugar demand is low and sugarcane supplies are plentiful. In that case, the 
removal of the mandate will increase the ethanol price. The number of years in which this has 
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happened in the past (if ever) and the extent to which ethanol prices would have risen with the 
elimination of the mandate awaits further research. 
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Appendix 1. Comparative Statics Results 
Totally differentiating the system of equations (2) to (4) and (6) to (11) and recalling that  
100F EP P   , we arrive at  
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where the prime (') denotes the derivative of a function with respect to its argument. 
Using the Implicit Function Theorem, we obtain changes in the prices of interest with 
respect to a marginal change in a policy variable. To simplify the expressions to follow, we 
define    
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 The individual derivatives take the following forms: 
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Appendix 2. Calibration of the Shift in the Demand for Fuel and Hydrous Ethanol 
We use a logistic function of the form 
                                                            
1 C
A
X D
Be 


 

                                                  (A2.1) 
where parameters A, B, and C > 0 and D < 0. As   , X A D  ; therefore, the value A + D 
represents the upper asymptote of the function (A2.1). Similarly,   implies X D , 
which defines the lower asymptote of the logistic function.  
In calibrating the curve (A2.1), we set the upper asymptote equal to the quantity of the 
fuel blend consumed by flex cars in the baseline, because flex cars are capable of running on the 
fuel blend (a mixture of gasoline and anhydrous ethanol) while non-flex cars cannot use hydrous 
ethanol. If the relative price changes in favor of hydrous ethanol, the maximum outward shift in 
the demand for hydrous ethanol is equal to quantity of fuel consumed by flex cars in the baseline, 
denoted as U0; therefore 
                                                                     
0A D U                                                           (A2.2) 
 The lower asymptote is equal to the quantity of hydrous ethanol in the baseline because 
this is the maximal shift in hydrous demand if the relative price changes in favor of fuel blend. 
This quantity is directly observable and is denoted as L0  
                                                                        
0D L                                                              (A2.3) 
 It follows directly from equations (A2.2) and (A2.3) that the parameter A equals  
                                                                     
0 0A U L                                                           (A2.4)  
We use the parameter B to change the curvature of the logistic function; thus it is 
assumed to be known, and we vary its value. Recognizing that the observed baseline represents a 
situation with no shift in the fuel and hydrous ethanol demand (the shifts have already occurred 
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and thus are not observed), we must have  0 0X   , where θ0 denotes the difference between 
fuel and hydrous ethanol price in the baseline. Then, invoking equation (A2.1), for the parameter 
C we obtain 
                                                             
0
0 0
1 1
ln
U
C
B L
 
   
 
                                                 (A2.5) 
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Appendix 3. Documentation of Fuel Taxes in Brazil for Gasoline and Ethanol 
There are two “fuels” consumed in Brazil: E100 (100 percent hydrous ethanol consumed by flex 
cars) and “fuel” (a mixture of anhydrous ethanol and petroleum-based gasoline). The price of 
E100 is given by 
100 100E H H EP P t m    
where PE100  denotes the consumer price of hydrous ethanol, PH  denotes the wholesale market 
price of hydrous ethanol, tH denotes the E100 fuel tax, and mE100 denotes a constant marketing 
margin. 
The price of fuel PF is a weighted average of the anhydrous ethanol price PA and gasoline 
price PG 
    1F A A G G FP P t P t m        
where α denotes the mandated volume of anhydrous ethanol in total fuel, and tA and tG denote 
taxes on anhydrous ethanol and gasoline, respectively. 
In general, the value of α varies. In 2010/11 (the marketing year beginning April 1), there 
were three months when the blend mandate for anhydrous ethanol was 20 percent; it was 25 
percent for the other months that marketing year. Until October of the 2011/12 marketing year, 
the mandate was 25 percent after which it has been 20 percent.  
The taxes in Brazil vary by state. In this study, we use taxes in the state of São Paulo 
because most of the ethanol in Brazil is produced and consumed in São Paulo. It is important to 
realize that there are four taxes on gasoline and three on hydrous ethanol, some of which are ad 
valorem and others are specific. The anhydrous tax is an ad valorem tax.  
The tax on gasoline has four components. First, there are two federal per unit taxes: the 
CIDE tax of R$0.23/liter and the PIS/COFINS tax of R$0.2626/liter. The CIDE value can vary 
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between years and within years according to the perceived political need to adjust the final price 
paid by fuel consumers. In 2010/2011 the average CIDE is R$0.2186 and it is R$0.1708 in 
20011/12 (from March 1 2011 to February 2012 as data for March 2012 is not yet available). 
 Because the wholesale gasoline price reported by the ANP — a government agency— 
includes the CIDE and PIS/COFINS taxes, we first need to calculate the gasoline price without 
these two specific taxes. The reported gasoline price with taxes was R$1.54/liter and R$1.53, for 
2010/11 and 2011/12, respectively.  This means that the implied wholesale market price of 
gasoline equals R$1.0451 and R$1.099 for each season (before any marketing margin to the 
retail gas pump is added). 
Second, we calculate the ad valorem tax called the ICMS which is 25 percent of the 
gasoline price given by ANP at R$1.54 and R$1.53, for 2010/11 and 2011/12, respectively. 
Therefore, the ICMS for gasoline was R$0.512/liter and now it is R$0.5104/liter.  
 Third, we calculate the ICMS- ST tax, which is 56.35 percent of the ICMS tax calculated 
above. It is the total cost that is directly attributed to the ICMS. The value of this ICMS-ST is 
therefore R$0.289 for 2010/201 and R$0.288 for 2011/12. While there is no sales tax per se in 
Brazil, every manufacturer, distributor, retailer, and provider of almost every type of 
merchandise or service pays the state ICMS and passes the cost along to the consumer. It is 
largely a “hidden” tax, in that it is not reported on any consumer’s receipt or directly on the price 
of the goods.  
Finally, we add all the gasoline taxes to obtain the total gasoline taxes of R$ 1.2827 and 
R$1.2305 for these two periods, respectively.   
The tax applied on anhydrous ethanol tA is only the PIS/COFINS of R$0.048/liter.  
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 The tax on hydrous ethanol tH has three components. First, we have PIS/COFINS for the 
producers R$0.0048/l and PIS/COFINS for distributers at R$0.072. The producer price is given 
by CEPEA (Center for Advanced Studies on Applied Economics) at R$0.982 in 2010/11 and 
R$1.207 in 2011/12. 
The margin for the distributer is R$0.05 for both periods. We add the PIS/COFINS taxes 
and the margin to the producer price (it give us R$1.04 for 2010/11 and R$1.26 for 2011/12) and 
from there we calculate the second tax that is the ICMS.  
To calculate the ICMS at 12 percent, we add the number we got above to the 
PIS/COFINS for the distributers (R$0.072) and multiply the sum by 12 percent. For 2010/11 the 
ICMS is R$0.151 and for 2011/12 it is R$ 0.182/liter. 
Finally, we calculate the third tax, that is, the ICMS ST. It is 25 percent of the values we 
got from the ICMS described above. The values calculated are R$0.038 and R$0.045 for 2010/22 
and 2011/12, respectively.  
The total hydrous tax is R$0.26 for 2010/11 and R$0.30 for 2011/12 (from March to 
February). In summary, the total hydrous tax is the sum of the PIS/COFINS for the producer and 
distributer and the ICMS taxes.  
 
Data Sources 
 
CEPEA (Center for Advanced Studies on Applied Economics), ethanol market price, data 
available at 
http://cepea.esalq.usp.br/english/ethanol/ accessed April 2012. 
                     
Contribution to Social Security Financing —COFINS data available 
http://www4.planalto.gov.br/legislacao/legislacao-por-assunto/impostos-taxas-e-contribuicoes-
teste/impostos-taxas-e-contribuicoes#contribuicoes 
                    
Contribution to the Social Integration Program —PIS data available at 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/LCP/Lcp07.htm 
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ICMS-ST substituição tributária, available at 
http://www.fazenda.df.gov.br/aplicacoes/legislacao/legislacao/TelaSaidaDocumento.cfm?txtNu
mero=404&txtAno=1999&txtTipo=7&txtParte and at http://www.brazil-help.com/taxes.htm 
            
Estrutura de Formação dos Preços Agência Nacional do Petróleo, Gás Natural e 
Biocombustíveis (ANP) (National Agency of Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels), data 
available at  
http://www.anp.gov.br/?pg=58058&m=&t1=&t2=&t3=&t4=&ar=&ps=&cachebust=133711076
5166 accessed March 2012. 
 
ANP Agência Nacional do Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis Levantamento de Preços e 
de Margens de Comercialização de Combustíveis, data available at 
http://www.anp.gov.br/preco/ accessed March 2012. 
 
SINDICOM Sindicato Nacional das Empresas Distribuidoras de Combustíveis e Lubrificantes 
data available at 
http://www.sindicom.com.br/pub_sind/cgi/cgilua.exe/sys/start.htm?tpl=home accessed March 
2012. 
 
Taxes on Goods and Services — ICMS — Impostos Sobre Circulação de Mercadorias e 
Prestação de Serviços (Merchandise and Services Circulation Tax) data available at 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/LCP/Lcp87.htm 
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Variable/parameter Symbol  2010/11  2011/12 Unit  Source
PARAMETERS
Kilometers per liter of anhydrous ethanol relative to 
gasoline
λA 0.67 0.67 UNICA
Kilometers per liter of hydrous ethanol relative to 
gasoline
λH 0.67 0.67 UNICA
Kilometers per liter of fuel blend relative to gasoline λF 0.92 0.92 λF = αvλA + (1-αv)
Tonnes of sugar per tonne of sugarcane φS 0.133 0.130 CONAB
Liters of anhydrous ethanol per tonne of sugarcane φA' 71.74 68.59 liter/tonne CONAB
Liters of hydrous ethanol per tonne of sugarcane φH' 75.03 71.56 liter/tonne CONAB
GEELs of anhydrous ethanol per tonne of sugarcane φA 48.07 45.96 GEEL/tonne φA = λAφA'
GEELs of hydrous ethanol per tonne of sugarcane φH 50.27 47.95 GEEL/tonne φH = λHφH'
Liters of ethanol from molasses per tonne of 
sugarcane
δ' 9.25 9.25 liter/tonne CONAB
GEELs of ethanol from molasses per tonne of 
sugarcane
δ 6.20 6.20 GEEL/tonne δ = λAδ'
Liters of anhydrous ethanol from molasses per tonne 
of sugarcane
δA' 2.69 3.67 liter/tonne δA' = μAδ'
GEELs of anhydrous ethanol from molasses per 
tonne of sugarcane
δA 1.80 2.46 GEEL/tonne δA = λAδA'
Liters of hydrous ethanol from molasses per tonne of 
sugarcane
δH' 6.56 5.58 liter/tonne δH' = μHδ'
GEELs of hydrous ethanol from molasses per tonne 
of sugarcane
δH 4.40 3.74 GEEL/tonne δH = λHδH'
Share of anhydrous ethanol in total ethanol 
production
μA 0.29 0.40 μA = CA'/(CA' + DH')
Share of hydrous ethanol in total ethanol production μH 0.71 0.60 μA = DH'/(CA' + DH')
Share of sugar production consumed domestically 1 - σ 0.33 0.33 1 - σ
Share of sugar production exported σ 0.67 0.67 UNICA/CONAB
Net processing cost of sugar per tonne of sugarcane φSξS - ψS 46.56 58.87 $/tonne φSξS - ψS = φSPS + δAPA + δHPH- PSC
Net processing cost of anhydrous ethanol per tonne 
of sugarcane
φAξA - ψA 28.54 29.67 $/tonne φAξA - ψA = φAPA - PSC
Net processing cost of hydrous ethanol per tonne of 
sugarcane
φHξH - ψH 16.01 17.33 $/tonne φHξH - ψH = φHPH - PSC
POLICY VARIABLES
Tax on gasoline (volumetric) tG 1.28 1.23 $/liter SINDICOM
Tax on anhydrous ethanol (volumetric) tA' 0.05 0.05 $/liter SINDICOM
Tax on anhydrous ethanol (energy) tA 0.07 0.07 $/GEEL tA = tA'/λA
Tax on hydrous ethanol (volumetric) tH' 0.26 0.30 $/liter SINDICOM
Tax on hydrous ethanol (energy) tH 0.39 0.45 $/GEEL tH = tH'/λH
Blend mandate (volumetric) αv 0.246 0.231 αv = CA'/DF'
Blend mandate (energy) αE 0.18 0.17 αE = λAαv/(1 + λAαv - αv )
ELASTICITIES
Elasticity of sugarcane supply η
S
SC Schmitz et al. (2003)
Elasticity of domestic demand for sugar η
D
DS de Freitas and Kaneko (2011)
Elasticity of export demand for sugar η
D
XS Schmitz et al. (2003)
Elasticity of demand for fuel (E25) η
D
F Menezes et al. (2008)
Elasticity of demand for hydrous ethanol (E100) η
D
H Menezes et al. (2008)
Note: The data sources are documented below.
Appendix 4. Data Used to Calibrate the Model
0.50
-0.75
-0.23
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-2.00
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Data Sources: 
 
ANP (2012). National Agency of Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels, Hydrous Consumers 
Price, data available at http://www.anp.gov.br/preco/prc/resumo_mensal_index.asp 
 
ANP (2012) National Agency of Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels, Pure Gasoline Market 
Price, data available at http://www.anp.gov.br/?pg=55347 accessed April 2012 
Variable/parameter Symbol  2010/11  2011/12 Unit  Source
PRICES
Price of gasoline (volumetric) PG 1.05 1.10 $/liter ANP
Fuel price (volumetric) PF' 2.47 2.66 $/liter ANP
Fuel price (energy) PF 2.68 2.88 $/GEEL PF = PF'/λF
Price of anhydrous ethanol (volumetric) PA' 1.18 1.42 $/liter CEPEA 
Price of anhydrous ethanol (energy) PA 1.76 2.12 $/GEEL PA = PA'/λA
Price of hydrous ethanol (volumetric) PH' 0.96 1.19 $/liter CEPEA 
Price of hydrous ethanol (energy) PH 1.43 1.78 $/GEEL PH = PH'/λH
Consumer price of hydrous ethanol (volumetric) PE100' 1.54 1.88 $/liter ANP
Consumer price of hydrous ethanol (energy) PE100 2.29 2.80 $/GEEL PE100 = PE100'/λH
Price of sugarcane PSC 56.11 67.83 $/tonne IEA
Price of sugar PS 700.93 884.00 $/tonne ERS
Marketing margin for fuel (volumetric) mF' 0.41 0.53 $/liter mF' = PF' - αv (PA' + tA') - (1 -αv )(PG + tG)
Marketing margin for fuel (energy) mF 0.44 0.57 $/GEEL mF' = PF - αE(PA + tA) - (1 -αE)(PG + tG)
Marketing margin for E100 ethanol (volumetric) mE100' 0.31 0.39 $/liter mE100' = PE100' - PH' - tH'
Marketing margin for E100 ethanol (energy) mE100 0.47 0.57 $/GEEL mE100 = PE100 - PH - tH
Price gap between fuel and hydrous ethanol θ 0.393 0.082 $/GEEL θ = PF - PE100
QUANTITIES
Consumption of anhydrous ethanol (volumetric) CA' 7.51 8.49 billion liters CA' = DF' - CG
Consumption of anhydrous ethanol (energy) CA 5.03 5.69 billion GEELs CA = λACA'
Consumption of hydrous ethanol (volumetric) DH' 15.29 10.19 billion liters UNICA
Consumption of hydrous ethanol (energy) DH 10.24 6.83 billion GEELs DH = λHDH'
Consumption of gasoline (volumetric) CG 22.99 28.31 billion liters UNICA
Consumption of fuel  (volumetric) DF' 30.50 36.80 billion liters UNICA
Consumption of fuel (energy) DF 28.02 34.00 billion GEELs DF = λFDF'
Production of sugarcane SSC 0.62 0.57 billion tonnes CONAB
Production of anhydrous ethanol (volumetric) QA' 8.32 8.59 billion liters UNICA
Production of anhydrous ethanol (energy) QA 5.58 5.76 billion GEELs QA = λAQA'
Production of hydrous ethanol (volumetric) QH' 19.05 14.05 billion liters UNICA
Production of hydrous ethanol (energy) QH 12.77 9.42 billion GEELs QH = λHQH'
Residual anhydrous ethanol (volumetric) IA' 0.40 1.22 billion liters UNICA
Residual anhydrous ethanol (energy) IA 0.27 0.82 billion GEELs IA = λAIA'
Residual hydrous ethanol (volumetric) IH' 0.68 1.62 billion liters UNICA
Residual hydrous ethanol (energy) IH 0.46 1.09 billion GEELs IH = λHIH'
Quantity of sugarcane devoted to sugar production C
S
SC 0.29 0.28 billion tonnes Derived from equation (8)
Domestic consumption of sugar D
D
S 0.01 0.01 billion tonnes D
D
S = (1-σ)φSC
S
SC
Foreign consumption of sugar D
W
S 0.03 0.02 billion tonnes D
W
S = σφSC
S
SC
Note: The data sources are documented below.
Appendix 4. Data Used to Calibrate the Model (continued)
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ANP Agência Nacional do Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis Levantamento de Preços e 
de Margens de Comercialização de Combustíveis, data available at 
http://www.anp.gov.br/preco/ accessed March 2012. 
 
CEPEA (2012) Centro de Estudos Avançados em Economia Aplicad, Indicador Mensal Açúcar 
(Sugar Price International Trade), data available at 
http://cepea.esalq.usp.br/english/sugar/ accessed April 2012. 
 
CEPEA (2012) Centro de Estudos Avançados em Economia Aplicada, Indicador Mensal 
Ethanol Anhydrous and Hydrous), data available at 
http://www.cepea.esalq.usp.br/etanol/?page=407 
 
CONAB (2012) Companhia Nacional de Abastecimento (National Food Supply Agency). 
Levantamento de Safra, (sugar cane, ethanol and sugar produced) data available at 
http://www.conab.gov.br/conteudos.php?a=1253&t accessed February 2012. 
 
EIA (2012) U.S. Energy Information Administration, New York Harbor Conventional Gasoline 
Regular Spot Price, data available at  
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=EER_EPMRU_PF4_Y35NY_DP
G&f=M accessed May 2012. 
 
ERS (2012) Table 4. World and U.S. Sugar and Corn Sweetener Prices, data available at U.S. 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Sugar/Data.htm accessed May 2012. 
 
IEA 2012.Preços Médios Mensais Recebidos pelos Agricultores Cana de Açucar (Sugarcane 
Price to Producers) data available at 
http://ciagri.iea.sp.gov.br/bancoiea/precos_medios.aspx?cod_sis=2 accessed April 2012. 
 
Nebraska Energy Office, Ethanol and Unleaded Gasoline Average Rack Prices, data available at 
http://www.neo.ne.gov/statshtml/66.html accessed May 2012. 
 
Mandate available at http://www.senado.gov.br/ 
http://www.senado.gov.br/noticias/jornal/cidadania/Gasolinaaditivada/not009.htm  
 
UNICA (Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association), data available at http://english.unica.com.br/  
 
PECEGE (Programa de Educação Continuada em Economia e Gestão de Empresas).Custos de 
produção de cana-de-açúcar  açúcar  e etanol no Brasil:safra 2010/11. ISSN 2177-4358 Data 
available at www.pecege.esalq.usp.br 
 
SINDICOM Sindicato Nacional das Empresas Distribuidoras de Combustíveis e 
Lubrificantes,data available at 
http://www.sindicom.com.br/pub_sind/cgi/cgilua.exe/sys/start.htm?tpl=home accessed March 
2012. 
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United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). (2012). “Brazil Biofuels Annual.” GAIN 
Report, Foreign Agricultural Service, Annual Report BR12013, São Paulo, August 21. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Emissions from Land Use Change: Do they Really Matter Given Fuel Market Leakage?  
1. Introduction 
The issue of carbon leakage – which arises when the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
reductions offered by an environmental policy are partially or more than offset by the market 
effects of the policy – is often raised as an obstacle to the success of environmental policies. 
Leakage has been extensively studied in the context of cap and trade policies (see Wooders et al. 
2009 for a survey), reduced deforestation and land degradation (REDD) policies (e.g., Murray 
2008), and the indirect land use change associated with biofuels policies (e.g., Searchinger et al. 
2008).59 
Although emissions from land use change due to biofuel policies have attracted a 
significant amount of research, leakage in the fuel market itself –which arises since the addition 
of biofuels always causes a reduction in the world gasoline market price—has been studied 
less.60 Leakage in the fuel market is the focus on this paper. To our knowledge, de Gorter and 
Just (2009a) are probably the first to recognize this effect (calling it the “indirect output use 
effect”), but they only discuss its intuition and do not provide an analysis for individual biofuel 
policies. Chen et al. (2011) use a dynamic, spatial, multi-market equilibrium model to examine 
changes along the extensive and intensive margin of land use in the United States that are 
induced by biofuel policies and the implications of these policies for GHG emissions. Although 
they provide estimates of leakage in the fuel market, they model the biofuel mandate differently 
than we do. They assume that consumers can choose between ethanol and gasoline even when 
                                                 
59 There are numerous studies on land use change. Al-Riffai et al. (2010) provide one of many surveys. 
60 In other words, we seek to quantify the changes in the fuel market resulting from the introduction of biofuels via 
various biofuel policies. Production of biofuels is the only shock to the fuel market we analyze; for example, we do 
not investigate how much world gasoline (oil) consumption would change with an oil supply shock. 
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the use of ethanol is mandated; hence, in their model the ethanol price (in energy equivalent) is 
equal to the price of gasoline. In our model, the price of fuel (which is a blend of ethanol and 
gasoline) is a weighted average of the ethanol and gasoline prices (in energy equivalent), where 
the weights are equal to ethanol and gasoline’s respective shares of the fuel blend. Rajagopal et 
al. (2011) empirically estimate fuel market leakage related to the U.S. ethanol blend mandate and 
find that the U.S. blend mandate combined with a blenders’ tax credit results in a reduction in 
global carbon emissions.61 In contrast, we find that corn-ethanol policies are associated with an 
increase in carbon emissions.62 
Although U.S. ethanol policies historically have been motivated primarily by concerns 
related to energy security, local air pollution, and farm income support, the U.S. introduced 
legislation in 2007 which specifically requires that ethanol reduce GHG emissions by 20 percent 
(relative to the gasoline it is assumed to replace). The 20 percent figure is estimated based on 
“life-cycle accounting” (LCA), which reflects a “well to wheel” measure of GHG emissions 
from gasoline production and a “field to fuel tank” measure of emissions from ethanol 
production (Farrell et al. 2006). If this requirement is not met, the ethanol is not eligible for tax 
credits or for being counted towards the mandate. 
Given the recent concern in the U.S. about global climate change, the corn-ethanol lobby 
seized upon the benefits of ethanol in reducing GHG emissions. However, this strategy has back-
fired because the LCA method is inherently flawed, as highlighted by Searchinger et al. (2008) 
who show that U.S. corn-ethanol emits greater GHG emissions relative to gasoline if changes in 
                                                 
61 For brevity, when we use the term “carbon emissions” in the paper we mean carbon-equivalent greenhouse gas 
emissions which are generated at combustion. 
62 Du and Hayes (2009) find that U.S. ethanol production pushes the wholesale gasoline prices down, but this is not 
leakage as it is defined in the literature. They obtain their result because they assume the oil price is fixed and look 
only at the oil crack ratio and spread. They also do not take into consideration the market effects outside the United 
States. We endogenize the world oil price, which gives rise to the indirect output use change effect in the fuel 
market. 
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the use of land (e.g., converting forest into crop land) are correctly taken into consideration. The 
existence of leakage from land-use change sparked a controversy that reached a fever pitch and 
eventually led to both the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the California Air 
Resources Board (CARB) revising their 20 percent estimate of ethanol’s relative GHG benefit to 
reflect emissions from land use changes.63  
Instead of focusing on indirect land use change, this paper addresses the issue of whether 
corn-ethanol still meets the 20 percent threshold when (direct) fuel market leakage is taken into 
account. We define “market leakage” as a market effect of biofuels in displacing gasoline and 
other oil (domestic non-transportation and international oil) consumption64. The LCA estimate of 
emissions savings from a gallon of ethanol assumes that ethanol replaces an (energy-equivalent) 
gallon of gasoline—i.e., LCA assumes there is no market leakage in the fuel market. However, 
leakage inevitably exists in the fuel market, as it exists in land and other markets related to 
biofuels production and consumption. In this paper, we advance an analytical framework to 
analyze the fuel market leakage of two biofuel policies—a blender’s tax credit and a mandate— 
by themselves and in combination. 
We find that for the same quantity of ethanol, fuel market leakage due to a tax credit is 
always greater than that due to a binding mandate. We also find that the combination of a 
binding mandate and a tax credit produces greater fuel market leakage than a mandate alone. 
Although the land market does not enter our analytical model explicitly, we do capture land use 
                                                 
63 CARB made their ruling on land use change in April of 2009, while the EPA made their ruling in February 2010. 
The revised EPA ruling included not only an estimate of land use change due to ethanol, but also a revised and 
substantially lower LCA estimate. As a result, even with land use change, corn-ethanol still meets the threshold, 
provided relatively more ‘clean’ inputs like natural gas are used instead in the production of ethanol. 
64 Life-cycle accounting that underpins the binary sustainability thresholds, such as the U.S. requirement that corn-
ethanol reduce GHG emissions by 20 percent relative to gasoline, assumes that one gallon of ethanol (gasoline 
equivalent) replaces one gallon of gasoline.  
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change effect through an emissions savings parameter derived from the EPA’s RFS2 ruling in 
February 2010. 
In addition to quantifying the fuel market leakage effects, our paper also contributes to 
the biofuels debate by providing a more complete analysis of the carbon emission effects of 
biofuels policies by taking into account fuel market leakage. For example, we show that while 
the addition of a tax credit to a binding ethanol consumption mandate has no effect on the 
ethanol market price, the ethanol price increases if the tax credit is combined with a blend 
mandate. In addition, a tax credit combined with a binding mandate always alleviates 
international leakage, though perhaps only marginally, because it causes an increase in the 
gasoline market price. 
Our analysis finds that one gasoline-energy equivalent gallon of ethanol replaces only 
0.19 to 0.37 gallons of gasoline and the rest (0.63 and 0.81 gallons, respectively) is displaced 
(i.e., contributes to higher fuel consumption). The significant fuel market leakage combined with 
the land use leakage makes one gallon of ethanol emit as much as 16 percent more carbon than 
one gallon of gasoline. This is a key finding: U.S. corn ethanol does not meet the EPA’s 20 
percent “sustainability standard”.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section defines market 
leakage, describes the emissions savings effect of corn ethanol with and without consideration of 
petroleum by-products, and derives a rule to determine whether or not corn ethanol meets the 
EPA’s sustainability standard. In Section 2, we analyze market leakage due to a blenders’ tax 
credit. For analytical tractability, we do not model crude oil (which is proxied by gasoline) or 
petroleum by-products, but our theoretical findings also hold for the more complex numerical 
model. In Section 3, we investigate market leakage under a binding consumption mandate, and 
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we extend the analysis to a binding blend mandate in Section 4.65 The data and procedures used 
to calibrate the numerical model are presented in Section 5. In Section 6, we present our results. 
The last section provides some concluding remarks. 
2. Market Leakage (Indirect Output Use Change Effect) and Changes in Global Carbon 
Emissions due to Ethanol 
At combustion, one gasoline-energy equivalent gallon (GEEG) of ethanol emits less carbon 
dioxide (CO2) than one gallon of gasoline. Letting eG and eE denote kilograms of CO2 emitted per 
GEEG of ethanol and gasoline, respectively, the term  
                                                                    G E
G
e e
e


                                                                 (1) 
represents carbon savings of ethanol relative to gasoline; for example, a value 0.20  means 
that one GEEG of ethanol emits 20 percent less carbon than the same quantity of gasoline. 
Embedded in expression (1) is the EPA’s assumption that every GEEG of ethanol consumed 
replaces one gallon of gasoline. 
However, gasoline is one of several products which are jointly produced from crude oil, 
so ethanol also replaces the by-products of gasoline production, such as distillate fuel oil or 
kerosene; it is generally assumed that the gasoline and by-product quantities are linked through a 
fixed production coefficient.66 The existence of by-products is not reflected in the EPA’s 
estimates of CO2 savings of ethanol. Denoting βG and βB as GEEGs of gasoline and by-products 
                                                 
65 We model both a consumption mandate and a blend mandate because in theory the U.S. mandate is a consumption 
mandate but it is implemented on a yearly basis as a blend mandate. Some authors model it as a consumption 
mandate (e.g., Lapan and Moschini 2012), while others model it as a blend mandate (e.g., de Gorter and Just 2009). 
Furthermore, the distinction facilities exposition as the consumption mandate is more straightforward and the 
extension to a blend mandate makes it easier to understand. 
66 We assume that oil is not a substitute for other primary energy sources, such as coal or natural gas. Therefore, 
leakage estimates presented in this paper are a lower bound if one allows for any substitutability between oil and 
other primary energy sources. 
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per barrel of crude oil, respectively, the ratio of the quantity of gasoline (G) and by-products (B) 
is given by 
                                                                       G
B
G
B


                                                                    (2) 
 Equation (2) implies that associated with one GEEG of gasoline are βB/βG GEEGs of 
petroleum by-products. Therefore, the CO2 savings of one GEEG of ethanol relative to one 
GEEG of gasoline and a corresponding quantity of the petroleum by-products are 
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                                                         (3) 
where eB denotes the CO2 emissions of a GEEG of by-products.
67 The interpretation of equation 
(3) is analogous to that of equation (1). A comparison of equations (1) and (3) yields θ > ξ. 
Intuitively, the carbon savings of ethanol are expected to be higher when petroleum by-products 
are included;  in addition to reducing gasoline consumption, ethanol also reduces consumption of 
the by-products (which are produced in a fixed proportion to gasoline) and the carbon associated 
with the by-products’ consumption. 
 Let E denote the volume of gasoline energy-equivalent gallons of ethanol which are 
introduced to the fuel market because of a biofuels policy. The additional ethanol volume will 
affect relative prices and hence also affect global consumption of gasoline and the petroleum by-
products. An increase in ethanol consumption decreases the relative price of gasoline, which 
results in increased oil consumption in the rest of the world (ROW); hence, the EPA’s implicit 
assumption that one GEEG of ethanol replaces gasoline one-to-one will not hold. To measure the 
                                                 
67 In the numerical part of the paper, we show that θ = 0.79 if land use change is not considered, and θ = 0.65 when 
this effect is taken into account. 
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number of gallons of gasoline that are actually displaced (i.e., not replaced) by ethanol, we 
define market leakage as 
                                                                   
M
G E
L
E
 
                                                             (4)  
where ΔG < 0 denotes a reduction in global gasoline consumption due to the introduction of E 
GEEGs of ethanol. Although equation (4) defines market leakage solely in terms of gasoline and 
ethanol, the presence of petroleum by-products is implicitly embedded in the change in gasoline 
consumption, ΔG. For example, a value of LM = 0.7 means that one GEEG of ethanol replaces 
only 0.3 gallons of gasoline and the rest, 0.7 gallons, is displaced. 
If the initial consumption of ethanol is zero, and it increases to E GEEGs, the change in 
CO2 emissions is given by
68  
                                               2 in global CO E G Be E e G e B                                               (5) 
where ΔB denotes a change in global consumption of petroleum by-products.  
 Relationship (2) implies  B GB G     and from equation (3), we have
   1E G B G Be e e       . Substituting these expressions into equation (5) and rearranging, 
we obtain 
                          2
reduction in emissions associated with change in emissions due to 
consumption of ethanol market leakage
 in global CO G B G B G B G Be e E e e E G                                (6) 
                                                 
68 Throughout the paper, we assume that ethanol policies are implemented only in the Home country. While this 
assumption greatly simplifies the theoretical analysis, it makes no difference to our qualitative results because, in 
theory, one can always aggregate all countries producing biofuels into a Home country and treat the remaining 
countries as a Foreign country (as it is typically done in a partial equilibrium analysis). Because our numerical 
simulations are meant to illustrate and quantify our theoretical results, we follow the same principles and use the 
Unites States – the world’s largest ethanol producer – as an example. Even though we do not model biofuel policies 
in every single country that produces biofuels, we note that leakage estimates are more sensitive to elasticities than 
they are to fuel consumption/production shares. This suggests that, for a given set of elasticities, our leakage 
estimates would not change significantly if more than two countries were analyzed.  
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The first term on the right-hand side of equation (5) represents a reduction in carbon emissions 
due to E GEEGs of ethanol relative to the same quantity of gasoline and corresponding by-
products, assuming that ethanol replaces gasoline one-to-one. The second term represents a 
change in global carbon emissions – typically an increase – that occurs because of a change in 
the relative prices of ethanol, gasoline, and the petroleum by-products. To see this better, the 
term E + ΔG in equation (5) can be replaced by ELM (from equation (4)). Therefore, total carbon 
emissions per GEEG of ethanol, taking into account the market leakage effect, are  
                                    
     1 G B G B G B G B Me e E e e EL
E
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                               (7) 
where the first term in the numerator of expression (7) represents carbon emissions of corn 
ethanol, assuming it replaces gasoline one-to one. With expression (7), we are in a position to 
determine the overall carbon savings of one GEEG of corn ethanol relative to one GEEG of 
gasoline and associated petroleum by-products. To do that, we reuse definition (3) by 
substituting the overall carbon savings of ethanol,    1 M G B G BL e e        (obtained by 
simplifying expression (7)) for the term eE in equation (3), to obtain
69 
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Equation (8) shows that increasing corn ethanol consumption offers a net reduction in global 
carbon emissions if and only if θ – LM  > 0 – i.e., if the emissions savings effect  outweighs the 
indirect output use effect that is also known as leakage. For instance, if θ = 0.8 and LM  = 0.7, the 
net savings of corn ethanol relative to gasoline and corresponding by-products are only 10 
percent (and not 80 percent as assumed previously by policymakers). 
                                                 
69 This result is in line with the finding of Stoft (2010).  
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 Empirically, we will estimate the quantity on the right-hand side of equation (8) to 
determine whether corn ethanol meets a given EPA sustainability standard (for example, the 
current standard of 20 percent). This entails determining whether  
                                                EPA's sustainabilty standardML                                            (9) 
If condition (9) holds, corn ethanol meets the standard.  
3. Market Leakage with a Blender’s Tax Credit 
Throughout the paper, we assume that gasoline and ethanol (in gasoline-equivalent terms) are 
perfect substitutes in consumption. Consumers do not distinguish between the two, so the only 
relevant market demand curve is one for fuel, which consumers demand in order to obtain miles 
traveled. A blender’s tax credit is an ethanol consumption subsidy paid to fuel blenders for each 
gallon of ethanol blended with gasoline. Competition among blenders implies that the ethanol 
market price will be higher than the gasoline price by the amount of the tax credit.70 In Appendix 
1, we derive a formula for market leakage when ethanol production increases due to an increase 
in the blender’s tax credit, using the definition of market leakage in equation (4): 
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                                   (10) 
where denotes the blenders’ tax credit,  denotes the Home country’s share of world gasoline 
consumption, denotes the Home country’s share of world gasoline  production, and the terms 
denote the relevant elasticities. The first subscript (D or S) in each elasticity term signifies an 
elasticity of fuel demand or supply, respectively, and the second subscript (H or F) denotes the 
country (Home or Foreign/Rest of world). 
 The value of market leakage in (10) is always non-negative and does not exceed unity, 
                                                 
70 That the tax credit is modeled as a consumption subsidy follows from the increase in the ethanol market price. 
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which means that one GEEG of ethanol produced under the tax credit can replace at most one 
gallon of gasoline. The actual rate of replacement depends mostly on market elasticities and to a 
lesser extent on the consumption and production shares of the Home country. For illustration, 
assume that demand and supply elasticities are the same in both countries and are equal to -0.2 
and 0.2, respectively. In this case, the market leakage due to a tax credit is 0.5 [x100] percent, 
meaning that one energy-equivalent gallon of ethanol replaces 0.5 gallons of gasoline. Notice 
that market leakage is independent of market shares if the demand and supply are equal in 
absolute values and do not vary between countries. 
 Since an ethanol production increase caused by a tax credit always lowers the world 
gasoline price, the tax credit increases not only international gasoline consumption but also 
domestic consumption (unless the Home country is “small” – i.e., its share of gasoline is small 
enough that it has no effect on the world gasoline price – see Appendix 1). Hence, we must 
distinguish between domestic leakage and international leakage.71 Decomposing the total market 
leakage given by expression (10) into a domestic 
D
ML and international 
I
ML component, the 
relative share of domestic leakage depends on the consumption shares and demand elasticities in 
both countries. The relative domestic share of leakage does not depend on the fuel supply 
elasticities, since leakage occurs only along the demand curves; it is equal to 
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                                                        (11)                             
Inspection of ratio (11) reveals that domestic leakage becomes more significant relative to 
international leakage as (i) the Home country’s share of world gasoline consumption increases, 
or (ii) the elasticity of demand for fuel in the Home country becomes more elastic relative to fuel 
                                                 
71 We define domestic leakage as a change in fuel consumption – due to biofuels – occurring in the country that 
introduces biofuels, while international leakage denotes a change in fuel (gasoline) consumption in the rest of the 
world. 
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demand in the Foreign country. Therefore, if an ethanol-producing country72  consumes a 
substantial share of world gasoline, the bias of market leakage estimates which ignore domestic 
leakage could be substantial. Likewise, if domestic demand for fuel is relatively elastic and only 
the international component of leakage is considered, estimates of market leakage are likely to 
underestimate its true value. 
Is Market Leakage for a Small Country Always 100 Percent? 
One might suppose that a biofuel policy of a small importer (exporter) in the gasoline 
market that faces a perfectly elastic excess supply (demand) curve of gasoline would necessarily 
have 100 percent leakage. The argument is that if a small country increases its production (and 
consumption) of ethanol, but this has no effect on gasoline prices (due to the small country 
assumption), then ethanol does not replace any gasoline. However, this does not necessarily have 
to be the case, and, under some conditions, a small country can have less leakage of its biofuel 
policies than a large country which influences the world gasoline price. 
A small country in international markets faces a perfectly elastic excess supply/demand 
curve. The conditions under which it faces the perfectly elastic curve are derived in Appendix 2). 
We analyze the case of a perfectly elastic trade curve because of consumption and production 
shares.73 Given this assumption, market leakage with a blenders’ tax credit is equal to 
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If we assume further than the fuel demand and gasoline supply elasticities in both countries are -
0.2 and 0.2, respectively, then market leakage is 50 percent – only half of what we might have 
expected for a small country. 
                                                 
72 Or a coalition of countries. 
73 A small importer faces no market leakage provided that production technology in the Foreign country exhibits 
constant returns to scale which render the Foreign gasoline supply curve perfectly elastic. On the other hand, a small 
exporter sees 100 percent market leakage, if the fuel demand curve in the rest of the world is perfectly elastic.  
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4. Market Leakage with a Consumption Mandate 
The economics of a biofuel consumption mandate are different from those of a blenders’ tax 
credit. The tax credit is a taxpayer-financed ethanol consumption subsidy which raises the 
ethanol market price and hence increases ethanol supply from domestic production and imports. 
In contrast, the ethanol supply which is produced to meet a consumption mandate is financed by 
an implicit gasoline consumption tax which reduces the equilibrium quantity of gasoline and its 
market price. Gasoline producers are made worse off by a consumption mandate, but fuel 
consumers can be better off under some circumstances, since the mandate can either increase or 
decrease the fuel price (de Gorter and Just 2009b; Lapan and Moschini 2012). 
Total market leakage from a consumption mandate depends on whether domestic fuel 
consumption decreases with the mandate. Total leakage may actually be negative (i.e., it would 
further reduce ethanol’s GHG emissions relative to gasoline) if the reduction in domestic fuel 
consumption is larger than the increase in Foreign country gasoline consumption which occurs 
when the gasoline price decreases. We also note that even if the domestic fuel price increases 
with a mandate, global GHG emissions can increase; this result arises if one GEEG of ethanol 
replaces less than one gallon of gasoline and the emissions savings effect θ is sufficiently small. 
It can also be the case that the mandate decreases the domestic fuel price and decreases global 
GHG emissions as well; this result arises if the emissions savings effect θ is strong enough. 
Therefore, a reduction in the fuel price is not a sufficient condition for GHG emissions to 
increase. 
The analytical formula for market leakage with a consumption mandate, denoted by
ML
 , 
is equal to (see Appendix 3 for derivation) 
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where is the ratio of the intercept of the ethanol supply curve and the gasoline market price 
under the mandate. The structure of equation (13) is very similar to that of the market leakage 
formula for a tax credit in (10). The new parameter  relates the ethanol mandate to the gasoline 
market.  It is easy to show that 1ML
  ; expression (13) can also take on negative values, meaning 
that one gallon of ethanol can replace more than one gallon of gasoline. 
Close inspection of equations (10) and (13) reveals that a binding consumption mandate 
is always superior to a blender’s tax credit in terms of the magnitude of market leakage. This is 
stated by the following result.  
Result 1: For the same quantity of ethanol, the market leakage due to a blenders’ tax 
credit is always greater than that due to a consumption mandate. This follows immediately from 
the differencing of equations (10) and (13) 
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Intuitively, this result is driven by the way the two policies are financed. While a blenders’ tax 
credit is a taxpayer-financed ethanol consumption subsidy, a consumption mandate is an implicit 
tax on gasoline (oil) producers (and sometimes also fuel consumers). This means that for the 
same quantity of ethanol, the gasoline (oil) price decreases more with a mandate than with the 
tax credit. This translates into lower global fuel consumption with a mandate, and hence less 
leakage under the mandate than under the tax credit. 
Market Leakage when a Tax Credit is Added to a Binding Consumption Mandate 
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If a blender’s tax credit is added to a binding consumption mandate for ethanol, the tax credit 
effectively subsidizes gasoline consumption, thus contradicting all environmental objectives (de 
Gorter and Just 2009b). In this case, the leakage due to the tax credit is infinite, because a tax 
credit does not induce additional ethanol production when a consumption mandate is binding. 
The tax credit’s addition to a binding mandate does not cause any gasoline to be replaced by 
ethanol, but it does cause additional gasoline to be consumed (a displacement effect; see de 
Gorter and Just 2009b for reasoning). Because our definition of market leakage has the replaced 
gasoline quantity in the denominator, its value for the tax credit is infinite. 
However, the market leakage due to the combination of the two policies is finite. The 
ethanol generated under a mandate does replace some gasoline, so the denominator of the 
fraction is not zero when the net effect of both policies is considered. However, total leakage of 
the combination of the two policies is greater than it would be with a mandate alone because of 
the oil consumption induced in the rest of the world by the tax credit. 
In a special case, there could be a consumption mandate which is combined with a tax 
credit whose magnitude is such that by itself it would generate a quantity of ethanol equal to the 
consumption mandate. The following result shows what happens when these two policies are 
combined. 
Result 2: If a binding consumption mandate is combined with a tax credit equal74 to the 
price premium necessary to generate the mandated quantity of ethanol, then  
                                                 
74 If the tax credit is less than the mandate premium (which almost has to be the case in reality when the mandate 
binds), then the market leakage in the large country case can still be positive, but may become negative if the 
mandate alone generates negative leakage; otherwise, leakage is greater with the policy combination than with the 
mandate alone. 
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i.) if the country is small in the world gasoline market, the tax credit exactly offsets the 
reduction in gasoline consumption due to the mandate and the market leakage of both 
policies combined is zero; 
ii.) if the country is large in the world gasoline market, the tax credit more than offsets the 
reduction in gasoline consumption due to the mandate and the market leakage of both 
policies combined is positive. 
Proof: 
Denote PF as the fuel price in the Home country with no policy. With no policy in place, we have 
PF  = PG, where PG denotes the world price of gasoline. Let PF' be the fuel price in the Home 
country when both policies are introduced. The change in the domestic fuel price is equal to 
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where CF' denotes fuel consumption with both policies, EP denotes the ethanol price determined 
by the binding consumption mandate of E gallons of ethanol, PG' denotes the world gasoline 
price with the policies, and 
*
c E Gt P P  is the tax credit equal to the price premium necessary to 
generate the mandated quantity of ethanol with the tax credit alone. 
Substituting the expression for the required tax credit back to equation (14) yields  
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where the negative sign of GP in equation (15) follows from Appendix 3 and results in 
   F Gsign P sign P    
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Therefore, for a small country whose policies have no impact on world gasoline prices, it must 
be that 0FP  . This means that domestic and foreign fuel consumption do not change with the 
implementation of the policies; hence, market leakage is zero. A consumption mandate combined 
with a tax credit in a large country reduces the world gasoline price and therefore the tax credit 
more than offsets the reduction in gasoline consumption due to the mandate and world fuel 
consumption increases, resulting in positive leakage. 
5. Market Leakage with a Blend Mandate 
We now analyze a biofuel blend mandate, which is a third policy option. Unlike the consumption 
mandate, under the blend mandate the quantity of ethanol to be consumed is not given in 
absolute terms, but rather given as a fixed share in the final fuel consumption in the economy. 
Although the economics of the two policies are not the same, it is easy to show that they produce 
identical outcomes if they yield the same quantity of ethanol production—i.e., if the blend 
mandate α is equal to the share of ethanol in the total domestic fuel consumption under the 
consumption mandate:  H FE D P  . Substituting this blend requirement to the system (A4-1) 
in Appendix 4, it is clear that the equilibrium conditions for the consumption mandate (A3-1) in 
Appendix 1 are identical to those in (A4-1). Therefore, if the consumption and blend mandate 
generate the same quantity of ethanol, they also generate the same market leakage. Hence, Result 
1 also applies to the blend mandate. 
Market Leakage when a Tax Credit is Added to a Binding Blend Mandate 
The addition of a tax credit to a preexisting binding blend mandate always increases the ethanol 
price, as shown by the last derivative in (A4-4) in Appendix 4. The ethanol price increases 
because the tax credit acts as a fuel consumption subsidy, reducing the fuel price (see the middle 
derivative in (A4-4)), increasing fuel consumption, and increasing ethanol production – a final 
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outcome that is only achievable through a higher market price of ethanol. Unlike a blend 
mandate alone, a tax credit combined with a blend mandate always has an unambiguous impact 
on the ethanol and fuel prices. The effect of a higher tax credit combined with a binding blend 
mandate on the world gasoline price is also unequivocal – it increases, as shown by the first 
derivative in (A4-4). The gasoline price increases because of increased fuel consumption in the 
Home country; since the quantity of gasoline in the Home country is proportional to the quantity 
of fuel, (1 – α), blenders demand more gasoline which increases its market price. 
It follows from the forgoing discussion that a tax credit in combination with a blend 
mandate alleviates (although possibly only marginally) the international leakage caused by a 
mandate alone, though at the same time it increases domestic leakage because it lowers the fuel 
price. The overall impact on leakage of adding a tax credit is thus indeterminate and depends 
mainly on supply and demand elasticities in both countries. 
 Unlike the effects explained for the consumption mandate in section 3 – where market 
leakage due to the addition of a tax credit resulted in infinite market leakage – the addition of a 
tax credit to a blend mandate results in finite (although positive) market leakage. Gasoline 
reduction is non-zero because the market price of ethanol increases, generating some ethanol 
production. 
In the result to follow, we investigate what happens if a tax credit is added to a binding 
blend mandate when the tax credit’s magnitude is such that by itself it would generate the same 
quantity of ethanol as the blend mandate alone. This tax credit differs from the tax credit whose 
ethanol quantity is equivalent to a consumption mandate; this accounts for the difference 
between Results 2 and 3. 
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Result 3: If a binding blend mandate is combined with a tax credit equal to the price 
premium necessary to generate the mandated quantity of ethanol with the tax credit alone, then  
i.) if the country is small in the world gasoline market, the tax credit does not fully offset the 
reduction in gasoline consumption due to the mandate, and market leakage of both 
policies combined is negative—i.e., one energy-equivalent gallon of ethanol replaces 
more than one gallon of gasoline (but the negative leakage effect is not as strong as with 
the mandate alone); 
ii.) if the country is large in the world gasoline market, the tax credit could more than offset, 
equally offset, or less than offset the reduction in gasoline consumption due to the 
mandate, depending on market parameters. 
Proof: 
Denote PF as the fuel price in the Home country with no policy. In this case, PF  = PG, where PG 
denotes the world price of gasoline in the absence of either biofuel policy. Let PF' be the fuel 
price in the Home country when both policies are combined. The change in fuel price is 
                                          ˆ' 1 'F F G E c G GP P P P t P P                                               (16) 
where PE denotes the ethanol price under the two policies combined and cˆt denotes the tax credit 
that would generate the same quantity of ethanol as the mandate alone. Let the ethanol price 
generated by the blend mandate α alone be ˆEP . Then 
ˆ
cˆ E Gt P P  , and equation (16) becomes 
                                                        1F E GP P P                                                           (17) 
where ˆE E EP P P   denotes a change in the price of ethanol from the situation with a blend 
mandate only to a situation where the mandate is combined with the tax credit; 'G G GP P P  
denotes a change in gasoline price from the situation with no policy to a situation where both 
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policies are combined. Therefore, the changes in ethanol and gasoline prices are not related to 
the same initial equilibrium. 
As shown in Appendix 4, the addition of a tax credit to a pre-existing blend mandate 
increases the ethanol market price; therefore for a small country ( 0GP  ), 0FP  and so, 
unlike with the consumption mandate, a combination of the blend mandate and the tax credit 
does result in a reduction in the Home country’s fuel consumption. However, the direction of 
fuel consumption change is ambiguous for a large country because the gasoline price 
unambiguously decreases when a tax credit is added (Appendix 4), making the sign of FP
indeterminate; the change in fuel consumption depends on market elasticities and consumption 
and production shares. 
6. A Numerical Example 
In this section, we empirically estimate the magnitude of market leakage of U.S. corn ethanol 
policies in 2009; we also determine whether U.S. corn ethanol meets the EPA’s 20 percent 
sustainability standard. We use the numerical model detailed in Cui et al. (2011), but we 
calibrate it to a different set of biofuel policies: a binding mandate combined with a blenders’ tax 
credit, ethanol production subsidy, and a feedstock (corn) production subsidy. Although the 
numerical model allows for a more detailed analysis compared to our theoretical framework – in 
that it considers oil, petroleum by-products, and the corn market – the theoretical insights and 
formulas for market leakage analyzed in the previous sections still hold. All the baseline data and 
their primary sources or formulas (if applicable) are presented in Appendix 5. All relevant data 
are converted into gasoline-energy equivalents to consistently model the linkages in the fuel 
market. 
Data and Calibration 
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Biofuel policies have historically caused ethanol production in the United States (Drabik 2011). 
Although the ethanol mandate and blender’s tax credit have perhaps been most influential in 
determining the quantity of ethanol consumed in the United States, the ethanol industry has also 
benefited from ethanol and corn production subsidies. U.S. ethanol consumption in 2009 
amounted to 11.04 bil. gallons, which represents a 6 percent share (by energy) in total U.S. fuel 
consumption. The ethanol blenders’ tax credit of $0.498/gallon consists of a federal component, 
equal to $0.45/gallon, and a state-level component, which is averaged at $0.048/gallon in 2009 
(Koplow 2009). The ethanol production subsidy calculated by Koplow (2009) is $0.14/gallon in 
2008. We assume the same level of the subsidy in 2009. 
Corn subsidies in the U.S. totaled $3.79 bil. in 2009 (Environmental Working Group).75 
Of this total, $2.00 bil. consisted of decoupled subsidies. Following Sumner (2006), we assume a 
coefficient of 0.25 to represent the degree to which decoupled subsidies are actually coupled. 
The total production subsidy for corn is computed as follows: 0.25x $2.00 bil. + ($3.79 bil. - 
$2.00 bil. ) = $2.29 bil. This translates to a subsidy of $0.17/bushel. 
The U.S. fuel tax for gasoline was $0.49/gallon in 2009 (American Petroleum Institute). 
This includes the federal and state excise taxes as well as other taxes. We assume that the 
average tax on the petroleum by-products we consider is equal to 33 percent of the gasoline tax. 
Following the analysis in de Gorter and Just (2010), we calibrate the model to a binding 
mandate (and other policies as described above). With the binding mandate, the price of fuel (a 
mix of ethanol and gasoline) is equal to the weighted average of ethanol and gasoline prices 
adjusted for the fuel tax and the tax credit. Corn and ethanol prices are linked through a zero 
profit condition for ethanol production; the prices of oil, gasoline, and petroleum by-products are 
similarly linked. 
                                                 
75 http://farm.ewg.org/progdetail.php?fips=00000&progcode=corn 
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In the feedstock (corn) market, we explicitly model the market effects of the co-product 
of ethanol production (Dried Distillers Grains with Solubles, DDGS)76. Following Hoffman and 
Baker (2011), we that assume 81 percent of DDGS is consumed domestically and the rest is 
exported. 
Our numerical model uses demand and supply curves that exhibit constant price 
elasticities; this enables us to capture potentially non-linear effects from the introduction of 
ethanol in the analyzed markets. The elasticities’ values are adopted from other studies (Gardner 
2007; Hamilton 2009; and Cui et. al. 2011) and are presented in Appendix 5. Owing to the lack 
of econometric estimates, we assume, following Cui et al. (2011), that the demand for petroleum 
by-products has the same elasticity as the demand for fuel. We assume that the supply elasticity 
of oil in the ROW is 0.15; this assumption results in a reasonable estimate of demand elasticity 
for oil in the ROW, -0.29,77 given our assumption that the elasticity of oil import supply facing 
the United States is 3.00 – the value used in Cui et al. (2011). 
Carbon Emissions 
An oil refinery produces various petroleum products, of which gasoline represents 46.1 percent 
by volume (Table 1). The implied volume of gasoline obtained from one barrel of oil (which is 
42 gallons) is thus 0.461 x 42 = 19.362 gallons. The second column in Table 1 presents the 
implied volumes for the petroleum by-products as well. The total number of gallons (44.772) of 
all petroleum products obtained from one barrel of crude oil exceeds 42. This is known as the oil 
processing gain (equal to 6.6 percent in 2009), and it occurs because the density of oil products 
changes relative to the density of oil during the refining process. The third column in Table 1 
                                                 
76 See Drabik (2011) for details on these effects. 
77 This demand elasticity is consistent with the results of a recent meta-analysis by Havránek et al. (2012). 
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provides shares of individual petroleum by-products (other than gasoline) of the total volume of 
by-products (25.41 gallons). 
The actual yield of gasoline per barrel of crude oil differs from the theoretical one 
reported in the second column of Table 1. There are two reasons for the difference. First, the 
volume of 19.362 gallons does not take into account the 6.6 percent oil processing gain 
mentioned above. It is not clear, however, how to properly model the distribution of processing 
gain among the various oil products. Second, before fuel is sold at pump stations, special 
additives (other than ethanol) are mixed with the fuel to enhance its properties. These additives 
are produced from petroleum by-products. Hence, some volume of the by-products is actually 
used as fuel, and the effective volume of consumer “gasoline” per barrel of oil actually exceeds 
19.362 gallons. 
We calculate the actual number of gallons of gasoline per barrel of oil as follows. The 
total fuel consumption in the Unites States in 2009 amounted to 134.74 bil. gallons (physical 
volume). This includes gasoline, additives, and ethanol.78 Ethanol consumption was 11.04 bil. 
gallons in 2009, and imports of additives (not produced from the oil processed in the United 
States) were 10.73 bil. gallons. Thus, the quantity of non-ethanol fuel (inclusive of additives) 
produced domestically is equal to 134.74 - 11.04 - 10.73 = 112.98 bil. gallons. Finally, we 
estimate the yield of gasoline per barrel of crude oil, equal to 21.483 gallons, by dividing the 
quantity of non-ethanol fuel produced in the U.S. (112.98 bil. gallons) by the quantity of oil 
processed in the U.S. in 2009 (5.26 bil gallons). 
                                                 
78 We endogenize imports of additives by fixing the ratio of imports of additives to domestic gasoline production at 
its baseline value. 
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Table 1. Oil Products and Their Carbon Emissions
Refinery yield 
(share)
a Gallons/barrel 
Share in by-
products
Adjusted 
gallons/barrel 
kg CO2/gallon 
b Total kg 
CO2/barrel
Gasoline 0.461 19.362 21.483 8.91 191.42
Distillate fuel oil 0.269 11.298 0.445 10.355 10.15 105.10
Kereosene type jet fuel 0.093 3.906 0.154 3.580 9.57 34.26
Residual fuel oil 0.040 1.680 0.066 1.540 11.79 18.15
Kerosene 0.001 0.042 0.002 0.038 9.76 0.38
Liquid refinery gases 0.041 1.722 0.068 1.578 6.00 9.47
Still gas 0.044 1.848 0.073 1.694 9.17 15.53
Petroleum coke 0.053 2.226 0.088 2.040 14.65 29.89
Finished aviation gasoline 0.001 0.042 0.002 0.038 8.32 0.32
Naptha for petrochemical feedstock use 0.013 0.546 0.021
Other oils for petrochemical feedstock use 0.008 0.336 0.013
Special naphthas 0.002 0.084 0.003
Lubricants 0.010 0.420 0.017
Waxes 0.001 0.042 0.002
Asphalt and road oil 0.024 1.008 0.040
Miscellaneous products 0.005 0.210 0.008
Total 1.066 44.772 404.52
     Subtotal for by-products (excluding gasoline) 25.410 23.289
Notes:
a 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pnp_pct_dc_nus_pct_a.htm
b
 http://205.254.135.7/oiaf/1605/coefficients.html
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Without an established method to apportion the oil processing gain to individual 
petroleum products, and without adequate information about how much of each petroleum by-
product is used to produce gasoline additives, we adjust the volumes of petroleum by-products 
per barrel of oil as follows. The total volume of the by-products is 23.289 gallons (=44.772 - 
21.483). Then, we multiply this absolute total volume by the by-products’ relative shares which 
are reported in the third column in Table 1. For example, the adjusted volume of distillate fuel oil 
is equal to 0.445 x 23.289 = 10.355 gallons, since distillate fuel oil comprises 44.5% of the 
petroleum by-products, by volume. We calculate the adjusted volumes only for petroleum by-
products that get combusted (we assume that the consumption of non-combustible by-products 
such as Waxes does not contribute to CO2 emissions). 
The fifth column in Table 1 shows how much CO2 is released when one gallon of the 
petroleum product is combusted. The last column gives the total CO2 emissions which each 
product contributes to a barrel of oil. For example, gasoline contributes 191.42 kg/barrel = 
21.483 gal of gasoline per barrel of oil x 8.91 kg/CO2 per gallon of gasoline. The sum of the 
values across by-products, shown in the last column, equals the total CO2 emissions associated 
with consuming a barrel of oil: 404.52 kg. 
 However, 404.52 kg CO2 per barrel of oil is an underestimate because it ignores other 
emissions that occur before consumption (i.e., before combustion) such as emissions related to 
drilling of oil. We thus need to determine the CO2 emissions of crude oil corresponding to its 
life-cycle analysis (LCA). To do that, we use the values given in Table 2. The total LCA (i.e., 
well-to-wheels) carbon emissions of gasoline are estimated to be 10.803kg/gallon; this translates 
into 21.483 x 10.803 = 232.07 kg/barrel. Approximately 80 percent of all carbon emissions of 
gasoline are released at combustion (i.e., tank-to-wheels). We assume that this ratio applies also 
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to other petroleum by-products. Thus, we calculate the LCA emissions of petroleum by-products 
as 213.10/0.8 = 264.89kg/barrel, where the value of 213.10 represents the total emissions (at 
combustion) of petroleum by-products per barrel of oil. (It is the sum of the values in the last 
column in Table 1 exclusive of gasoline). We calculate carbon emissions of petroleum by-
products by dividing carbon emissions of the by-products per barrel of oil (264.89 kg) by the 
sum of adjusted gallons/barrel of petroleum by-products from the fourth column in Table 1 
(20.864 gallons); hence, we calculate the carbon emissions of the by-products to be 12.696 
kg/gallon. Finally, the total carbon emissions per barrel of oil are given by the sum of gasoline 
and by-products emissions, that is, 232.07 + 264.89 = 496.96 kg/barrel. 
In the numerical simulations, we assume two different scenarios for the carbon savings of 
corn ethanol relative to gasoline. In the first scenario, corn ethanol emits 52 percent less carbon 
emissions relative to gasoline, assuming a 100 percent replacement and no indirect emissions due 
to land use change. When emissions from land use change are included in this model, the relative 
savings of corn ethanol decreases to 21 percent (EPA, 2010). It is important to note, however, 
that these savings relate only to gasoline and ignore other potential savings due to petroleum by-
products. Thus, to obtain estimates of the total carbon savings of ethanol relative to gasoline and 
corresponding petroleum by-products, we use equation (3) and values reported in Table 2 to 
arrive at carbon savings of 79 and 65 percent for the cases where emissions from land use change 
are excluded and included, respectively. Intuitively, the carbon savings should be higher when 
by-products are taken into account, because one gasoline-energy equivalent gallon of ethanol not 
only replaces gasoline, but also a corresponding quantity of petroleum by-products. 
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Table 2. Emission Intensities of Gasoline, Petroleum By-products, and Corn Ethanol
Variable Symbol Value Unit Source
Gasoline well-to-tank CO2e emissions GWT 19,200 grams/mmBTU EPA 
a, b
Gasoline well-to-wheels CO2e emissions GWW 98,205 grams/mmBTU EPA 
c
Gasoline tank-to-wheels CO2e emissions GTW 79,005 grams/mmBTU GTW = GWW - GWT
mmBTUs per gallon of gasoline σ 0.11 mmBTU/gallon National Renewable Energy Laboratories (2008)
Gasoline well-to-tank CO2e emissions (in kg/gallon) G'WT 2.11 kg CO2e/gallon G'WT = GWT*σ/1000
Gasoline well-to-wheels CO2e emissions (in kg/gallon) G'WW 10.803 kg CO2e/gallon G'WW = GWW*σ/1000
Gasoline tank-to-wheels CO2e emissions (in kg/gallon) G'TW 8.69 kg CO2e/gallon G'TW = GTW*σ/1000
Tank-to-wheels/well-to-wheels (=combustion/total emissions) ratio κ 0.80 κ = G'TW/G'WW
CO2 emissions of gasoline per barrel of oil, including LCA μ1 232.07 kg/barrel μ1 = βG*G'WW
CO2 emissions of petroleum by-products at combustion μ2 213.10 kg/barrel
Sum of the values in the last column in Table 1 
exclusive of gasoline
CO2 emissions of petroleum by-products (per barrel), including LCA μ3 264.89 kg/barrel μ3 = μ2/κ
CO2 emissions of petroleum by-products (per gallon), including LCA μ4 12.696 kg/gallon
μ4 = μ3/sum of adjusted gallons/barrel of petroleum 
by-products from Table 1
Total CO2 emissions per barrel of oil μT 496.96 kg/barrel μT = μ1 + μ3
Carbon savings of corn ethanol relative to gasoline
     Excluding land use change ξ52 0.52 RFA 
d
     Including land use change ξ21 0.21 EPA 
c
Carbon savings of corn ethanol relative to gasoline & by-products
     Excluding land use change θ52 0.79 θ52 = (G'WW + (βB/βG)*μ4 - z52)/(G'WW + (βB/βG)*μ4)
     Including land use change θ21 0.65 θ21 = (G'WW + (βB/βG)*μ4 - z21)/(G'WW + (βB/βG)*μ4)
Corn ethanol carbon emissions if 52% reduction relative to gasoline z52 5.19 kg CO2e/GEEG z52 = (1-ξ52)G'WW
Corn ethanol carbon emissions if 21% reduction relative to gasoline z21 8.53 kg CO2e/GEEG z21 = (1-ξ21)G'WW
Notes:
a
 nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPURL.cgi?Dockey=P1006DXP.txt (Table 2.5-8)
b
 mmBTUs = million British Thermal Units
c
 http://www.epa.gov/otaq/renewablefuels/420r10006.pdf (page 467 and Figure 2.6-1)
d 
http://renewablefuelsassociation.cmail1.com/T/ViewEmail/y/78B3C6C380747C63
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7. Results 
In this section, we empirically illustrate our theoretical findings. We analyze the market effects 
of three biofuel policies: an ethanol blender’s tax credit, a consumption mandate, and a 
combination of the two. To be able to compare the effects of individual policies, we hold ethanol 
consumption constant and equal to its baseline level (11.04 bil. gallons = 7.63 bil. GEEGs). In all 
simulations, we set ethanol and corn production subsidies to zero. For ease of comparison, we 
express all prices and quantities in energy-equivalent terms. 
The first column in Table 3 presents a market outcome under no biofuel policy (i.e., 
ethanol use is not mandated, and no blenders’ tax credit is provided). In this situation, the free 
market price of ethanol ($1.82/GEEG) is too low to generate any ethanol production.79 We take 
the no-policy values reported in the first column as benchmark values for evaluating the 
magnitude of market leakage associated with ethanol policies. 
In the second column, we present the market effects of a blender’s tax credit alone. To 
achieve the pre-determined level of ethanol consumption, a $0.87/gallon tax credit is required.80 
Notice that this tax credit is almost twice as high as the one actually used in 2009. The 
competition among fuel blenders for the tax credit bids the ethanol price up by $0.99/GEEG 
relative to the no-policy scenario. Ethanol consumption replaces some gasoline, thus reducing 
the world demand for oil. As a result, the oil market price decreases on net by $0.95/barrel, and 
the gasoline price decreases by $0.27/gallon. However, the reduction in the oil price is mitigated 
by an increase in the market price of petroleum by-products (it increases by $0.21/GEEG). 
 
 
                                                 
79 This occurs because the intersection of the corn supply and demand curves (which corresponds to the intercept of 
the ethanol supply curve) is above the free market price of ethanol (Drabik, 2011). 
80 This corresponds to $1.27/GEEG of ethanol. 
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Table 3. Market Effects of A Biofuel Tax Credit and Mandate Relative to No Ethanol Production
No policy Tax credit Mandate 
Mandate & tax 
credit
Oil price ($/barrel) 61.98 -0.95 -1.08 -1.01
Gasoline price ($/GEEG) 2.04 -0.27 -0.31 -0.29
Ethanol price ($/GEEG) 1.82 0.99 0.99 0.99
Fuel price ($/GEEG) 2.53 -0.27 -0.24 -0.26
U.S. market price of petroleum by-products ($/GEEG) 1.54 0.21 0.24 0.22
U.S. consumer price of petroleum by-products ($/GEEG) 1.71 0.21 0.24 0.22
U.S. gasoline consumption (billion GEEGs) 116.57 -3.47 -3.95 -3.68
U.S. fuel additives (billion GEEGS) 11.07 -0.33 -0.38 -0.35
U.S. ethanol consumption (billion GEEGs) 0.00 7.63 7.63 7.63
U.S. fuel consumption (billion GEEGs) 127.65 3.83 3.30 3.60
U.S. consumption of petroleum by-products (billion GEEGs) 126.37 -3.76 -4.29 -3.99
ROW oil consumption (billion barrels) * 21.03 0.09 0.11 0.10
         ROW gasoline consumption (billion GEEGs) 451.70 2.04 2.33 2.16
         ROW by-product consumption (billion GEEGs) 489.66 2.21 2.53 2.35
World oil consumption (billion barrels) 26.45 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07
* ROW - rest of the world
Source: calculated
Difference relative to no policy
 141 
 
The price of petroleum by-products decreases because the reduction in global oil production 
results in a decrease in their production (since they are produced from crude oil through a fixed-
coefficient technology) while demand for them remains unchanged. 
As predicted by theory, the reduction in the oil price under the mandate alone in the third 
column ($-1.08/barrel) is greater than the reduction under the combination of policies in the 
fourth column ($-1.01/barrel).81 The ethanol price increase is the same across all three policies, 
however, as they all share the same level of ethanol consumption. Although global oil 
consumption decreases due to the introduction of ethanol under each policy (between 0.07 to 
0.08 bil. barrels), a lower oil price induces higher oil consumption in the ROW (between 0.09 to 
0.11 bil. barrels). 
Given that global oil consumption decreases under each policy, a question arises whether 
ethanol (in energy equivalent) replaces gasoline one-to-one as assumed by the EPA in 
constructing the sustainability standard for ethanol. The answer is no, and Table 4 shows how 
much gasoline is displaced (as opposed to replaced) by ethanol; the displaced gasoline volume 
represents market leakage, which is calculated using the formulas developed earlier. 
The first row in Table 4, entitled Most plausible parameters, repeats the policy 
simulations presented in Table 3. For example, the value 0.812 under the tax credit policy means 
that the introduction of 1 GEEG of corn ethanol in the United States results in a global increase 
in fuel consumption by 0.812 GEEGs (see also equation (4).82 Notice that if ethanol replaced 
gasoline one-to-one, then the change in global fuel consumption should be zero. Under the tax 
                                                 
81 When the tax credit is combined with the mandate, the tax credit is equal to $0.498/gallon. 
82 More specifically, the change in global fuel consumption is given by the sum of ethanol consumption and the 
change in global gasoline consumption. The former amounted to 7.63 bil. GEEGs (Table 3) and the latter is equal to 
21.483 x (-0.07) = -1.43 bil. GEEGs, where 21.483 denotes GEEGs of gasoline per barrel of oil, and -0.07 denotes 
the reduction in global oil consumption from Table 3. Thus, the change in global fuel consumption is equal to 7.63 + 
(-1.43) = 6.20 bil. GEEGs (the rest of the world consumes only gasoline). One GEEG of ethanol is then associated 
with an increase in fuel consumption of 6.20/7.63 = 0.812 GEEGs. 
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credit, one GEEG of ethanol replaces only 1-0.812 = 0.188 gallons of gasoline. Consistent with 
the policy ordering predicted by the theory, the consumption mandate performs best in terms of 
market leakage (0.787), and the combination of the mandate and the tax credit has the second-
least leakage. 
The remaining rows in Table 4 show how sensitive the market leakage due to a biofuel 
policy is to the assumed elasticities of supply and demand curves in the world fuel market. The 
changes in elasticities in the second, third, and forth row are self-explanatory. In the scenario 
entitled Inelastic fuel demand, we assume that the elasticity of U.S. demand for fuel is -0.09; this 
value corresponds to the average short run elasticity reported by Havránek et al. (2012). In the 
last scenario, Reversed yields of gasoline and petroleum by-products, we assume, similarly to 
Cui et al. (2011), that there are no imports of gasoline additives in the calibration data. This 
implies that there are 23.52 and 21.25 gallons of gasoline and petroleum by-products, 
respectively, per barrel of crude oil.  
All scenarios exhibit very stable and high levels of market leakage for all biofuel policies. 
The smallest market leakage arises in the case of very elastic U.S. oil supply relative to oil 
demand in the ROW, yet market leakage is quite high— above 60 percent— in this case. In 
summary, one GEEG of ethanol is empirically found to replace between 0.185 to 0.371 gallons 
of gasoline. 
Even if world crude oil consumption decreases in response to consumption of ethanol, 
this does not necessarily mean that global carbon emissions decrease as well. Intuitively, this is 
possible because ethanol is not a carbon-free replacement of gasoline. Recall that the EPA only 
requires that corn-ethanol emits at least 20 percent less carbon relative to gasoline. 
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Table 4. Market Leakage
Tax credit Mandate Mandate & tax credit
Most plausible parameters 0.812 0.787 0.801
Demand for petroleum by-products twice as elastic as demand for fuel 0.763 0.731 0.749
ROW oil demand twice as elastic as oil supply 0.815 0.790 0.804
ROW oil supply twice as elastic as oil demand 0.674 0.629 0.654
Inelastic fuel demand 0.782 0.773 0.778
Reversed betas 0.777 0.747 0.764
Source: calculated
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We estimate the actual carbon savings of ethanol relative to gasoline and corresponding 
petroleum by-products in Table 5; all values are calculated as the difference between the 
emissions savings effect of ethanol relative to gasoline and the market leakage effect reported in 
Table 4 (see equation (8)). The actual carbon savings of corn ethanol are calculated under two 
situations, as mentioned above. In the first situation, we exclude emissions from land use change 
from total carbon emissions of ethanol, while in the second situation we include emissions from 
land use change. Because the latest EPA’s ruling does include land use change emissions, the 
latter set of results is likely to be more relevant from a policy point of view. 
To illustrate our results, consider first the actual carbon savings of ethanol under the Most 
plausible parameters case and tax credit, excluding emissions from land use change. The 
corresponding value of -2.3 percent is obtained as the difference between 0.789 [x100%] and 
0.812 [x100%], where the former value is the carbon emissions savings effect of corn ethanol 
relative to gasoline and corresponding petroleum by-products (when emissions from land use 
change are excluded), and the latter value is the market leakage effect from Table 4. The 
interpretation of the carbon savings of -2.3% is straightforward: corn ethanol increases 
carbon emissions relative to gasoline and petroleum by-products by 2.3 percent. Two effects 
cause this result. First, we have shown that corn ethanol fails to replace gasoline one-to-one. 
Instead, the rate of replacement is much lower (19 – 37 percent), meaning that the carbon 
reducing effects of ethanol are difficult to produce when price adjustments are taken into 
account. Second, combustion of ethanol does not produce 100 percent less carbon emissions than 
gasoline combustion and petroleum by-products. In other words; the biofuel policy replaces a 
dirty fuel with a less dirty (but still not “clean”) fuel. 
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Table 5. Actual Carbon Savings of Corn Ethanol Relative to Gasoline and Corresponding By-products (%) *
Tax credit Mandate Mandate & tax credit
Excluding Land Use Change
Most plausible parameters -2.3 0.2 -1.2
Demand for petroleum by-products twice as elastic as demand for fuel 2.6 5.8 4.0
ROW oil demand twice as elastic as oil supply -2.6 -0.1 -1.5
ROW oil supply twice as elastic as oil demand 11.5 16.0 13.5
Inelastic fuel demand 0.7 1.6 1.1
Reversed betas 1.2 4.2 2.5
Including Land Use Change
Most plausible parameters -16.0 -13.5 -14.9
Demand for petroleum by-products twice as elastic as demand for fuel -11.0 -7.8 -9.6
ROW oil demand twice as elastic as oil supply -16.2 -13.8 -15.2
ROW oil supply twice as elastic as oil demand -2.1 2.4 -0.2
Inelastic fuel demand -12.9 -12.0 -12.5
Reversed betas -12.4 -9.4 -11.1
* A negative number means that corn ethanol emits more carbon than gasoline.
Source: calculated
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Notice, however, that global carbon emissions decrease when ethanol is produced due to 
a mandate (first row and second column in Table 5). The reduction is only marginal, however, 
because one GEEG of ethanol reduces only 0.2 percent of carbon emissions relative to gasoline. 
A more significant reduction in relative emissions (16 percent) is achieved under the mandate 
with a very elastic oil supply curve in the ROW (fourth scenario). Nonetheless, corn ethanol does 
not meet the EPA sustainability standard of 20 percent. Because in this scenario we do not even 
consider the land use change effect and corn ethanol still fails the standard, it trivializes the 
controversy over how to measure land use change. 
When emissions from land use change are taken into account, the carbon saving potential 
of corn-ethanol relative to gasoline declines significantly. For example, under the Most plausible 
parameters scenario, corn ethanol emits 13.5 – 16 percent more carbon than gasoline and 
corresponding petroleum by-products. In conclusion, our results suggest that it is very unlikely 
that U.S. corn ethanol meets the 20 percent sustainability standard imposed by the EPA. 
8. Conclusions 
Leakage is a measure of the ineffectiveness of an environmental policy and is frequently 
discussed in the context of combating global climate change. We develop an analytical 
framework to analyze not only leakage in the fuel market due to alternative biofuel policies, 
namely consumption subsidies and mandates (and their combination), but also to determine 
whether a biofuel meets a pre-determined sustainability standard. 
Whether or not consumption of biofuels results in an increase in global greenhouse gas 
emissions depends on two factors. First, the market leakage effect determines the actual rate at 
which a biofuel replaces the fossil fuel. (We have focused here on corn ethanol and gasoline, 
respectively). Second, the emissions savings effect of a biofuel determines how much cleaner the 
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biofuel is relative to the fossil fuel it is assumed to replace. In theory, global GHG emissions can 
decrease due to biofuel policies even if the biofuel does not replace the fossil fuel one-to-one, 
provided that the biofuel has significantly lower GHG emissions than the fossil fuel. 
The international trade framework within which we analyze the biofuel policies gives rise 
to a distinction between domestic and international leakage. Under plausible assumptions, 
domestic leakage, which occurs in the country introducing the biofuels, can be a significant 
factor of total leakage (i.e., domestic and international combined). Because the world gasoline 
price (or equivalently, the crude oil price) declines with all analyzed biofuel policies, 
international leakage is always positive (meaning that one energy-equivalent gallon of ethanol 
replaces less than one gallon of gasoline), and domestic leakage is always positive with a tax 
credit. But domestic leakage with a mandate can be negative (in which case one energy-
equivalent gallon of ethanol replaces more than one gallon of gasoline), making it possible that 
total leakage can be negative with a mandate. We also find that being a relatively smaller country 
in world oil markets does not automatically imply less leakage. 
For the same quantity of ethanol, leakage due to a tax credit is always greater than that 
due to a binding consumption or blend mandate, while the combination of a binding mandate and 
a tax credit produces greater leakage than a mandate alone.  
Our sensitivity analysis results show that one gasoline-energy equivalent gallon of 
ethanol replaces only 0.19 to 0.37 gallons of gasoline and the rest (0.81 to 0.63 gallons, 
respectively) is displaced. We find that U.S. corn ethanol does not meet the EPA’s sustainability 
standard even if the land use change effect is not considered. This makes the recent controversy 
over how to measure land use change inconsequential. 
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The significant fuel market leakage combined with the emissions from land use change 
make the situation even worse: one gallon of ethanol can emit as much as 16 percent more 
carbon than one gallon of gasoline. In one scenario – when oil supply in the rest of the world is 
very elastic relative to U.S. oil demand – we do find that a gasoline-energy equivalent gallon of 
ethanol offers a modest carbon reduction of 2.4 percent relative to gasoline. Thus, our key 
finding is that U.S. corn ethanol does not meet the EPA’s 20 percent sustainability standard. 
The empirical evidence presented in this paper suggests that market leakage from biofuel 
policies is significant. Leakage from biofuel policies is difficult to address in policy design, 
because even the superior (in terms of leakage) mandate does not decrease emissions much due 
to international leakage overriding the potentially negative domestic leakage. Leakage from 
biofuel policies is also a special problem from a policy standpoint because, unlike with leakage 
in a cap and trade policy or REDD scheme, the problem could not always be solved by having all 
countries adopt a biofuel policy. If all countries did coordinate, all leakage would be “autarky” 
leakage (i.e., all domestic) but this will likely result in little emissions savings compared to the 
case where the United States is the only country with the biofuel policy. 
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Appendix 1. Market Leakage due to a Blender’s Tax Credit  
Consider a binding blender’s tax credit ct that determines the ethanol price EP (the tilde sign 
denotes prices expressed in dollars per gallon). The tax credit is a consumption subsidy that is 
paid to the fuel blender for each gallon of ethanol blended with gasoline. Following de Gorter 
and Just (2008) and assuming a zero fuel tax,83 the market price for ethanol equals  
                                                                    E G cP P t                                                         (A1-1) 
where λ denotes miles traveled per gallon of ethanol relative to gasoline and PG denotes the price 
of gasoline. Dividing equation (A1-1) by λ, we express the ethanol market price PE and the tax 
credit tc in dollars per gasoline-equivalent gallon 
                                                                      E G cP P t                                                         (A1-2) 
The intuition behind this relationship is as follows. The blenders compete for the tax credit until 
they bid up the price of ethanol to a level where it exceeds the gasoline price by the full amount 
of the tax credit.   
 We model ethanol and gasoline as perfect substitutes in consumption (adjusted for 
mileage). All ethanol is assumed to be produced and consumed in the Home country (H), while 
consumers in the Foreign country (F) consume only gasoline. The world fuel demand (D) equals 
the world fuel supply (S) 
                                                   H F F G H G F G E ED P D P S P S P S P                            (A1-3) 
where PF, denotes the price of fuel and SE denotes supply of ethanol.  
If the consumption of ethanol is not mandated, and consumers can choose a fuel by the 
mileage the fuel produces, then consumers are willing to buy ethanol only if the price of the fuel 
                                                 
83 Adding a fuel tax to the model would make the formulae more complex with no qualitative change to the results. 
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blend (gasoline and ethanol) PF equals the price of gasoline PG; the latter must equal the ethanol 
market price PE less the blender’s tax credit tc (see equation (A1-2))  
                                                                  F G E cP P P t                                                      (A1-4)                                        
 The system of equations (A1-2) to (A1-4) constitutes the market equilibrium under a 
binding tax credit. Totally differentiating this system, we obtain 
                                               ' ' ' ' '
E G c
H F H F F G E E
F G
dP dP dt
D dP S S D dP S dP
dP dP
 
   

                                (A1-5) 
where the prime (') denotes the derivative of a function with respect to its argument. 
Solving the system (A1-5), we arrive at 
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                                (A1-6) 
This means that the introduction of a tax credit by itself always reduces the world gasoline price 
and domestic fuel price by the same amount; however, the reduction is not as big as the tax credit 
itself. On the other hand, the tax credit always increases the ethanol market price by an amount 
smaller than the change in the tax credit (except if there is no pre-existing tax credit, when the 
increase is equal to the full amount of tax credit). 
 A change in the tax credit changes consumption of fuel in the Home and Foreign country 
and ethanol production as follows: H H F
c F c
dD dD dP
dt dP dt
 ; F F G
c G c
dD dD dP
dt dP dt
 ; E E E
c E c
dS dS dP
dt dP dt
 .  Note 
that H HDH
F F
dD D
dP P
 ; F FDF
G G
dD D
dP P
 and E ESE
E E
dS S
dP P
 , where DH , DF , SE denote fuel demand 
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elasticities in the Home and Foreign country and the (Home) ethanol supply elasticity, 
respectively. 
Market leakage due to the tax credit ML

is defined as a change in world fuel consumption 
divided by the amount of ethanol produced due to the tax credit 
                                       
0 0
0
c c
c
H F
c c
c ct t
M
E
c
c t
dD dD
t t
dt dt
L
dS
t
dt
  

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

                                      (A1-7) 
Note that for tc = 0, we have PF =PG =PE . Substitution of the derivatives in (A1-6) into 
expression (A1-7) yields the final expression for market leakage due to the tax credit 
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    
                              (A1-8) 
where  H H FD D D   and  H H FS S S   denote consumption and production shares, 
respectively, of gasoline in the Home country before production of ethanol.
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Appendix 2. Derivation of Elasticities of Excess Supply and Demand Curves 
At a price PG the Foreign country exports gasoline in the quantity of 
                                                           G F G F GX P S P D P                                                (A2-1) 
Differentiating both sides of (A2-1) with respect to the price and manipulating, we obtain 
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where ES denotes the elasticity of excess supply. 
Multiplying both the numerator and the denominator of (A2-2) by
1
H FD D
, which is 
also equal to
1
H FS S
, we obtain 
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                                              (A2-3) 
where the definition of  and is the same as in Appendix 1. Similarly, for the excess demand 
curve we obtain 
                                                      
ED DH SH
 
  
   
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 
                                             (A2-4) 
Therefore, a small importer faces a perfectly elastic excess supply curve when SF  ; a 
small exporter faces a perfectly elastic excess demand curve when DH   ; and irrespective 
of the trade position, a small country faces a perfectly elastic trade curve whenever    (the 
case analyzed in the paper).                                                    
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Appendix 3. Market Leakage due to a Consumption Mandate 
We specify here a full model of a consumption mandate combined with a tax credit. The results 
for a mandate alone are readily obtained by setting tc = 0. All quantities and prices are measured 
in gasoline equivalents. The world fuel market equilibrium with a binding consumption mandate 
and a blenders’ tax credit (both in the Home country) is given by 
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                               (A3-1) 
where E represents the mandated quantity of ethanol. The remaining notation is the same as in 
Appendix 1. The first two equations in (A3-1) are self-explanatory; the third represents an 
equilibrium condition where the blender equilibrates his marginal cost with the market fuel price. 
The marginal cost is given by a weighted average of ethanol and gasoline prices where the 
weights are formed by the share of the mandated quantity of ethanol in the endogenous amount 
of fuel. 
 Totally differentiating the system (A3-1), we obtain                                              
                  
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where the prime (') denotes the derivative of a function with respect to its argument. 
 Solving the system (A3-2), we arrive at 
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           and 
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The first set of derivatives (A3-1) reveals that the ethanol market price increases when 
the consumption mandate increases, while the world price of gasoline decreases. A change in the 
mandate has an ambiguous impact on the final fuel price in the Home country. The change in the 
Home country fuel price heavily depends on supply and demand elasticities in both countries, as 
well as on gasoline consumption and production shares in both countries. 
The second set of derivatives(A3-4) posits that, with a pre-existing binding consumption 
mandate,  a change in the tax credit has no effect on the ethanol market price (because this price 
is determined by the intersection of the ethanol supply curve and the perfectly inelastic demand 
for ethanol by blenders, which correspond to the mandate level). An increase in the tax credit 
does, however, increase the gasoline price. This happens because the tax credit acts as a 
consumption subsidy, thus lowering the fuel price (see the last derivative in (A3-4)) which 
translates into higher fuel consumption in the Home country. Since the quantity of ethanol is 
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fixed by the mandate, the additional fuel comes in the form of gasoline; the increase in gasoline 
consumption leads to an increase in the gasoline price. 
Market leakage due to a consumption mandate alone, denoted by ML

, is given by the 
change in global fuel consumption (due to a consumption ethanol mandate) divided by the 
mandated level of ethanol. It can be expressed as 
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 Evaluating the derivatives in (A3-3) at 0E  and tc = 0 and substituting then into (A3-5), 
after some manipulations we arrive at the expression for the market leakage due to a 
consumption mandate 
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where E GP P  denotes the ratio of the intercept of the ethanol supply curve and the gasoline 
price in the absence of the mandate; the rest of the notation is the same as in Appendix 1.
  Finally, from the system (A3-2) it follows that a change in the gasoline price when both 
the mandate and tax credit are changed simultaneously is given by   
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For Result 3, we need to determine the sign of (A3-7) when both policies are introduced 
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Appendix 4. Model for a Blend Mandate 
The world fuel market equilibrium with a binding blend mandate α and a blender’s tax credit tc 
in the Home country is given by 
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where the notation is the same as in Appendix 1. The first equation in (A4-1) posits that the 
quantity of ethanol produced is equal to the mandated share of total fuel consumption in the 
Home country; the second equation represents the world fuel equilibrium; the third equation 
equilibrates the fuel market price with the blender’s marginal cost. 
 Totally differentiating the system (A4-1) and solving it, we obtain  
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The first set of derivatives (A4-2) reveals that gasoline price always decreases with an 
increase in the blend mandate, but the effect of such an increase on fuel and ethanol prices is 
ambiguous. The ambiguity of the effect of a change in the blend on the ethanol price occurs 
because the ethanol price is linked to the fuel price through the first equation in (A4-1). 
The intuition for the signs of the first two derivatives in (A4-3) is the same as for the 
consumption mandate. In addition, the ethanol price increases with an increase in the tax credit 
because the tax credit lowers the fuel price which leads to higher fuel consumption and hence 
higher ethanol production. Increased ethanol production can only be achieved through a higher 
market price of the biofuel. 
Finally, it follows that a change in the gasoline price when both the mandate and tax 
credit are changed simultaneously is given by  
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For Result 4, we need to determine the sign of (A4-4) when both policies are introduced 
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Appendix 5. Data Used to Calibrate the Model
Variable/parameter Symbol Value Unit Source
PARAMETERS
Miles per gallon of ethanol relative to gasoline λ 0.69 Cui et al. (2011)
Ethanol produced from one bushel of corn β 2.80 gallon/bushel Eidman (2007)
DDGS production coefficient 
a γ 17/56 Eidman (2007)
DDGS relative price to corn r 0.86 r = (PC*56)/(PDDGS*2000)
Gasoline production coefficient βG 21.48 gallon/barrel βG = G/Q
H
O
Petroleum by-product production coefficient βB 23.29 GEEG/barrel 
b βB = 42*1.066 - βG
Price and quantity link between corn and ethanol market k 2.61 GEEG/bushel k = λβ/(1-rγ)
Ratio of additives to gasoline K 0.09 K = A/G
Ethanol processing cost c
E
0 1.36 $/GEEG c
E
0 = PE + sE/λ - PC/k
Gasoline processing cost c
G
0 0.83 $/GEEG c
G
0 = PG + βBPB/β1 - PO/βG
Share of domestic consumption of DDGS ω 0.81 Hoffman and Baker (2011)
POLICY VARIABLES
Blend mandate 
c α 0.06 α = E/F
Ethanol tax credit tc 0.50 $/gallon tc = $0.45/gal. + $0.048/gal. 
d
Ethanol production subsidy sE 0.14 $/gallon Assumed to be the same as in 2008 
e
Corn production subsidy sC 0.17 $/bushel Environmental Working Group
 f
Fuel tax t 0.49 $/gallon American Petroleum Institute 
g
Tax on petroleum by-products tB 0.16 $/gallon tB = 0.33*t
PRICES
Oil price PO 61.00 $/barrel Cui et al. (2011)
Gasoline price PG 1.76 $/gallon
Gasoline average rack price in 
Omaha, Nebraska 
h
Ethanol market price (volumetric) Pe 1.79 $/gallon
Ethanol average rack price in Omaha, 
Nebraska 
h
Ethanol market price (energy) PE 2.59 $/GEEG PE = Pe/λ
Ethanol producer price P
P
E 2.79 $/GEEG P
P
E = PE + sE/λ
Fuel price P
F 2.27 $/GEEG PF = α*(PE + t/λ + tc/λ) + (1-α)*(PG + t)
Market price of petroleum by-products PB 1.76 $/GEEG Cui et al. (2011)
Consumer price of petroleum by-products P
C
B 1.92 $/GEEG P
C
B = PB + tB
Corn market price PC 3.75 $/bushel USDA 
i
Corn producer price P
P
C 3.92 $/bushel P
P
C = PC + sC
DDGS price PDDGS 114.38 $/ton USDA
 j
Notes:
a 
DDGS = Dried distillers grains with solubles
b 
GEEG = Gasoline-energy equivalent gallon
c 
The blend mandate is expressed in energy terms.
d 
$0.45/gallon is the federal component of the tax credit; the $0.048/gallon is the average state tax credit reported by Koplow (2009).
e
 Koplow (2009) estimates the U.S. ethanol production subsidies in 2008 to be $1.356 billion. Ethanol production in 2008 reached
  9.6579 billion gallons (EIA).
f
 http://farm.ewg.org/progdetail.php?fips=00000&progcode=corn (For details on the calculation of the corn subsidy, 
  see the text of the paper).
g
 http://www.api.org/statistics/fueltaxes/upload/gasoline-diesel-summary.pdf (average for 2009)
h
 http://www.neo.ne.gov/statshtml/66.html
i
 http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/feed-grains-database/feed-grains-yearbook-tables.aspx
j
 http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/feed-grains-database/feed-grains-yearbook-tables.aspx#26818
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Appendix 5. Data Used to Calibrate the Model (continued)
Variable/parameter Symbol Value Unit Source
QUANTITIES
World oil production S
W
O 26.38 billion barrels EIA 
k
Domestic oil supply S
H
O 1.99 billion barrels EIA 
l
Oil supply in the Rest of the world S
F
O 24.40 billion barrels S
F
O = S
W
O - S
H
O
Oil consumption in the Rest of the world D
F
O 21.12 billion barrels D
F
O = S
W
O - S
H
O - S
M
O
U.S. oil imports S
M
O 3.27 billion barrels EIA 
l
Total oil available in the United States Q
H
O 5.26 billion barrels Q
H
O = S
H
O + S
M
O
Quantity of petroleum by-products QB 122.48 billion GEEGs QB = βBQ
H
O
Consumption of petroleum by-products CB 122.48 billion GEEGs CB = QB
Fuel demand (volumetric) f 134.75 billion gallons EIA 
l
Fuel demand (energy) F 131.34 billion GEEGs F = G + A + E
Ethanol consumption (volumetric) e 11.04 billion gallons EIA 
l, m
Ethanol consumption (energy) E 7.63 billion GEEGs E = λe
Gasoline supply G 112.98 billion gallons G = f - A - e
Imports of fuel additives A 10.73 billion gallons EIA 
l
Domestic corn supply S
H
C 13.09 billion bushels Cui et al. (2011)
Domestic yellow corn demand as food/feed D
H
C 7.29 billion bushels D
H
C  = S
H
C - Q'C - D
F
C
Foreign yellow corn import demand D
F
C 1.86 billion bushels Cui et al. (2011)
Corn used in ethanol production (initial) 
n QC 2.92 billion bushels QC = E/k
Corn used in ethanol production (equilibrium) 
o Q'C 3.94 billion bushels Q'C = QC/(1-rγ)
DDGS supply DDGS 1.02 billion bushels DDGS = rγQ'C
Quantity of domestic DDGS consumption DDGS
H 0.83 billion bushels DDGS
H 
= ω*DDGS
Quantity of DDGS exports DDGS
F 0.19 billion bushels DDGS
F 
= (1-ω)*DDGS
U.S. domestic consumption of non-ethanol corn-equivalent D'HC 8.12 billion bushels D'
H
C = D
H
C + DDGS
H
U.S. exports of corn equivalent D'FC 2.06 billion bushels D'
F
C = D
F
C + DDGS
F
ELASTICITIES
Domestic supply elasticity of oil η
H
SO 0.20 Cui et al. (2011)
Import supply elasticity of oil η
M
SO 3.00 Cui et al. (2011)
Domestic supply elasticity of corn η
H
SC 0.23 Gardner (2007)
Domestic demand elasticity of corn η
H
DC -0.20 Cui et al. (2011)
Foreign demand elasticity of corn η
F
DC -1.50 Cui et al. (2011)
Domestic demand elasticity of fuel η
H
DF -0.26 Hamilton (2009)
Domestic demand elasticity of petroleum by-products η
H
DB -0.26 Assumed to be the same as η
H
DF
ROW oil supply elasticity η
F
SO 0.15 Assumed
Demand elasticity of oil in the Rest of the world η
F
DO -0.29 η
F
DO = (S
M
O/D
F
O)*(η
F
SO*(S
F
O/S
M
O)-η
M
SO)
Notes:
k
 http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=57&aid=1&cid=ww,&syid=2009&eyid=2009&unit=TBPD
l
 http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/query/
m
 Ethanol consumption is assumed to be equal to ethanol production.
n
 This quantity of corn does take into account the market effects of DDGS.
o
 This quantity of corn takes into account the market effects of DDGS.
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